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Introduction1 
All kingdoms, empires and governments have needed to raise taxes in order to 
function. However, as well as raising revenue for their survival and the good of their 
citizens, along with other—less noble—purposes, states can use taxes to achieve 
justice. Distributive justice is achieved by taking the correct amount of tax from the 
fortunate and providing the appropriate transfers to the less-fortunate. I believe that 
the government should show equal concern to all its citizens, and so the central 
question for this thesis is to ask; what taxation system will achieve distributive justice 
by treating all members of society as equals? 
In order to motivate and answer the question above I will begin by presenting my 
methodological assumption, and the first of my starting assumptions. The 
methodological assumption is that taxation is a matter of political morality; that we 
need moral arguments to determine how benefits and burdens should be shared. I take 
this issue to be un-contentious. Of course, many people who write on taxation may not 
think they are approaching it with a conception of political morality, such as those who 
use economic methodologies. However, such methodologies rest on assumptions 
about what outcomes are important regarding taxation, and the way in which these 
good and bad outcomes should be maximised and minimized. Writing that makes 
judgments on taxation policy is therefore dependent upon a particular—if unstated—
political morality.2 Much work on taxation is economistic, based on a purportedly 
dispassionate analysis of welfare or preference satisfaction.3 The prominent 
                                                        
1
 References in this thesis are of the Oxford footnote style, with the exception of internal references 
within the thesis, which will refer by section, page, or footnote number. Where ibid. appears this will 
refer to the previously listed external reference, and never to the thesis itself even if an internal 
reference occurs in between. 
2
 The exception being descriptions as provided by positive economics, see Graham Bannock, R. E. 
Baxter, and Evan Davis, The Penguin Dictionary of Economics (London; New York: Penguin Books, 
2003) at 302. 
3
 For examples, see pretty much any public economics, public finance or tax law journal. Economists 
make reference to Rawls in their work. However, when doing so they refer to a “Rawlsian” position 
in which a “social welfare function” is calculated which seeks to maximise the position of the worst-
10 
 
approaches of this kind are optimal taxation,4 public economics,5 or tax 
constitutionalism.6 These approaches can either be seen as non-normative 
methodologies or as determining the normatively correct outcome. If the former then 
it is necessary to insert a normative theory into the methodology, in which case the 
normative aspect is external and needs to be provided. However, if the approaches are 
supposed to determine normative conclusions then they clearly fail since they do not 
provide any convincing motivations for their normative conclusions.7 This work can 
therefore be contrasted to the large bulk of academic writing on taxation.  
                                                                                                                                                            
off; Christopher Heady, 'Optimal Taxation as a Guide to Tax Policy: A Survey', Fiscal Studies, 14/1 
(1993), 15-36 at 20. Phelps attempted to specify Rawls’ view in economic terms, Edmund S. Phelps, 
'Taxation of Wage Income for Economic Justice', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87/3 (1973), 
331-54. However, as will become clear in section 1.5, Rawls is concerned with primary goods, not a 
social welfare measure based upon welfare.  
4
 Following James A. Mirrlees, 'An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation', The 
Review of Economic Studies, 38/2 (1971), 175-208. I will mention two problems with this approach at 
this stage. The first is that it is inherently welfare-based, which is problematic for reasons that I 
discuss in sections 2.1-2.6. The second is that it assumes that endowment taxation is an ideal, which 
is clearly an issue that needs to be determined from a normative perspective; see section 3.9 and 
Linda Sugin, 'A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model', Tax Law Review, 64 (2011), 229-
81. 
5
 This attempts to judge the equity of the tax system, with a distinction between horizontal and 
vertical equity; Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959) at 
160. I conceive this as proposing that everyone in society should be positioned on an imaginary 
ladder, where each should be on the correct rung in relation to others. The problem with this view is 
that it is necessary to specify what relationship each person should have to others on the ladder, 
something that the approach has to assume rather than provide. For criticism of the equity 
approach, which is usually linked to the idea of ‘ability to pay,’ as well as many other economistic 
approaches to taxation see Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and 
Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2002). 
6
 Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax : Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal 
Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). These authors are concerned that 
governments do not turn into revenue and spending maximising “Leviathans,” Brennan and 
Buchanan, The Power to Tax  at Ch 2. They argue that it is necessary to create constitutional 
constraints on governments to stop this from happening, since other constraints—such as electoral 
choice—may not be sufficient to stop “over-taxation.” This approach is normative in that it seeks to 
avoid exploitation of the taxpayer, and utilises the idea of a veil of ignorance taken from Rawls, but 
only applied to the constitution. I agree that governments need to be restricted by some form of 
constitution and independent judiciary, but I disagree that it is necessary to set such strict limits on 
tax policy in order to avoid the problem of government corruption. 
7
 The ideal outcomes are generally assumed, such as that the government should provide resources 
or welfare to the worst-off to a certain (unspecified) degree. The appropriate level of redistribution 
are then either assumed without argument or left to governments or electorates to decide. One 
point in favour of the optimal taxation approach and tax constitutionalism is that they may set limits 
on what policies are practically sensible, since exceeding the stated limits would be self-defeating. 
This is because there would be no additional revenue raised, or that the revenue would be 
11 
 
The first starting assumption8 is that the rules of society should be constituted so as to 
treat citizens as equals, the most common approach in political philosophy.9 Some 
political philosophers reject egalitarianism, for example because it is only important 
that people have enough,10 because there are pre-political rights,11 or because it is 
more important to maximise.12 However, I take it as foundational that government 
should show equal concern to all.13 I do not have space to discuss these non-egalitarian 
views in more detail as I need to leave room for discussion among the many views that 
follow from egalitarianism. The focus of this work is to determine the best institutional 
interpretation of my starting assumptions.  
                                                                                                                                                            
counterbalanced by larger losses to the worst-off elsewhere. To this extent, I would suggest that 
such considerations will be useful to normative approaches such as the one I present here. 
8
 I will add two others in section 1.1. 
9
 Kymlicka is a prominent proponent of the idea that all attractive political philosophies have an 
egalitarian basis; Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, 2002) at 3. 
Examples of theories regarding which there is argument about their egalitarian status include 
prioritarianism, libertarianism (footnote 11) and utilitarianism (footnote 12). Prioritarianism 
suggests that priority should be given to the worst-off, but not necessarily to ensure equality. It is 
therefore a view with structural similarities to the so-called “Rawlsian” economic approach 
described in footnote 3; see Derek Parfit, 'Equality or Priority?', in Matthew Clayton and Andrew 
Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000), 81-125, Derek Parfit, 'Equality 
and Priority', Ratio, 10/3 (1997), 202-21, Derek Parfit, 'Another Defence of the Priority View', 
Utilitas, 24/Special Issue 03 (2012), 399-440. The prioritarian approach can be seen as a mixture of 
ex post equality and maximisation. I will discuss ex post equality in chapters three and four.  
10
 This view is referred to as sufficientarianism, which takes it that government needs only to ensure 
that its citizens have enough of the goods that are taken to matter; Harry Frankfurt, 'Equality as a 
Moral Ideal', Ethics, 98/1 (1987), 21-43, Liam Shields, 'The Prospects for Sufficientarianism', Utilitas, 
24/01 (2012), 101-17. Shields’ approach is pluralist, and so leaves space for a degree of 
egalitarianism, although this would not be foundational. 
11
 Philosophical or Kantian libertarianism is the view that property rights are foundational to political 
morality, and should not be violated; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1974). For criticism of libertarianism see Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2000) at 110-2, Ronald Dworkin, 'Comment on Narveson: In Defense of 
Equality', Social Philosophy and Policy, 1/01 (1983), 24-40, J. W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1996), G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), Samuel Freeman, 'Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal 
View', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 30/2 (2001), 105-51. 
12
 Utilitarianism is the view that utility (or alternatively “happiness” or “felicity”) should be 
maximized; Jeremy Bentham, Selected Writings on Utilitarianism (Ware, Herts.: Wordsworth, 2000). 
For criticism of utilitarianism, the simplest expression of which would be to say that it does not 
respect the separateness of persons, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). See also footnote 179, Amartya Sen, 'Utilitarianism and Welfarism', 
The Journal of Philosophy, 76/9 (1979), 463-89. 
13
 Nor should the government focus its efforts on bringing about some particular good outcome, 
such as military, artistic or sporting excellence. This violates both the principle of equal concern and 
the additional starting assumption of anti-perfectionism that I will explain in section 1.1.  
12 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, but can be understood as tripartite. The first part 
presents further starting assumptions and argues that Ronald Dworkin’s equality of 
resources is the most attractive approach to distributive justice given those 
assumptions. Equality of resources is the idea that people are treated as equals if they 
begin their lives in a community with equal resources, measured according the 
valuation that each places on those resources. This is achieved through the idea of 
envy-freeness; that no-one should envy the initial resources available to another. Envy-
freeness is taken to apply at an initial point in time, after which people are able to 
transact with their resources as they wish. It can therefore be acceptable for one 
person to envy the resources of another at a later point. Where resources are not 
initially available for redistribution, it is still possible to determine external resource 
transfers to achieve equality. However, rather than insisting upon ex post equality, 
Dworkin proposes a hypothetical insurance scheme to determine how much to transfer 
from the fortunate to the unfortunate. This is a scheme whereby transfers are made in 
accordance with an insurance deal that people would make from a hypothetically equal 
position where they do not know if they are fortunate or not. In order to justify my 
choice of resource egalitarianism, I consider and dismiss alternative theories.  
In the second part I consider resource-based responses to bad market luck and defend 
the hypothetical insurance approach. This is the idea that to consider the justice of the 
tax system we should ask what sort of taxes people would favour if they were choosing 
an insurance scheme in a position of hypothetical equality where they do not know 
how fortunate they are in their social background or market talents. The final three 
chapters specify how to apply the hypothetical insurance approach and then elaborate 
and defend the practical implications on benefit and tax policies. I argue that a tax 
system which would calculate very progressive tax-rates14 on the basis of the average-
                                                        
14
 The definition of progressive taxation is that the average tax rate rises as the tax-base rises, which 
can also be explained as the marginal rate of tax being higher than the average rate of tax at any 
13 
 
hourly-lifetime-comprehensive-income of members of society would be most attractive 
to hypothetical insurers. This tax revenue would be used, in part, to fund a negative-
rated hourly income tax—a form of earning subsidy—for those with low lifetime-
average earnings, and a programme providing work to the unemployed.  
I have mentioned that the approach I take here differs from the vast majority of the 
literature on taxation. In the first four chapters of the thesis I defend a Dworkinian, 
resource egalitarian, approach as the most attractive anti-perfectionist egalitarian 
approach. As I take an anti-perfectionist position, the view here differs from that of 
Dworkin, who bases resource egalitarianism on his view of the truth about the good 
life.15 Despite this difference, I show how resource egalitarianism is the most attractive 
interpretation of the assumptions I lay out at the start of Chapter One. Unfortunately, 
the advantages of resource egalitarianism have often been misunderstood, and I 
provide a comprehensive statement and defence of the position. In order to do this, I 
consider it against many rival positions and respond to numerous criticisms of the 
approach. Arguing for equality of resources from the starting assumptions set out here 
therefore provides a new extended defence of resource egalitarianism. 
From his first presentation of the view, Dworkin made clear that resource 
egalitarianism had tax implications.16 He concluded that there should be a ‘graduated 
income tax’17 with benefits paid to those who are involuntarily unemployed and those 
who are disabled.18 The degree of taxation on workers and payments to the 
unemployed are determined by the hypothetical insurance decisions that individuals 
would make from a position of equality. Dworkin also uses this approach to consider 
                                                                                                                                                            
given point on the tax-base, James A. Mirrlees and IFS, Tax by Design : The Mirrlees Review (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 24.  
15
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at Ch 6, Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). 
16
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 91-109. This is from the second chapter of Sovereign Virtue, which is 
a reproduction of Ronald Dworkin, 'What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources', Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 10/4 (1981), 283-345. 
17
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 102. 
18
 Dworkin presented developments of his proposals in Ibid.  at chs 8 and 9. 
14 
 
how much people would wish to transfer from those who inherit large amounts of 
resources to those who do not. Dworkin therefore treats employment and social luck 
as independent hypothetical insurance matters with separate—and hypothecated—tax 
implications. In chapter five I criticise Dworkin’s assumptions and conclusions regarding 
taxation and present a rival holistic and policy-focused interpretation of the 
hypothetical insurance approach. This combines all the hypothetical insurance 
decisions relating to taxation and benefits into one procedure, and I explain its 
superiority to Dworkin’s hypothecated, insurance-based, approach.  
In the final two chapters I argue that a lifetime hourly-averaging form of tax calculation 
would be attractive to insurers both as a form of assistance to the less fortunate 
(Chapter Six) and as a tax on the more fortunate (Chapter Seven). The final two 
chapters therefore contain the first normative arguments for this novel form of tax 
calculation. In the final two chapters I also argue for specific types of unemployment 
policy (a guaranteed work programme) and a specific tax-base (acquired income). The 
thesis therefore draws much more detailed and explicit policy conclusions than have 
been drawn before from resource egalitarianism.  
0.1 Methods and restrictions 
As this is a work of political morality, I utilise the usual methods of political philosophy. 
This involves the development of theories and principles and their interpretation.19 
These are developed as much as possible by testing them against moral intuitions in 
hypothetical situations. This is an exercise in ideal theory, about which some have 
expressed reservations.20 I will therefore briefly defend the approach taken here 
against claims that this idealisation is problematic. The ideal/non-ideal distinction has 
                                                        
19
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition  at 42-5, Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification : 
Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at Part 
I. Dworkin emphasises the importance of interpretation in Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs  at Chs 7 
& 8. 
20
 Such as Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (London; New York: Allen Lane, 2009). 
15 
 
roots in Rawls’ work, though Sen presents a different cut between ideal and non-ideal 
theorising. One common distinction is that ideal theory abstracts from the real world 
and rests on facts or assumptions that are not necessarily true, such as that people will 
comply with just rules. Non-ideal theory, by contrast, applies where it is not possible to 
reach the ideally just situation and the question for theory is therefore how to improve 
justice where this ideal is unattainable.  
Before discussing the ideal/non-ideal approaches further I will distinguish the useful 
notion of a “theory of ideals.” This is a theory that attempts to determine what matters 
normatively, independently of implementation. An example would be a discussion of 
the abstract values of equality and welfare and the ideal trade-offs between them. In 
these terms, equality of resources—as I have presented it—has its ideal that the 
government treats all members of society with equal concern when it allows them to 
choose what matters to them from a position of equality.  
In contrast, the ideal/non-ideal debate proceeds on the assumption that the theory in 
question is considering how to instantiate social arrangements that will bring about 
justice in either an ideal or non-ideal setting. However, as I have indicated above, there 
are many interpretations of what counts as ideal and non-ideal. Indeed, writers have 
picked out several issues on which their theory is ideal or non-ideal. It is therefore 
useful to consider several dimensions, each of which contains a continuum of 
idealisation. To illustrate, take the issue of compliance with just rules and institutions. 
At one extreme, when theorising we could assume that people will not comply with 
even just rules, while at the other extreme we could assume that people would comply 
perfectly with a just scheme even if it would hurt their interests and they could 
costlessly get away with not doing so. Philosophers may follow Rawls and place a line 
on this continuum and suggest that one side of the line represents ideal theory and the 
other non-ideal theory. However, the issue remains on a continuum, and others could 
cut the issue differently. Given the several dimensions involved, and the different types 
of issue about which philosophers theorize, it is perfectly sensible to set different 
16 
 
idealising conditions depending upon the issue at hand. As such, what matters for this 
work is the appropriate level of idealisation for taxation and benefit policy.  
Critics of ideal theory, then, are those who think that the inclusion of idealising 
assumptions renders such theories irrelevant. However, philosophers will disagree 
about which assumptions are realistic and which not. All parties, therefore, wish to 
show that they are in the sensible-middle-ground, while their opponents are 
impractically overly-idealising or pessimistically under-idealising. As will become clear, 
the theory I utilise here, equality of resources, does involve an initially idealised 
situation—Dworkin’s previously unpopulated island. However, it then moves quickly to 
more realistic ground. Furthermore, the hypothetical insurance approach internalises 
all practical concerns, allowing individuals to make their insurance choices with full 
knowledge of the practical limitations of redistributive schemes. As the approach is 
realistic,21 it is an unproblematic ideal theory for distributive justice policy.22 
Finally, it is worth noting two restrictions on the scope of the thesis. Firstly, it does not 
attempt to answer all questions relating to taxation and expenditure, as discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5. Many philosophical issues are bracketed, such as that of 
how to spend resources on health and education.23 Furthermore, the just levels of 
                                                        
21
 By this I mean that practical issues, including potential non-compliance by a statistical minority of 
other members of society, are accounted for and internalised into the approach I take. 
22
 Hamlin argues that taxation is a non-ideal issue in (a draft version of) Alan Hamlin, 'What Political 
Philosophy Should Learn from Economics About Taxation', in Martin O’Neill and Shepley Orr (eds.), 
Taxation and Political Philosophy (Oxford: OUP, forthcoming). He suggests that since taxation is 
coercive it has nothing to do with an ideal setting. However, if we view taxation as part of the 
institutional rules and laws of the society it seems to be clearly within the remit of ideal-theory 
justice. It is not clear whether he means that taxation is not part of a “theory of the ideals” (which 
might be true) here or ideal theory (about which it is not true), but as I have said I argue that my 
position is perfectly reasonable since it internalises the practical issues such as taxpayer responses 
to tax policies. 
23
 For a sample of literature on health care costs see Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), Norman Daniels, Just Health : Meeting Health Needs Fairly 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Allen E. Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice : 
Genetics and Justice (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Dworkin, 
Sovereign Virtue  at Ch 8, Ronald Dworkin, 'Justice in the Distribution of Health Care', in Matthew 
Clayton and Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000). For a 
sample of literature on the costs of childhood and education see Paula England and Nancy Folbre, 
17 
 
some specific types of taxation, such as environmental and sin taxes, are not covered 
by this thesis, for the sake of simplicity and brevity. I follow Rawls in assuming a single-
country world, focusing on what is required for domestic justice.24 This enables me to 
focus on the issue of what justice demands and not its scope, enabling me to bracket 
the important but sizable debates regarding global and international justice.25 
0.2 Thesis structure 
I will now describe the thesis structure in more detail. The first chapter presents the 
starting assumptions, where I add the principles of anti-perfectionism and special 
responsibility to the egalitarian assumption described above. I then explain how 
Dworkin’s equality of resources is an attractive attempt to apply these assumptions to 
distributive justice. In the remainder of the chapter, I compare equality of resources 
favourably to the rival resource-based approach to justice taken by Rawls. I also 
consider criticisms of the use of the market in resource egalitarianism by Samuel 
Freeman and Joseph Heath.  
                                                                                                                                                            
'Who Should Pay for the Kids?', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 563 
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In the second chapter I consider two prominent rival views in which the currency of 
justice is not resource-based. The first alternative currency is that of responsibility-
sensitive welfare or a welfare-and-resource hybrid, which its proponents argue to offer 
the advantages of equality of resources without the need to ignore welfare inequality. 
In response to this, I emphasise that by taking the first-person perspective on 
inequality, equality of resources avoids the need to impose any costs on individuals on 
the basis of values they do not hold, including values about welfare. The second 
alternative currency is that of capabilities. As with the previous alternative, the 
capability approach is presented as providing the benefits of equality of resources 
while offering more in addition. I argue that, with regard to taxation policy at least, the 
capability approach is indeterminate if it is specified in such a way as to avoid the 
problem that plagues the welfarist approach.  
Chapter three considers the nature of bad market luck and possible responses to it that 
rival the hypothetical insurance approach. I explain the nature of bad market luck and 
how it can result in reduced income, reduced leisure, or both. I then consider and 
reject seven resource-based schemes that would compensate people for bad market 
luck. These are an equal-income scheme, a no-job-envy scheme, mimicking a talent-
equal world, labour-forcing, talent-auctioning, endowment-taxing, and an Egalitarian 
Subsidy Scheme. In Chapter four I present Dworkin’s ex ante hypothetical insurance 
solution to compensation for bad market luck, and explain how it differs from ex post 
schemes. I then consider various challenges to the ex ante approach, beginning with 
the challenge from Michael Otsuka. Next, I consider and reject outcome-based ex post 
views, and the actual-envy-freeness approach. Finally, I clarify the ex ante position with 
regard to two challenges. The first is the extent to which the approach is personalised 
or universal. I show that the position is personalised but that it justifiable to impose an 
average-based policy on everyone. The second challenge is that hypothetical insurance 
will replicate equality of welfare, which may be true but only if welfare is understood in 
an unusual and unobjectionable way. 
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Having defended the ex ante resource egalitarian approach to distributive justice, I 
apply the hypothetical insurance approach in the remaining chapters. In Chapter five I 
present and defend a holistic interpretation of the hypothetical insurance approach, 
challenging Dworkin’s application of the hypothetical insurance approach to taxation. I 
then answer several possible challenges to my interpretation of the approach, some of 
which also serve to explain my conception further. In Chapter six I consider the choices 
that hypothetical insurers would make regarding institutions designed to assist those 
with bad market luck. I present a set of policies to assist the unemployed and those 
with low-pay, and then defend these against prominent alternative policies. The 
alternative policies for the unemployed are to impose greater or fewer conditions on 
the receipt of unemployment benefits, while the alternative policies for the low-paid 
are the minimum wage and alternative forms of wage subsidy. The preferred policy for 
improving the position of the low-paid is an original proposal, and is therefore 
explained in this chapter.26  
In the final chapter I consider the types and rates of taxation that would be chosen by 
hypothetical insurers. It begins with a discussion of tax-bases, concluding that 
hypothetical insurers would choose a comprehensive “acquired-income” tax-base. I 
then consider the most attractive form of tax calculation, and find that a lifetime 
hourly-averaging approach with highly progressive tax-rates would be the most 
attractive for insurers. Finally I anticipate some possible objections to this policy, such 
as that it enslaves the talented or those I refer to as leisure-lovers.  
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 Resource Equality Chapter 1
 
There is much disagreement regarding what form of taxation is the most just. Many 
people—including political philosophers—think that there should be some form or 
forms of taxation. But how should the form and degree of taxation be determined? Are 
those who lack marketable talents or wealthy families entitled to some form of 
compensation, and if so, how much? These questions appear to be separate but in fact 
they are intrinsically linked, since tax revenues would fund the compensation for the 
less fortunate. In this thesis I will attempt to answer these questions by considering 
what regime of taxation and spending will treat people as equals. 
In this chapter and the next I will argue that equality of resources provides the best 
approach to distributive justice—and therefore the design of tax systems—as it 
specifies the appropriate form and levels of taxation and spending by government. 
After elaborating the main features of resource egalitarianism,27 I will consider two 
types of rival view, which can be distinguished according to their preferred metric for 
distributive justice. The metric of justice is the focus of judgments about the justice and 
injustice of the distribution of resources; for example in accordance to the material 
goods or positive mental states of the members of society. This first chapter responds 
to criticisms that agree that resources are the correct metric for judgments about 
justice, but disagree that Dworkin’s conception of equality of resources is the most 
attractive resourcist approach. The second type of criticism is that resources are not 
the correct metric of distributive justice. In chapter two I respond to rival views that 
propose welfare or capabilities as the focus of distributive considerations.  
A government that fails to treat its members with equal concern is unjust and might be 
illegitimate. I will focus in this work on the issue of justice, since a just government is 
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 I will use this term interchangeably with equality of resources. However, I will consider other 
resource-focused forms of egalitarianism in this chapter and chapter three. 
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also a legitimate one.28 I will begin this chapter by presenting the starting assumptions 
for the argument (section 1.1). These are that the state should show equal concern for 
all members, that the state should be anti-perfectionist, and that it should 
acknowledge the responsibilities of individuals. In sections 1.2-1.4 I will present 
equality of resources as the theory of justice that best fits these starting assumptions. 
The remainder of the first chapter and the second will consider resourcist challenges to 
this position—resourcist in Chapter One and non-resourcist challenges in Chapter Two.  
The first resourcist rival is John Rawls’ theory of justice (section 1.5), which I will argue 
in section 1.6 is unnecessarily insensitive to the ambitions that people have. In section 
1.7 I will consider the Rawlsian criticism of Dworkin’s use of the market articulated by 
Samuel Freeman. Sticking to the issue of the role of the market in equality of resources, 
I will argue in section 1.8 against Joseph Heath’s anti-market resource egalitarian 
proposal. Freeman and Heath both overlook the importance of the role of true 
opportunity costs in equality of resources in their discussions, and fail to produce a 
more plausible alternative.  
1.1 Starting assumptions  
I will begin by stating the principles that underlie the arguments that follow. These are 
the principles of equal concern, anti-perfectionism, and special responsibility.29 While I 
assume that equal concern is the primary principle, I think it is possible to meet all 
principles simultaneously and that there is no conflict between them. 
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 A legitimate government is one that aims at the ideal of justice, to treat its citizens as equals and 
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obligation to unjust but legitimate governments; Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs  at 321-2. For 
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Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) at 135-6, Ronald Dworkin, Is 
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Equal concern: The first starting assumption is the principle that the basic institutions of 
society should treat all members with equal concern.30 That is to say that the 
institutions should be designed with the ideal that the lives of all individuals matter and 
should go well. Furthermore, the institutions should show no prejudice to any 
particular individual or group of individuals within the society. All members of a society 
should have their interests respected by the institutions of the government and the 
rules of society, and to an equal degree.  
It is possible that several different institutional arrangements could meet this principle. 
However, the principle would clearly exclude many social structures and political 
philosophies. For example, feudal institutions are unacceptable to the extent that they 
give priority to the first born males of monarchs and lords and therefore do not show 
equal concern to all members of society. It excludes political philosophies that rest 
upon the assumption that government should consist of, or exist to benefit, a particular 
ethnic group or economic class. The interpretation of concern is obviously crucial here, 
and I clarify this with the second principle.  
Anti-perfectionism:31 This is the view that the government should not attempt to 
impose any particular interpretation of the good life on its members, or to stop its 
members from pursuing their own interpretation of the good life.32 In Rawlsian terms, 
this can be described as the freedom to pursue a theory of the good,33 or a 
comprehensive conception of the good.34 Society should allow for pluralism with 
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 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition  at 347-55. 
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 Rawls, Political Liberalism  at 12-4. 
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regard to the good,35 and so the tax system should not rest on, or be designed to 
achieve, a particular interpretation of the good life. That is to say, the state should only 
act on political reasons that are acceptable to all citizens with reasonable conceptions 
of the good.36 This rules out religious doctrine or philosophical ideals of society as the 
source of legitimate tax policy. Examples of this would be the imposition of clerical law, 
or policies based upon the truth of Aristotelian Republicanism.37 
It is worth describing the nature of justification on this anti-perfectionist approach. 
Following Rawls, we can say that the justification of the constitution of society should 
be ‘political, not metaphysical.’38 This means that it should be justified to all reasonable 
members of society in accordance with their comprehensive conception of the good 
life.39 Social Institutions should still show respect to those who do not agree that public 
justification should be “political”—the unreasonable—by allowing them to follow their 
own view of the good within that constitution.40  
Special responsibility: The third starting assumption also has an anti-perfectionist slant. 
The principle insists that the members of society are each to have responsibility for 
developing their view of what matters in life, following the first principle above, and 
also for achieving whatever goals they have set themselves. This means that where an 
individual fails to achieve her goals, this would not in itself give her a right to receive 
additional assistance.  
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The idea of responsibility is complicated, since it is a concept that can be used in so 
many different ways. We might describe someone as showing the virtue of 
responsibility through her generally responsible conduct.41 Dworkin distinguishes virtue 
responsibility from relationship responsibility, which denotes a relationship between 
persons and events.42 One possibility here is to focus on a particular situation and then 
to attempt to determine who is responsible for doing something about it. This view 
assumes that a situation—for example someone drowning—may impose a moral 
obligation upon persons—such as the nearest person who can swim—to help, and we 
may say that this obligation makes the situation the responsibility of that individual.43 
However, it is not clear that responsibility does any real work in such cases, since these 
cases of assignment responsibility seem to just be moral obligations or straight answers 
to the important questions we are considering. Rather than focusing on bad situations, 
therefore, it is better to follow Dworkin’s account of relational responsibility and to 
focus on events and individuals and in order to develop the theory that best links 
individuals with events. 
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Dworkin distinguishes causal, assignment, liability and judgmental responsibility.44 
People are causally responsible for an event if they have had some role in a causal 
chain that has led to it. However, playing a causal role does not necessarily imply any 
moral failure on their part—for example if someone is knocked off his bicycle by a car 
and onto a pedestrian. Assignment responsibility holds that person x has had some 
responsibility assigned to her by some institution for a particular event, such as to 
ensure that the Olympic Games run smoothly. Liability responsibility arises where 
person y is liable to pay or bear some form of cost. This could be to compensate others 
for specified harms or burdens, such as polluting the local river or damaging someone 
else’s property. Alternatively, the liability could be to bear certain costs rather than to 
pass them on to others, such as bearing the cost of weather damage to one’s own 
property. This may arise where some damage occurs in an event, such as carelessly 
driving into a cyclist. A final form of responsibility that Dworkin distinguishes is that of 
judgmental responsibility, which is to praise or criticise an act performed by an 
individual. We may judge the irresponsibility of the careless driver above, but not the 
blameless pedestrian-injuring cyclist.  
The question of responsibility relevant to distributive justice—and therefore taxation—
is that of liability responsibility.45 What benefits and burdens of society is it appropriate 
to hold people liable for, and how should we determine these liabilities? One obvious 
option is to link liability to agency. However, there are clear cases where causal 
responsibility does not imply liability responsibility, such as in the actions of animals, 
children, and those with a mental deficiency.46 In these cases, those who are causally 
responsible are not considered responsible agents, and are not therefore considered to 
be in control of their actions. As a result, they can never be liability-responsible. This 
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has led thinkers to pessimistic conclusions regarding the possibility of free will and 
therefore responsible action,47 since it is clear that no individual human has complete 
control over their actions; our bodies contain physical processes and our mental 
processes have been influenced by others. This metaphysical challenge to responsibility 
comes from the assumption that control is linked to causality and control is required 
for responsibility. Since no-one has complete control over their actions all-the-way-
down, it is concluded that free-will, and therefore responsibility, is impossible.48  
The above challenge to responsibility is focused on physical or metaphysical facts. 
However, responsibility is a moral issue, as thinkers such as Scanlon and Dworkin have 
emphasised.49 It would undermine our sense of ourselves as moral beings if we accept 
that we have no physical control over our activities. If we have no control over our 
lives, our conscious selves would merely be passengers in our bodies, watching a 
documentary of our lives. The fact that some people are excused responsibility on the 
grounds that they do not have the capacity to act responsibly should not lead us to 
assume that responsibility requires people to have complete-control over everything 
they do all-the-way-down. Indeed, as Dworkin argues,50 such complete control is 
impossible, since we are all influenced by our surroundings—no man is an island. 
Therefore we should not take complete-control as the basis for responsibility, but 
rather consider whether each individual has adequate capacities to exercise 
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responsibility. Someone who has the ‘capacity to form true and pertinent beliefs, or to 
match his decisions to his normative personality,’51 can be held morally responsible for 
his life, choices and actions. A critic who would deny this would thereby deny that he is 
a choosing being at all, meaning he cannot think he has chosen to believe that there is 
no such thing as responsibility. It is acceptable to hold someone responsible, therefore, 
if they are a sufficiently capable agent.  
It is worth noting the interplay between these starting assumptions. The anti-
perfectionist principle that the state should not interfere with the theory of the good 
held by its members implies that people should have assignment responsibility to set 
their own aims and values and to go about achieving them. Anti-perfectionism and 
assignment responsibility in turn link to the principle of equal concern in that society 
should respect the concerns of actual persons as they express them, without taking any 
official position on what those concerns or values should be. To understand concern in 
any other way would be to impose on people a particular view of what should matter in 
life, which would not show concern for that person.  
Liability responsibility also links to equal concern and assignment responsibility. 
Allowing each person to assign themselves a plan of life, and applying this equally to all, 
implies that everyone can be assigned some liability responsibility to bear the—
appropriately determined—cost of their self-chosen plan. Furthermore, since 
assignment responsibility is applied to each individual, the liability costs of the choices 
that each individual makes should be borne by that person and not others. Not holding 
people responsible for the costs of their choices would mean that others will bear the 
cost of these choices. If this were the case then some would receive special treatment 
to achieve their goals over and above that given to others, violating the requirement of 
equal concern for all. Many approaches to distributive justice would claim to meet the 
principles I have set out in this section, and I will consider which of these presents the 
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best interpretation and instantiation of the starting position in this and the following 
chapter. I will start by explaining what I take to be the best approach, which I will then 
defend against the most plausible alternative views. 
1.2 Dworkin’s equality of resources  
In 1981 Dworkin proposed a form of responsibility-sensitive, resource-based, 
egalitarianism.52 In explaining and justifying his approach, Dworkin utilises the device of 
an auction and a hypothetical insurance scheme held in an idealised position of 
equality in order to specify distributive outcomes that treat all individuals as equals. I 
will now explain equality of resources and show how it meets the starting assumptions 
of equal concern, anti-perfectionism and special responsibility. To do so I will explain 
the essential features of the theory. I will then set out some preliminary reasons to 
begin the search for the right resourcist approach to distributive justice. I will then 
explain the baseline conditions from which the auction is presumed to proceed.  
In order to illustrate his theory, Dworkin asks us to imagine the formation of a society 
by shipwreck victims landing on an uninhabited island. These immigrants have to 
decide how to apportion the resources available to them. By “resource” here is meant, 
provisionally,53 any item that can be delineated, controlled by humans, and that is 
considered valuable to at least one party.54 Dworkin suggests they should run an 
auction whereby all have equal counters; the island and its resources will be divided up 
and trial auctions run until everyone is satisfied with the result. The process will end 
when no-one envies the resources purchased by any other and all can accept the form 
that the auction has taken,55 a distribution we can describe as envy-free. This very 
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simple situation, according to Dworkin, is one that we can happily call equal because no 
one would prefer to have the resources of another.  
The notion of envy-freeness presented here is of the kind imagined by economists,56 
whereby an individual does not envy the resources that others hold. It does not stretch 
to other aspects of life such as envy that another person has a particular spouse. This 
also excludes envy understood as the vice of coveting what others have out of 
jealousy,57 and also envy for those who made decisions that one wishes one had made.  
From the initial position of envy-freeness, people will be able to live their lives as they 
see fit, trading with one another where desired. If Adrian works hard on his land and 
grows lots of produce, while Bruce spends most of his time playing tennis, there is no 
inequality if Adrian has much greater resources than Bruce later on as a result of their 
choices and actions. The envy test will continue to be met over time; no one will envy 
the resources of another because they all had the same resource opportunities. Any 
difference in resources at a later date reflects different choices from an equal starting 
position. This means that everyone is treated equally under such a system; there is no 
prejudice towards the life-choices of any type or individual over another.58  
What the Dworkinian approach captures is the ideal that people pay for the 
opportunity costs of their resource ownership and usage. When considering 
investments, opportunity costs represent the costs of forgoing alternative uses of a 
                                                        
56
 Hal Varian, 'Equity, Envy, and Efficiency', Journal of Economic Theory, 9/1 (1974), 63–91, Hal 
Varian, 'Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness', Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 4 (1975), 223-47, William J. Baumol and Dietrich Fischer, Superfairness : Applications and 
Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986) at ch 2. Similar concepts of envy freeness have 
appeared in economic and philosophical work at various points, and have been traced back to a 
suggestion by Dutch physicist Ehrenfest to Jan Tilbergen in the early 1950s. For more on this see 
John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998) at 
Appendix, Duncan K Foley, 'Resource Allocation and the Public Sector', Yale Economic Essays, 7/1 
(1967), 45-98, Serge-Christophe Kolm, Justice and Equity (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 1997), 
Christian Arnsperger, 'Envy-Freeness and Distributive Justice', Journal of Economic Surveys, 8/2 
(1994), 155-86, Serge-Christophe Kolm, 'Playing Fair with Fairness (a Comment on Arnsperger's 
‘Envy-Freeness and Distributive Justice’)', Journal of Economic Surveys, 10/2 (1996), 199-215. 
57
 It is this understanding of envy that exercises Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition  at §80-1. 
58
 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs  at 324. 
30 
 
given set of resources, when the resources are not sufficient to make all the 
investments. So, if I were to spend my disposable income rather than invest it, the true 
cost to me of that expenditure is not just the money, but also the returns I could have 
obtained by investing it in a way that others will pay for in the future. Equality of 
resources therefore attempts to capture the value of the opportunity costs to others of 
what each individual secures for herself from a position of initial equality.  
It may be clear at this point that equality of resources shares certain similarities with 
Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice.59 This theory holds—on the basis of certain 
fundamental rights—that all should be free to work and transact as they see fit, and 
that justice is determined by transactions made across time. For Nozick, this process of 
ownership begins with the acquisition of land, followed by the use of this land to create 
other forms of property which can be exchanged or given away. Items of property are 
then passed from one person to another through freely made transactions, and any 
interference with this historical process is unjust to those who lose out. Equality of 
resources is also a historical entitlement theory. However, instead of starting with 
acquisition of unowned or communally-owned land, equality of resources begins with a 
hypothetical equal starting position. Furthermore, it allows that transfers from the 
fortunate to the less fortunate should be allowed in order to correct the inequalities 
that markets cause, as I will now explain.60  
It may strike some as unfair to utilise the market when some people have handicaps 
that render them unable to work, or work very effectively, in a market setting. 
Furthermore, unlike the island—where everyone starts with an equal amount of 
counters—people start their lives with differing amounts of wealth and support from 
their family. It is important to be clear that Dworkin does not propose a libertarian or 
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laissez-faire theory.61 In order to deal with handicaps and a poor start in life, Dworkin 
proposes a hypothetical insurance market, in which people would consider what 
insurance they would buy behind a veil of ignorance62 under which they do not know 
their initial family background or physical characteristics. This procedure would be used 
to determine levels of taxation in order to provide goods, services and compensatory 
payments to people based upon their presumed insurance levels against handicaps or 
poor parents.63 This ex ante insurance would cover people if they are unfortunate, as 
the insurance is in their interests as they conceive them prior to their knowledge of 
their morally arbitrary misfortune.  
The advantage of the ex ante approach is that people decide for themselves how much 
each particular form of disadvantage is one against which they would have deemed it 
worthwhile to insure. This means that the compensation will match the seriousness of 
the disadvantage to their disadvantaged self against the costs to their fortunate self. 
This justifies a precise amount that people should transfer for the benefit of the less 
fortunate if they do not suffer from the disadvantage. Apparent inequalities are 
therefore judged on the basis of how much they matter to actual people themselves; if 
people would not have insured to protect fully against the cause of the inequality then 
they cannot claim to have been shown a lack of concern if they do not receive the 
equivalent of a fully compensatory pay-out. 
On this view, then, a functioning market is essential to equality, which rules out 
centrally planned economic systems.64 However, I will re-emphasise that this does not 
imply laissez-faire; markets would need to be regulated in order to correct distortions 
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and unfairness due to monopolies, externalities, or information asymmetries. This is 
done in order that true opportunity costs will be upheld.65 Furthermore, as I have 
mentioned, laissez-faire would be most beneficial to the fortunate, something that 
equality of resources would seek to remedy. Some people may find it easier to live 
their ideal life than others do, as this will depend on their plans, the availability of 
different natural resources and the desires of others. However, comparisons are 
limited to the cost of the resources people purchase given the resources desired and 
produced by others, an approach I will now describe in more detail.66  
1.3 True Opportunity Costs 
One way to value the resources of society would be for one person to work out what 
everything is worth and for all to get an equal share according to that valuation. 
However, this would not do. The divider could value the resources such that she would 
get the best possible outcome for herself. Furthermore, the approach would not be 
acceptable even if she attempted to value the resources in an altruistic fashion. The 
problem would be that one person would have placed a value on the resources on the 
basis of what she takes the important things in life to be.67 So if she felt that all people 
should have a particular notion of welfare, or a certain set of capabilities, she would 
organise resources accordingly. I will discuss such views—those of G.A. Cohen and 
Amartya Sen—in chapter two. The resource egalitarian ideal is for each person to value 
resources based upon her own notion of what matters in life, of what her ambitions 
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are. The aim, then, is to construct a position in which each person values resources in a 
way that is continuous with her own authentically held values.68 
Dworkin introduces the auction and market as a way to manage all of these competing 
requirements. Each member of society would value resources according to his 
ambitions in life, while all other members do the same from a position of equality. The 
market thus enables everyone to value resources at the same time, each according to 
her own ambitions.69 The process of resource division is equally in the interests of all, 
as each defines his own interests. We can refer to this in terms of opportunity costs 
because each has to match her ambitions to her share of resources, and consider the 
ambitions that she will forgo due to her choices. Simultaneously, each has to pay the 
costs of those resource decisions in terms of the opportunities that others forgo. 
Market processes will act to push resources into the directions that fit best with the 
ambitions that people have, and away from those that no-one has.  
Dworkin describes this fair approach to valuing resources as the attempt to construct a 
position in which it is possible to determine true opportunity costs. This is the search 
for baseline conditions under which the costs of resources are determined in a market-
based procedure in which all members have a suitably equal role. The first aspect of 
this search is that it is necessary to value resources in accordance with the desires 
people have for their lives, where each person will need to tailor his choices to his 
equal share of resources. People need to value these resources themselves, based on 
their interests, and so it is necessary to take account of these interests. For this reason, 
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liberty plays a crucial role in determining equality.70 In order to have concern for 
individuals, equal opportunity costs respects their valuation of resources, and in order 
for this to work, people have to be free to value resources as they see fit. To do the 
opposite, to impose valuation on the resources or to restrict people’s freedom to value, 
would over-ride their assignment responsibility for their life and show a lack of concern 
for that individual.71 
Another aspect of resource egalitarianism to emphasise is the link to a freely operating 
market, whereby people are free to value resources with as few restrictions as 
possible. Dworkin refers to this as the principle of abstraction, which ‘establishes a 
strong presumption in favo[u]r of freedom of choice.’72 Dworkin illustrates this 
principle with the example of the size of lots in his auction, since the choice of lot size 
will influence the outcome of the auction. Some will prefer larger lots, for example 
because they wish to build and use a stadium, while others will desire smallholdings 
and would not like such large lots. There is no baseline which is clearly in the interests 
of everyone, and resourcists cannot appeal to differences in welfare that will obtain 
based upon the baseline.73 However, Dworkin argues that the lots should be auctioned 
at the smallest requested size. This is because it is ‘more sensitive to the discrete 
preferences and plans that people in fact have,’74 and will enable people to tailor their 
purchases as they desire. This may make those who wish to own or visit the stadium 
worse-off, as it will be more expensive for them, but stadium lovers are of course still 
able to buy the required land by purchasing several smaller plots. In contrast, if the lots 
were large and inflexible this would fail to show regard for the ambitions of the 
smallholder by forcing him to bid for something that he does not want. By limiting him 
in this way, the smallholder would have fewer of his resource allocation available to 
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purchase other things, not as a result of a reduction in his share of resources, but as a 
result of the restriction in his freedom to purchase what he values.  
One challenge here might be to point out that if people were forced to buy a larger lot 
than they wish they could always sell-off the excess after the auction stage.75 Indeed, 
the auction participants would not be materially disadvantaged by being forced to hold 
on to an unwanted amount of land (or other resource) if it was costless for them to sell 
the excess.76 If such sales are costless, then the case for a market is made anyway, since 
everyone has resources of equal value. However, if such restrictions do affect prices, 
then the prices calculated in such an auction favour those who desire a particular size 
lot (corresponding to the size chosen). The abstract approach does not show any such 
favour. Either way, then, the importance of the market in determining equal shares still 
holds. The auction prices that clear the market with the required degree of flexibility 
thereby show equal concern for all the participants. This flexibility in valuation enables 
the baseline valuation of resources to follow as closely as possible the desires that 
people have to live the life they choose. It also supports the provision of public roads 
and rights of way in order to enable greater ability to make use of and divide land.77  
A further implication of the principle of abstraction is that people should have a pro 
tanto freedom to do what they wish with their resources, commensurate with a similar 
freedom for all.78 If there were a restriction on the availability of philosophical books, 
for example, this would show a lack of concern for those who might wish to read those 
books. Similarly, if people wish to give their resources to another person, there is a 
strong reason that they be entitled to do so; to restrict this activity would render them 
less able to act in accordance with their ambitions. This emphasises why it is necessary 
to have property rights and entitlements. These examples illustrate the point that the 
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presumption should be for people to be as free as possible to use their resources as 
they deem fit.  
This freedom and flexibility over resources is only a presumption as it might be over-
ridden in some cases. Firstly, society will have a set of rules defining what liberties 
there are and what constraints there are on those liberties. These will be borne out in 
the legal system of the society. Those engaging in the auction also need to know the 
nature of this liberty and constraint system, and it is therefore necessary to specify 
these rules as part of the baseline conditions for the auction. Equality of resources 
takes certain rights to be necessary in order to determine distributive justice, including 
rights to use one’s property.79 One element of this is the principle of security, which 
would ‘mandate constraints on liberty necessary to provide people with enough 
physical security and enough control over their own property to allow them to make 
and carry out plans and projects.’80 The positive side to this is the power of control over 
our bodies necessary to exercise our assignment liability.81 The familiar legal rights 
structure follows from this need for individuals to have true power over their lives. This 
will require governments to prohibit—and attempt to undermine where possible—
assault, rape, and murder. Property rights are also necessary in order for people to be 
free to use their resources, as insecure property rights would make it difficult for 
people to use their power since otherwise people would not have sufficiently stable 
expectations to be able to make and carry out plans. 
As I mentioned above, equality of resources imposes another set of restrictions on 
abstract freedom in order to ensure that markets show equal concern for all. Dworkin 
refers to this desire to deal with market externalities as his principle of correction, 
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which justifies the imposition of public goods.82 One set of market imperfections comes 
about through the power of monopoly and due to information asymmetry, and steps 
should be taken to arrest these.83  
Another issue is that of market externalities whereby interactions affect others who are 
not directly involved in the interactions. This could include aesthetic issues, such as the 
erection of unsightly buildings, or environmental pollution which would also affect 
health and climate. To deal with these, Dworkin proposes a “superimaginary pre-
auction,” in which all motives are transparent, all transactions are predictable, and 
organisational costs are absent.84 This pre-auction suggests cases in which market 
outcomes should be constrained. Constraints on resource-uses are acceptable where 
the windfall that supporters of constraints would gain from them would be sufficient to 
compensate those who would be restricted. For example, in this pre-auction people 
would work together to buy lots in order to block unsightly and “out-of-context” 
developments, something which would not be possible in the real world.85 Similarly, in 
the case of pollution, people would pay to preserve their environment if they could, 
and this justifies regulation, taxation on polluting industries and activities, as well as 
the provision for litigation against those whose activities thwart people’s ambitions.86  
We can now review the role of true opportunity costs in equality of resources. I 
explained the notion of opportunity costs above, and it should be clear that it is only 
possible to work out opportunity costs from some baseline. One possibility would be to 
calculate opportunity costs from a baseline whereby all could achieve equal amounts of 
                                                        
82
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 155-8. 
83
 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs  at 357. Most economics textbooks will include a discussion of 
externalities, see for example Hal Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996) at ch 31. 
84
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 157. 
85
 This justifies planning rules which give people the right to object to developments, and for local 
governments to regulate development. 
86
 Taxation of this sort is usually referred to as Pigovian (after economist Pigou) or sin taxes; Varian, 
Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach  at 568, 76. The case for environmental taxes to 
be progressive is explained in Paula Casal, 'Progressive Environmental Taxation: A Defence', Political 
Studies, 60/2 (2012), 419-33 at 424, 28. 
38 
 
welfare—a view I will consider in chapter two. Another possibility would be to work out 
opportunity costs based upon historical entitlement principles, without attempting to 
interfere in the market. This would be the preferred approach for libertarians, though 
they would not feel the need to make any reference to opportunity costs to justify their 
view.87 Dworkin’s notion of true opportunity costs is an attempt to specify an ideal 
egalitarian baseline for market prices and liabilities. By focusing on envy-freeness from 
an initially equal situation, equality of resources harnesses the market to find a way to 
allow individuals to bring their own ambitions and commitments into the joint 
valuation of resources, and for each to bear the costs of the resources they receive to 
the lives of others. Restrictions on the purchase and use of resources are justified only 
on the basis of reasons that conform to the desire for equal true opportunity costs. 
Property rights are necessary as they enable people to use their resources as they see 
fit, though they should be restricted where this will enable markets to overcome 
problems such as externalities, informational asymmetries, and monopoly. Only public 
reasons relating to the use of resources are taken to be valid when considering 
restrictions on the freedom that individuals have to utilise those resources as they see 
fit; such reasons cannot come from a comprehensive view of what is good in life such 
as a religious doctrine or notion of welfare. This explains why equality of resources 
requires an entitlement approach to justice, albeit not a laissez-faire one. The only 
aspect of the person that is used to judge her relative position for the purpose of 
distributive justice is her purchase and use of resources from a position of equality 
under conditions in which her purchase of resources proceeds from a position where 
the true opportunity costs of those resources are calculated.  
1.4 Equality of resources and the starting assumptions 
I will now explain how equality of resources meets the starting assumptions of equal 
concern, anti-perfectionism, and special responsibility. Determining equal resources 
                                                        
87
 See footnote 11. 
39 
 
shows concern for all members of society, since all members of society are participants 
in the equal auction. The auction is equal as all participants have the same opportunity 
to obtain the resources they desire as others, since they all have the same bidding 
position.88 The approach is anti-perfectionist as it focuses solely on the resources that 
people purchase in order to live the life they choose to live.89 As Matthew Clayton puts 
it, equality of resources is judgmentally continuous with the ethical commitments of all 
reasonable persons in society. This means that the distribution will be ‘justifiable to 
everyone because no one can make a claim in good faith that they have less than 
others in light of what matters to her.’90 
Equality of resources also respects the principle of responsibility. This can be expressed 
in terms of the types of relational responsibility described by Dworkin.91 Each individual 
has assignment responsibility to determine her aims and goals in life,92 to secure the 
most appropriate resources in order to carry out her plans, and then to see her plans to 
fruition. This relates to the anti-perfectionist point above that the community or 
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government should not determine the ends of its members,93 but rather that citizens 
should set them for themselves. The assignment responsibility that people have leads 
to the freedom implied in the principle of abstraction—people need be to be able to 
use their resources in order to carry out their plans. Correlative to this freedom, people 
should carry out their plans themselves.94 This is attractive to all parties; third parties 
do not want to be forced to carry out the plans of others, and we as individuals usually 
wish to carry out our plans—it is our performance that we value. For example, if my 
aim is to produce a thesis on anti-perfectionist egalitarian taxation then I wish to 
produce this myself, but I do not will for someone else who does not value it to 
produce one because I wish it.  
The assignment responsibility to set and obtain one’s ends relates to the attractiveness 
of the resource egalitarian interpretation of liability responsibility. People are held 
liable to bear the true opportunity costs of the use of their resources. The liability 
comes about through the interaction of equality and assignment responsibility. Each 
has the liability responsibility for the cost of his resources to others as he has 
assignment responsibility for his own values and the achievement of his own ends. 
Imagine someone, Mark, who claims at a later stage that he should receive additional 
resources from society because he regrets his choices or due to a change in 
circumstances. Mark is held liability responsible for his past resource uses whatever his 
later regrets. If his circumstances change then he will be held responsible unless he 
would have hypothetically insured against it. He was assigned responsibility to 
determine his plan of life in relation to the choices of others, and if he later has less 
valuable resources than others then he has no grounds to complain. Mark had liability 
over his resources because he had assignment responsibility over his life; no-one else is 
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held liable for the disadvantage Mark now feels as others were not assigned 
responsibility for his life.  
If additional resources were transferred from everyone else to Mark, then this would 
make him better-off than them. This would violate the egalitarian principle.95 Equality 
is therefore determined on the basis that the individual has received equal resources to 
others given the resource choices of others. This is achieved through the idea of true 
opportunity costs, whereby each person should take into account the opportunity costs 
to others in determining and carrying out his plans. Developing the above points, the 
ex-ante hypothetical insurance scheme is designed to guide redistribution from the 
fortunate to the less-fortunate where the less-fortunate person does not have liability 
responsibility for his relative resource disadvantage. This compensation is based upon 
the valuation that the parties themselves place on the resources being redistributed.96  
1.5 Rawls’ theory of justice  
An approach that clearly rivals equality of resources is John Rawls’ theory of justice as 
fairness. Rawls’ theory is avowedly anti-perfectionist and egalitarian, meaning that it 
has a strong claim to meeting the starting principles set out above. I will now set out 
Rawls’ theory and argue in section 1.6 that it does a less good job at meeting the 
starting assumptions. In the book A Theory of Justice,97 Rawls’ primary target was the 
utilitarian theory which dominated political philosophy up until that point, proposing 
an alternative social contract determination of justice.98 To construct principles for a 
just society, Rawls suggests that we imagine what agreements free and equal persons 
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in an original position would make, with the conclusion that the outcome of this 
decision would indicate what is just. The original position is a hypothetical situation 
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ in which the contractors do not know their personal 
features, social class and natural assets.99 This is designed to ensure that people cannot 
benefit from morally arbitrary features when making the social contract.  
Rawls argues that people would choose the following principles in the original position: 
a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and 
b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle).100  
People would choose these principles in order to ensure that they would be as well-off 
as possible even if they turn out to be part of the least favoured group in society. The 
basic liberties and freedoms would be guaranteed because, behind the veil of 
ignorance, the parties would not know if they were part of a minority upon which a 
majority could impose its comprehensive doctrine. The second principle of justice 
concerns the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation within 
society, i.e. the rules of production and distribution. Rawls in his later work101 makes 
clear that he is not concerned with allocative—or patterned—justice, as some of his 
critics have made out.102 Rather, he takes distributive justice to be concerned with the 
way that the ‘institutions of the basic structure [are] to be regulated as one unified 
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scheme of institutions so that a fair, efficient, and productive system of social 
cooperation can be maintained over time, from one generation to the next.’103  
Those in the original position are presumed to be concerned that they will be in the 
worst-off group, and will seek to maximise the position of that worst-off group (to 
“maximin”, or rather to “leximin”104). However, that leaves the question as to how the 
worst-off group is to be defined. For Rawls, people would be concerned with primary 
goods; by which he means all-purpose goods such as liberties and opportunities, 
income and wealth.105 Everyone can be assumed to want these goods, as they would 
be required in order for someone to go about living her life according to whatever 
conception of the good she turns out to have. The worst-off are taken to be the group 
who possess the smallest share of primary goods, though not those with disabilities 
and other special needs.106  
Rawls thinks that distributive justice, and therefore taxation, should be governed 
according to the second principle, and most importantly the difference principle. He 
remained ecumenical on the need for a market economy, suggesting that a socialist 
economy could be compatible with the difference principle.107 However, Rawls’ views 
on taxation are somewhat surprising as they seem to be focused on starting 
inequalities rather than on-going ones.108 As such, his treatment of taxation involves a 
split between what we might consider “unearned” and “earned” income. Regarding 
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bequests and gifts, Rawls follows Mill in proposing to tax the recipients of these at a 
progressive rate.109  
Regarding ‘earned’ income, Rawls suggests a proportionate consumption tax.110 This is 
surprising as a progressive income tax would be likely to generate more resources for 
the benefit of the worst-off, thus better meeting the difference principle.111 However, 
Rawls thinks it would be better to create a “property owning democracy” in which all 
citizens have an ownership share in the means of production.112 A society without a 
small elite with a grip on the economic levers will be one in which people can “manage 
their own affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and economic equality.”113 
As a result, the least advantaged would not receive aid on the basis of their misfortune, 
but rather in order to ensure they are equal participants in society. For Rawls, the 
welfare state, by contrast, encourages division within society.114 
1.6 Criticisms of Rawls’ difference principle  
I will now explain why—borrowing terms from Clayton115—Dworkin’s ambition-
sensitive approach is preferable to Rawls’ interest-based approach as the best 
interpretation of the starting assumptions set out above. An initial question to consider 
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is what role the original position plays in determining the just outcome. One possibility 
is that the original position device produces the just outcome because it is the correct 
procedure, while alternatively it could be the procedure that best interprets the 
underlying requirements.116 Since I have begun from specific starting assumptions, and 
because any procedure would need to follow from these anyway, I will focus on the 
latter question; whether the original position is superior to the resource-equal 
approach at meeting the starting assumptions.  
Rawls’ difference principle insists that inequalities are justified to the extent that they 
benefit the worst-off. This is because those in the original position would not know 
their attitude to risk. In such a situation, the rational action is to act conservatively and 
to ensure that they are as well-off as possible if they are in the worst situation. 
However, determining who is worst-off is a difficult undertaking. Once the worst-off 
individual has been helped they will no longer be the worst-off individual, and the 
ensuing policies would not target the broad sources of inequality—such as economic 
class division within a market society. Rawls therefore focuses on the idea of the worst-
off group,117 but while this helps in some respects it creates alternative problems. For 
one thing, the advantage of a group is difficult to calculate; it could be the position of 
the median member or the mean. These averages would ignore the position of the 
worst-off members of that group, despite the fact that Rawls is motivated by the 
principle of the separateness of persons and the conservative response to risk.118 There 
are further problems concerning the delineation of the groups; who is to determine 
how to allocate people to groups? As I indicated in the previous section, Rawls would 
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determine groups based upon the primary goods held by members of society. I will 
return to this grouping below.  
As well as concerns about the composition of groups, Rawlsians need to justify the 
thickness of the veil of ignorance on the interest-based approach. Equality of resources 
asks people what they would choose from a hypothetically equal position, where the 
circumstances of one’s own health, social class and market luck are unknown. In 
addition to these, Rawls’ veil also excludes all information about the values, plans and 
preferences of the contractors.119 It is not clear what justifies this additional restriction 
on knowledge and how it makes the principles that follow any more just; the attitudes 
and goals a person has do not have any obvious bearing on the injustice of their 
putative situation. Furthermore, Rawls does not provide adequate justification as to 
why the contractors would choose the most conservative possible principles.120 
According to Rawls, the contractors would not be concerned with probabilities, and 
with the level of resources they could obtain ‘above the minimum.’121 However, this 
assumes that contractors would focus on the worst-off group irrespective of the cost to 
the plans of the rest of society.122 Excluding knowledge of actual plans, probabilities, 
and attitudes to risk, are significant restrictions on contractors. It is not clear how these 
restrictions help to treat persons as equals. The thinner veil utilised by equality of 
resources, on the other hand, more accurately reflects the individuals of the society; it 
shows equal concern for all members as it is based upon their actual values—allowing 
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people to take risks in accordance with the actual ambitions that they have.123 One 
Rawlsian worry about the thinner veil might be that people would choose to restrict 
the use of resources if they knew their particular theory of the good; for example for 
militant atheists to stop the building of temples. However, such restrictions are ruled 
out by equality of resources as they would violate the principle of abstraction required 
to calculate equal opportunity costs. 
The third starting assumption is special responsibility, and equality of resources has a 
clear advantage in this issue. Firstly, as I mentioned above, the worst-off group 
according to the difference principle is the one with the fewest resources. However, 
the amount of resources—or primary goods—that an individual has at a particular 
point in time will depend upon his choices as well as his relative fortune.124 
Remembering the examples above,125 Adrian has more resources than Bruce after 
several years because he worked his land while Bruce used his for tennis. If Bruce is 
judged to be in the worst-off group on account of his choices, then the society should 
apparently transfer resources from Adrian to Bruce as a member of the worst-off 
group. However, this would ignore the liability responsibility that people have for the 
choices they make regarding their resources and that people should pay the costs of 
these choices to others. This can be related to the discussion of equal concern in the 
previous paragraph; overriding Adrian’s choices and subsidising Bruce’s displays 
unequal concern for Adrian and Bruce. The focus on primary goods and the use of this 
measure to determine the worst-off group therefore renders Rawls’ approach less 
responsibility-sensitive than equality of resources.126 In addition, secondly, Rawls’ 
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prescription of a Property-Owning-Democracy would also appear to overrule 
assignment responsibility, by restricting the form of property that citizens receive, and 
also the options available to them.127  
1.7 Freeman’s challenge to market-based egalitarianism 
Equality of resources utilises the idea of a market in order to determine when 
resources are equal. Other resource-based egalitarians, such as Rawls, would accept 
market institutions, but would not make use of the market to determine equal shares. I 
will now consider the response to Dworkin provided by Rawlsian scholar Samuel 
Freeman.128  
Freeman finds the policy implications Dworkin’s theory attractive, and highlights that 
many egalitarians would accept market institutions.129 However, Freeman challenges 
                                                                                                                                                            
much closer together, it does not build liability responsibility into the theoretical structure in the 
way it is for equality of resources. 
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Dworkin on his utilisation of markets at a fundamental level in his theory.130 He argues 
that it is not possible to utilise markets to calculate distributive shares without falling 
back on a prior theory of justice—such as that of Rawls. Another way to express this is 
that Freeman challenges Dworkin on the issue of baseline, the point from which the 
theory—and Dworkin’s market process—begins. Freeman highlights that a baseline is 
necessary to work out opportunity costs. For Freeman the baseline should be justified 
by a theory of justice such as Rawls’ difference principle. He suggests Dworkin’s 
responsibility principle cannot justify a baseline that does not rest upon a further 
theory. Since Dworkin does not utilise such a theory, Freeman concludes the 
justification for equality of resources is circular.131 I will explain how Freeman reaches 
this conclusion, and then clarify market-based egalitarianism in order to show it is not 
circular. 
Freeman presents what he takes to be the potential reasons Dworkin could use to 
justify the use of the market in determining his theory. Since Dworkin rejects laissez-
faire and libertarianism, these cannot provide justification for the baseline conditions 
from which to work out opportunity costs.132 Nor can Dworkin rely on economic 
reasoning to justify responsibility for opportunity costs. The price of someone’s time is 
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determined by marginal factors and does not indicate its true value in any sense.133 
Furthermore, people who gain an income through investment do not contribute to 
society in the same way that those who work for low-pay.134 Their capital makes a 
contribution to production, but they themselves do not do anything other than abstain 
from consuming what is legally theirs to consume. However, this abstinence is only of a 
legalistic form,135 and theories of justice apply at a pre-legal level which would then 
justify legal institutions and rules.136 Dworkin cannot utilise these contentious theories 
to justify his use of market prices. 
Dworkin’s position is that people should be held responsible for the opportunity costs 
of their choices and actions, and that these costs should be worked out by reference to 
the market. Freeman thinks is circular; how is it possible to calculate opportunity costs 
in the abstract? For Freeman, the obvious solution is to calculate opportunity costs in a 
pre-existing institutional setting with property rights and a market. These institutions 
require justification, however, and indicated above this must come from the theory of 
justice.  
Freeman argues that Dworkin’s justification comes from the requirement to hold 
people responsible for the opportunity costs of their choices. This appears simply to 
take us back to the beginning; the institutions necessary to work out opportunity costs 
have been justified on the basis that they enable us to work out opportunity costs, 
even though opportunity costs can only be worked out in a particular institutional 
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setting, which is justified in terms of equal concern through the requirement that 
people pay their opportunity costs. As indicated above, it is not possible to break this 
circularity with a libertarian theory, or based upon the nature of markets 
themselves.137 However, this is not the basis of resource egalitarianism.  
The baseline institutions for Dworkin are those which will determine true opportunity 
costs, as I explained in section 1.3. This is not a libertarian baseline, but it shares certain 
features with the libertarian view,138 being a rights-based entitlement theory, albeit 
one with a less restrictive starting requirement. So where Freeman correctly 
characterises libertarianism as requiring ‘absolute property rights and unconstrained 
freedom of property,’139 he does not see equality of resources as presenting a view in 
which property rights are crucial though not absolute. In fact, equality of resources can 
be characterised by the statement that there is assumed freedom of contract unless 
there is a good reason otherwise. The notion of true opportunity costs is therefore not 
justified by the value of markets or market values, but rather that everyone should be 
in as equal—by which is also meant neutral—a position as possible to make choices 
and face the costs of these choices to one another as determined by this maximally 
neutral position.140  
I explained in section 1.3 that the true opportunity cost baseline at which to apply 
market forces allows each person assignment responsibility over their lives, and holds 
them liable for the costs of that life to others as determined in the most fair and equal 
possible fashion. The argument is not that markets hold people responsible, but that 
true opportunity costs would ensure that people could determine how to live their lives 
in a way that will fairly hold them responsible for the costs of that life to others. This 
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baseline best meets the principles which a theory of justice requires, whether or not it 
is a theory of justice as Freeman understands it. Freeman’s mistake is in taking Dworkin 
to be more of a Rawlsian than in fact he is.141 Equality of resources is not a theory of 
justice in the same way as Rawls’, which justifies institutions based upon principles that 
are the outcomes of the theory. Whether equality of resources has the same form and 
structure as other theories of justice is irrelevant to this work as what matters is that it 
is the best available instantiation of the starting principles.  
The purpose of equality of resources is not to elevate the role of the market, but rather 
to develop a theory that avoids the use of any prior outcome-based theory of justice or 
valuation in working out distributive shares.142 This is Dworkin’s point in his short 
response to Freeman;143 to attempt to use a theory of justice will impose a particular 
ideal metric for use in determining equal concern144 or to indicate individuals or groups 
who should be the primary beneficiary from society (in Rawls’ case, the worst-off).145 
Regarding the difference principle, those who are not in the worst-off group can 
complain that the institutions of society are designed for the benefit of a specified 
group of which they are not a part, and for reasons that they would not have accepted 
from a hypothetically equal position. True opportunity costs, in comparison, is an 
attempt to imagine as neutral and equal as possible a position from which people can 
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value resources.146 To bring in a prior theory of justice will either violate the equality or 
neutrality of the starting point, or both.  
As with the libertarian view, resource egalitarianism has a presumption that people 
should be free to make any transaction they desire. However, as I indicated above, this 
freedom is not absolute. The free choices and activities of individuals can be 
interrupted, but only for reasons which would ensure the fair and neutral working of 
the market itself, or for reasons they themselves would accept ex-ante.147 Equality of 
resources may not count as a full theory of justice on Freeman’s reckoning, but it is still 
a better instantiation of the starting principles set out in section 1.1. It does not rely on 
actual market institutions or the abstract fairness of market outcomes. Instead, it 
utilises the market in order to determine equal opportunity costs, which then 
determines equal shares and equal concern.  
1.8 Heath’s challenge  
I have responded to Freeman’s claim that market responsibility can only be determined 
after the introduction of an external theory of justice. I argued that markets are 
necessary to hold people liable for the costs their choices, and for Dworkin’s baseline of 
true opportunity costs as a basis of neutral choice. I will now consider another recent 
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criticism of equality of resources provided by Joseph Heath. Like Freeman, Heath 
argues that it is possible to determine equality without utilising the market. However, 
instead of suggesting that another theory of justice is necessary in order to calculate 
just market prices, Heath criticises markets on a more fundamental level and proposes 
that an alternative approach would better fit with the envy-freeness ideal underlying 
equality of resources. The argument I gave in response to Freeman—that the aim of 
true opportunity costs is to provide as neutral as possible a basis from which people 
can make choices and pay the costs of those choices to the plans of others—is not an 
adequate response to Heath as he accepts the ideal of envy-freeness.  
Joseph Heath challenged equality of resources as part of his complaint about a 
catallactic bias within contemporary political philosophy.148 Heath is sympathetic to 
                                                        
148 By this he means a bias towards market trades and solely gains of this kind. Heath claims 
that this focus on gains from trade ignores other types of cooperative benefit, such as 
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I do not dispute that society produces more for its members than the “catallactic” 
benefits from trade. However, equality of resources is not explicitly organised around the 
distribution of gains from trade. This may be a crucial part of other liberal egalitarian 
theories, perhaps such as that of Rawls, but it does not play an obviously crucial role for 
Dworkin. The implication of Heath’s view seems to be that there are other gains from 
society that might not be shared out equally; or that certain sections of society—
presumably the wealthy—may be able to garner an unequal share of these advantages. In 
response to this I would point out that it may be possible for hypothetical-insurance-based 
taxation decisions to take account of any greater ease that some section of society has in 
benefitting from society. This is certainly not dismissed as a non-trade-related-gain. Where 
it is not possible to tax or otherwise utilise these benefits, it is not clear that any rival 
theory could take account of them either.  
Nevertheless, there remains the claim that equality of resources is unable to justify 
the distribution of other forms of benefit that society can provide, and thus would insist 
that these forms of social benefit should not be provided or should be left within the 
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resource egalitarianism, and highlights that since the ideas of envy-freeness and 
“superfairness” have been discovered and rediscovered so many times they must be 
compelling.149 He writes that ‘the envy-freeness principle is very closely tied to the very 
simple and attractive idea that a just cooperative arrangement must be one that is 
acceptable to all.’150 This is indeed one way to look at it, but I will argue there is a 
further justification for the envy freeness standard—and of the integral place of private 
property and the market in distributive justice. 
Heath explains the economics of envy-freeness, and demonstrates that there can be 
multiple “superfair” envy-free solutions, using the economic tools of an Edgeworth box 
and indifference curves,151 as depicted in figure 1-1.152 An envy-free situation, as I have 
said, is one in which nobody prefers the resources held by any other to their own—
                                                                                                                                                            
purview of private interests. I think that this is untrue, however. For one thing, equality of 
resources would support intervention in laissez-faire markets that would reduce 
imperfections, perhaps including the collection and dissemination of information such that 
everyone is in a fair position to be held reasonably responsible for their decisions. This 
would justify state provision of information for the benefit of all. Second, it is also not the 
case that hypothetical insurance decisions are limited to the provision of compensatory 
resources to individuals. Hypothetical insurance decisions may be more reasonable if they 
offer instead of compensation the use of public facilities or the provision of national 
services. These would have to be justified on a case-by-case basis, but they would take into 
account the factors that Heath claims are ignored by equality of resources. One example 
would be that the provision of a universal pension may be a sensible hypothetical insurance 
option in order to provide valuable security and avoid invidious comparisons. 
149
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they are indifferent. Superfairness refers to a situation in which everyone actually 
prefers their resources to those of everyone else.153  
 
Heath argues that the existence of multiple envy-free solutions implies the need for 
further principles, in order to determine the best—or better—among the superfair 
solutions.154 Heath acknowledges that the most obvious is the Pareto-efficiency 
standard, which converts an envy-free starting position into a more efficient envy-free 
position. This is the process that Dworkin uses and which Heath takes to be his 
justification for the use of the market. In order to understand this process of efficient 
trading, Heath suggests we require reference to the Second Fundamental Theorem of 
Welfare Economics, which is that ‘every Pareto optimal allocation can be the 
equilibrium outcome of a competitive market, given some initial allocation of goods 
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and resources. This shows that there is no conflict in principle between equality and 
the exchange of goods.’155 This allows us to move within the Edgeworth box from an 
equal allocation—e—to an efficient equal allocation—p, as depicted in figure 1.1.156  
Heath’s most relevant criticism157 is that the auction is not the only means to achieving 
an envy-free solution, and it is not the best. Indeed, there are many possible envy-free 
solutions, a point familiar to readers of Dworkin who highlights that the auctioneer 
could convert all of the resources of the island into wine and eggs and still produce an 
envy-free result.158 The Dworkinian auction with equal counters helps to maintain and 
improve a pre-existing envy-free outcome based on equal counters. Heath takes 
Dworkin’s purpose to be determining the best envy-free approach, and argues that 
some will prefer an alternative envy-free solution to that produced by an equal 
auction.159 I imagine that he has in mind the sort of situation that I will describe 
between Mike and Mavis. Mike trades some of his sugar with Mavis for her whiskey 
such that both consider themselves better-off than they did previously—compared to 
each other and to their previous situation. However, while Mavis only has a slight 
preference for the post-trade situation, Mike feels he is much better-off.160 However, 
there were other trades of sugar and whiskey which Mike would have still considered 
worth making, which would have been superfair. Within the range of superfair 
outcomes, the chosen rate of trade appears better for Mike than Mavis, given that he 
would have happily accepted less if more were unavailable. According to Heath, there 
are no grounds within Dworkin’s market-based approach to conclude that any of these 
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superfair outcomes are fairer than another, and Heath proposes an alternative non-
market process that he thinks would be able to make such distinctions.  
Heath does not offer much by explanation of his procedure, but he references a section 
of Baumol’s book which describes sequential superfairness.161 Baumol suggests 
sequential applications of the superfairness approach in order to determine outcomes 
that are “more superfair” than others.162 This procedure works by taking the each 
party’s preferred superfair solution and using that as the two opposite corners of a 
smaller sub-region of the superfair region. The superfairness approach would then be 
applied within this smaller region, and this procedure could be repeated again. This 
multi-stage recursive process may not produce a single solution, but it might reach a 
limit point.163 This is an alternative to the auction procedure, which challenges equality 
of resources because it is a resource-based proposal which does not utilise the market. 
Indeed, Heath goes so far as to say that a ‘recursive application of the envy-freeness 
standard’ would be more consistent with Dworkin’s ‘insistence upon a monistic 
conception of equality.’164 If Heath is correct, it would appear that the market has a 
much less prominent role in resource equality than Dworkin makes out.  
The problem with Heath’s argument is that he overlooks the reasons Dworkin offers for 
taking a market approach. Heath appears to focus solely on Dworkin’s original 
presentation of equality of resources, before later embellishment and clarification, and 
he reads this as having presented the market as the only approach that provides a 
unique envy-free solution. Admittedly, Dworkin did present the market as the solution 
to the problems of unfairness due to arbitrariness and oversimplification in choosing 
between envy-free alternatives.165 However, this is not the main reason for preferring 
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the market-based approach. If the main determinant of fair distributions were that 
they were envy-free and unique, then Heath would be correct that the sequential 
approach is a possible alternative which could be considered to be as good—if not 
better—than a market-based approach.166 
The question, therefore, is whether a market in which people pay the true opportunity 
costs of their resources is superior to sequential superfairness. I will therefore consider 
this approach. Heath does not mention that Baumol suggests that his proposal is 
‘probably more pertinent for theory than for application,’ though Baumol suggested it 
could be useful for determining divorce settlements.167 As a proposal to indicate how 
to distribute resources in the real world, then, it appears to be a non-starter;168 Heath 
offers no further suggestions about how to utilise his alternative proposal. His point is 
therefore that the market is not the only possible way to calculate envy-freeness. This 
argument does not seem a problem for equality of resources, since equality of 
resources merely needs to claim that the market is the best known way of maintaining 
envy-freeness over time, and the only one known to be workable.169  
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The auction is only one—illustrative—part of the theory of equality of resources. It is 
followed by people making decisions about what to do with those resources and 
bearing the costs of those actions. The principle of special responsibility therefore has a 
crucial role to play in the justification of the role of private property and the market, of 
which the auction stands as an illustration. Sequential superfairness might do well at 
producing an equal and anti-perfectionist outcome, but it may not be able to provide 
people with assignment responsibility over their lives, nor liability for the costs of their 
activities to others. Assignment responsibility implies property rights that allow people 
to use their equal share of resources as they see fit. I cannot see—and Heath does not 
explain—how it would be possible to apply his superfairness approach to the many 
choices that people make over time which impact upon the resources held by that 
individual and others.  
As I mentioned in response to Freeman’s criticism, the ideal of determining true 
opportunity costs plays an important role in justifying the market approach, by 
providing as much neutrality as possible in the determination of prices by all.170 Heath 
proceeds as if the reason for preferring the auction is that it provides Pareto-efficiency, 
when this is not the case.171 Heath does consider the ideal of true opportunity costs in 
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an endnote,172 but only repeats his claim that the auction only increases the efficiency 
of the initially equal distribution. Heath goes on to acknowledge that the purpose of 
the auction, according to Dworkin, is to reduce the arbitrariness of division which 
would occur if an appointed auctioneer were to set the lots.173 Heath argues that the 
baseline operating according to the principle of abstraction does not provide enough to 
ensure that people have an equal role in the determination of the bundles available, 
because ‘it is entirely the choice of e [equal counters] as the initial allocation that 
equalizes roles.’174 Heath’s argument here is that auction does not itself ‘influence the 
form that the resources take,’ since Dworkin admits that if the available items were 
limited to eggs and old claret the person who hated these could not complain.175  
However, this is to mistake two fundamentally different cases. The egg and wine hater 
cannot complain in the case where the situation, or nature, or a fair society, has only 
provided eggs and wine. However, people can complain if their choice has been 
actively restricted to these commodities. The ideal of true opportunity costs is designed 
to enable people to make these decisions under the most neutral circumstances 
possible. The principle of abstraction is one way to ensure neutrality, as it should avoid 
arbitrariness. It states that people should be presumed to be free to make agreements 
without intervention except where this is designed to improve the generation of 
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opportunity costs.176 From the perspective of each individual approaching the market, 
nature and the preferences of others are taken as external to the pricing process, and 
each has to respond separately to these facts in order to set prices for all. There is no 
prejudice towards the preference of any one person or another.  
Heath’s arguments have not successfully shown that equality of resources fails to meet 
the three starting assumptions that I set out above. Using markets to calculate 
resources does not violate the requirement of equal concern, and I have argued that 
the purpose of true opportunity costs is to get as close as possible to that ideal. It is not 
apparent how Heath’s interesting alternative would meet these requirements any 
better, particularly how any interpretation of it can hold people responsible for the 
costs of their choices to others over time. The potential existence of this alternative 
does not damage the case for utilising the market to determine equal opportunity 
costs. 
1.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has defended the claim that equality of resources satisfied my starting 
assumptions, and is better at doing so than its resource-based rivals. I began by setting 
out the three starting assumptions of equal concern, anti-perfectionism and special 
responsibility. I then presented equality of resources, explaining how it rests on, and 
elaborates a conception of distributive justice that builds on, these starting 
assumptions. In the second half of the chapter I presented alternative resource-based 
approaches and criticisms. The first alternative approach was Rawls’ difference 
principle, which I argued showed neither as adequate a form of equal concern nor 
adequate assignment and liability responsibility. I then argued against Freeman’s 
Rawlsian criticism of equality of resources that the market cannot do the job required 
of it. Joseph Heath also criticised the use of market in equality of resources and I 
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showed his concerns to be unfounded. Heath’s alternative proposal would not 
obviously be able to hold people responsible for their choices and calculate the costs to 
others in an equal manner in the way that a market-based approach would be. In the 
following chapter I will consider egalitarian proposals that integrate non-resource-
based comparisons between persons in their currency of justice.  
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 Welfare and Capability Metrics Chapter 2
In chapter one I presented equality of resources as the best approach to distributive 
justice, and defended it against critics who propose resource-based alternatives. I will 
now consider criticisms that propose that the resource-based metric is inadequate. The 
intuitive thought that motivates this criticism is that justice should be concerned with 
what fundamentally matters, and since resources only matter instrumentally, then 
resources cannot be the appropriate metric of justice. The first alternative metric I will 
consider, in sections 2.1-2.6, is welfare. The welfarist claim is that the achievement of 
welfare should play some part in our notion of justice. In the second half of the 
chapter, sections 2.7-2.11, I explain and counter the capability approach. I will argue 
that these alternative metrics violate one or more of the starting assumptions set out 
in chapter one, and that both violate the continuity test.  
2.1 Equality of welfare and expensive tastes 
The first alternative metric that I will consider is that of welfare. Philosophers, 
economists, and policy-makers have a history of focusing attention on welfare as the 
likely answer to the question of what makes a person’s life go well.177 Perhaps this is 
because it is clear that more welfare or happiness is always better than less or that 
happiness appears to accompany any good thing.178 This led to the once dominant 
utilitarian—utility maximising—approach to moral and political philosophy.179 The ideal 
of maximising the total or average amount of utility came under attack in the 1960s 
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and 70s.180 Rawls argued that idealized representatives of people would not choose 
utilitarianism in the original position because they would worry that they would be 
someone who would face poor prospects in order to maximise overall utility.181 I will 
not consider utilitarianism any further as I take it to be unattractive from an egalitarian 
perspective, though I will discuss the relationship between resource egalitarianism and 
utilitarianism in section 4.8.  
Rawls’ separateness-of-persons critique would not apply to an egalitarian theory which 
focuses on welfare as the appropriate metric.182 If welfare were equalised, then no-one 
could complain that she has not been shown equal concern. Indeed, economist Henry 
Simons made exactly this sort of argument that equality of welfare would be more 
appropriate than maximisation of welfare.183 I will therefore consider equality of 
welfare as an obvious rival to equality of resources as an interpretation of equal 
concern.  
Dworkin highlights that there is a difference between questions of what makes our 
lives go well, and that of what the distributive metric should be. The appropriate view 
for people to take of their lives might not coincide with the correct distributive metric, 
and so it is not sufficient to show that particular views of welfare are inappropriate for 
                                                        
180
 Probably most notably from Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Bernard Williams; Nozick, Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia  at 42-5, John J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985) at 94-99. 
181
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition  at 144-53. I explained Rawls’ approach above, in 
section 1.5.  
182
 G.A. Cohen refers to this as the equalisandum, that is, the thing to be equalized; G.A. Cohen, 'On 
the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', Ethics, 99/4 (1989), 906-44 at 908. 
183
 Henry Calvert Simons, Personal Income Taxation : The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal 
Policy (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1938) xi, 238 p. at 14. Simons makes use of an 
‘impartial spectator’ argument, which has a long history of use in philosophy, as it has an important 
role in Adam Smith’s moral philosophy; Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: A. 
Millar, and A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1759) at 52-59. Sen uses the notion of the impartial spectator, and I 
will discuss his position in the second half of this chapter. 
66 
 
the former purpose.184 I will briefly note some points about what might be meant by 
welfare before focusing on the latter, relevant question.  
What might “welfare” mean? Various interpretations of welfare have been proposed as 
an answer to questions such as what makes our life goes best?185 One is that of the 
success people achieve in obtaining what they desire.186 A second approach to welfare 
is hedonism,187 which is to focus on experiencing pleasure.188 A third approach would 
endeavour to avoid the problems of the previous two subjective approaches by 
proposing an objective position.189 These different interpretations of welfare are, of 
course, very different from one another. I have said that there is something appealing 
in the notion of welfare, but—as Dworkin points out—it is as a nebulous concept and 
loses some of its appeal once it is specified.190 
These views are problematic with regard to distributive justice since people would 
need to have an idea of the resources they would have in order to determine their 
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expectations. If people were to waste their resources, then it would be necessary to 
transfer resources from others to ensure that they were at the same welfare level. This 
means that an irresponsible use of resources by one person will make everyone else 
worse off.  
Dworkin gives the example of Louis in a welfare-egalitarian society. Louis was initially 
given the resources he required in order to achieve the same level of welfare as 
everyone else. However, Louis then developed expensive tastes for rare items like 
Champagne, with the result that his resources no longer get him to the same level.191 
The dilemma for the welfare egalitarian is whether to support the transfer of resources 
to Louis in order to return to welfare equality. One option is to pander to expensive 
tastes. However, everyone will then be worse-off as a result of Louis’ new preference, 
as the new equal level of welfare will be lower than previously as it would be more 
expensive to obtain. This will of course include Louis, who will not be able to meet his 
new tastes as well as he could his earlier ones. Alternatively, if welfarists do not 
propose to support Louis then it would appear that they do not respect people’s 
genuine development of preferences expensive or otherwise.  
The problem in this case is that while Louis has assignment responsibility over his aims, 
he does not bear the full liability for them. By altering his tastes, Louis creates costs for 
society that are shared equally among all. Arguments such as this one led to the 
development of responsibility-sensitive welfare egalitarianism—equal opportunities for 
welfare—which I will describe in the following section, along with Dworkin’s counter-
argument. I will then (2.3) consider the strongest welfare-inclusive challenge to 
equality of resources—the brute taste challenge from G.A. Cohen. In section 2.3 I will 
also show how welfare considerations are included in the resourcist metric through 
hypothetical insurance decisions. There are two interpretations of Cohen’s position; 
either as an argument for brute preference luck or brute price luck, and the latter is the 
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focus of sections 2.4 and 2.5. In section 2.6 I will summarise the reasons to prefer a 
resource-only metric to one that includes welfare.  
2.2 Opportunity for welfare  
In order to resolve the responsibility problem from the previous section, welfarists 
could propose that opportunity for welfare should be equalised, rather than welfare 
levels. This would seek to ensure that everyone in society is in a position where they 
can attain the specified equal level of welfare. So if someone has a genetic disability or 
poor upbringing which renders her less able to achieve the same welfare as others, 
then she would receive additional resources in order to render her equal in that regard. 
However, if she squanders those resources or additional opportunities then she should 
be held liability-responsible for squandering them. This is to insist that opportunity for 
welfare is itself a theory of fair shares. The fair shares are set according to people’s 
ability to obtain the set amount of welfare, and people are responsible for what they 
do with those shares.192  
One problem with this view is that this appears to disallow redistribution to individuals 
whose preferences become more expensive; a strange move given that accounting for 
more expensive preferences appears to motivate the view. This is borne out in an 
example that parallels that of Louis, but to which we are more sympathetic.193 Jude’s 
initial ambitions in the welfare-equal society are cheap, and he is happy with his 
resources despite having fewer than others. However, upon reading Hemmingway, 
Jude decides to take up the challenging sport of bullfighting. Jude’s resources are not 
sufficient to cover this expense, and he is unfulfilled. However, the resources he now 
requires are still no more than others receive.  
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The two cases have a similar structure, with the difference that Louis already had 
resources of average value to begin with while Jude had less than the average. 
Welfarists would have to choose to compensate Jude and Louis, in which case they 
pander to expensive tastes. Or they should reject Jude’s claim on the basis that at some 
previous point in time he had cheap tastes and he chose to change his goals to pursue 
the more expensive pursuit of bullfighting. In order to explain the intuition that Jude 
should receive extra resources while Louis should not, we need to have a theory of fair 
shares, which would imply an underlying theory of equality of resources. Equality of 
resources provides all people with the same resource-based opportunities, allowing 
them to reconsider their tastes as they see fit without any redistributive implications. 
This fits in with the ideal that individuals have assignment responsibility over their 
tastes, and liability responsibility for the costs of their tastes. 
Richard Arneson presents a possible reply to the case of Jude, which is that opportunity 
for welfare supporters can compensate Jude and not Louis if they distinguish between 
preferences that are fairly or voluntarily chosen and those that are not. They would 
then hold people responsible for preferences that they have chosen to cultivate 
themselves while allowing compensation for those that are not chosen.194 However, 
there is clearly nothing wrong with a person intentionally changing their preferences195 
to make them more expensive.196 The problem is that others bear the cost of this, 
which opportunity for welfare resolves. However, it does not then answer the case of 
Jude—if Jude deliberately changed his preferences then he would not be able to go to 
Spain, even though he has fewer resources than others and developed a genuine 
interest in something more expensive.  
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The case for a resource metric is well-expressed in the case of Jude. There is no reason 
why Jude should not develop his tastes as he sees fit and there is no reason why he 
should not be able to pursue those tastes if others would be so able. We would wish to 
limit Louis’ resources because we would not want him to be able to do things that 
others cannot afford to do simply because he has more expensive preferences. 
Similarly, Jude should have the resources to be able to do what others can do, as long 
as he bears responsibility for the expense of the choice that he makes. This supports 
the envy-based approach to distributive justice taken by equality of resources.197  
2.3 Hypothetical insurance, welfare and bad preference luck 
G.A. Cohen challenged equality of resources on the basis that it is actually the idea of 
compensating bad luck that renders the view attractive, rather than the ideal of equal 
resources and hypothetical insurance decisions.198 Cohen argued that it is unnecessary 
to focus solely on resources as the equalisandum, and that it is possible to include 
welfare considerations. I will discuss Cohen’s arguments in this section and discuss his 
notion of bad preference luck. However, Cohen later changed his position to one 
focusing on bad price luck, as I will explain in section 2.4. I will respond to Cohen’s 
alternative view in section 2.5.199 In this section I will consider the bad preference luck 
argument, and clarify that welfare considerations do have a place in equality of 
resources, but not as part of the metric.  
The challenge of bad preference luck is that people may have less luck in their 
preferences, since they turn out to be expensive, and that people should receive 
                                                        
197
 Another way of putting this is that equality of opportunity for welfare requires three premises to 
hold simultaneously. These are; some notion of appropriate preferences for each person, a way to 
measure those appropriate preferences, and a way to ensure that each individual has an equal 
amount of preference satisfaction. It seems that it is only possible to avoid the—perfectionist—
imposition of valuation on the latter two by insisting that people should have their resources 
restricted to those required to meet whatever preferences they happen to have at a specified time. 
198
 Cohen, 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice',   at 907, 08, 22. 
199
 This way of characterising the disagreement—that Cohen is either accusing equality of resources 
of failing to respect people’s bad preference luck or bad price luck—is from Dworkin, Sovereign 
Virtue  at 285-99.  
71 
 
compensation for this misfortune. This is the basis on which it is possible to 
differentiate between Jude and Louis; if Jude has suffered from bad luck in the 
unintended formation of a new preference he would (possibly) be due compensation 
according to the opportunity for welfare view. One problem here is that it is not then 
clear how the “compensation for bad preferences” view is different from simple 
equality of welfare, since it is not then the existence of opportunities at a set point that 
matters, but the existence of opportunities at the initial point plus or minus any 
legitimate change in preferences later on. 
Much of the confusion in the debate between resourcists and opportunity-for-
welfarists has resulted from certain similarities between this approach and a feature of 
equality of resources. For example, Dworkin claims that someone who found tap water 
to be incredibly sour and undrinkable might have a claim for compensation according 
to equality of resources.200 This is because they could cite problems such as these as 
disabilities against which they would insure. Dworkin proposes a test for handicaps that 
may be considered preferences, which is whether or not someone would take a—side-
effect free—pill in order to remove the preference.201 If they would take the pill then 
their unwanted preference is unfortunate—an addiction—and a candidate for 
compensation according to hypothetical insurance.202 However, if they would not take 
the pill then they obviously approve of their preference and they have no basis for 
compensation. This is true even if their preference was initially unchosen, such as the 
expensive tastes that some religious believers have for pilgrimages. 
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We can understand this point in terms of that for which people should be deemed 
responsible. Cohen distinguishes according to whether or not tastes have been chosen 
in order to determine those for which people should be held responsible.203 He would 
provide compensation to anyone who did not act in ways that would lead to the 
cultivation of more expensive tastes. Dworkin, on the other hand, does not focus on 
the genesis of the tastes. Instead, he focuses on whether the individual would rather 
not have the taste.204 For Dworkin, one must take liability-responsibility for the cost of 
any taste that one affirms. This is because one has assignment responsibility for one’s 
conception of the good, and for living out one’s life in accordance with it. According to 
equality of resources, people are held responsible for the preferences they have and 
endorse, and for meeting them, no matter by what process those preferences came 
about.205  
The hypothetical insurance device can therefore include welfare considerations, where 
preferences are disowned. However, it is important to make clear that this does not 
mean that welfare is part of the resourcist metric.206 People are able to value any 
welfare-related problem from which they may suffer according to the resources they 
would be willing to risk as an insurance premium. This means that welfare 
considerations come into play, to the extent that they matter to people when 
compared to other considerations. However, these comparisons between people are 
made in terms of resources, insured from a position of hypothetical equality. People 
have to consider their aversion to pain and their prospects of pleasure in this situation 
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of equal resources. Welfare will not be equalized on the quite legitimate assumption 
that people will care about other matters rather than simply ensuring they achieve as 
high an amount of pleasure over their lives as possible.207 People cannot claim that 
their preferences are a form of bad luck, however, because if they did they would 
disown them. If they disowned them they would legitimately be liable for schooling 
themselves out of them or simply ignoring them and focusing instead on what matters 
to them more. Where unable to do so, due to addiction, people would be eligible for 
assistance.  
2.4 Cohen’s brute tastes  
I have considered one argument from Cohen that bad preference luck actually does the 
attractive work in equality of resources. However, in a later work Cohen emphasised 
that his complaint was actually against what Dworkin refers to as bad price-luck.208 This 
means that, for Cohen, people can have a legitimate complaint in some circumstances 
that their self-affirmed tastes are more expensive than those of others. Cohen feels he 
can avoid the problems faced by other proponents of opportunity for welfare because 
his metric need not be welfare-based. Indeed, he proposes that what should matter is 
‘equality of access to advantage’, which seeks to equalize opportunity not for ‘welfare 
alone but for a vector which includes that, and resources, and need satisfaction, and, 
perhaps, other advantages.’209 I will set out what I take to be Cohen’s position in this 
section, and respond to it in section 2.5.  
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For Cohen, someone suffers from bad luck if their preferences are more expensive to 
satisfy than others—assuming certain conditions—and those suffering from this form 
of bad luck should receive additional resources in order to satisfy those preferences. 
Cohen’s point is that people do not face the market on equal terms because some are 
luckier in the price of what they want than others are. If he is able to sustain this view it 
would undermine the fundamental role of the market in determining equality under 
equality of resources.210 This is because markets respond to preferences as they are, 
ignoring this alleged form of misfortune; the market is then simply a ‘brute luck 
machine’.211 Cohen’s example of Fred and Paul illustrates his point. Fred finds fishing a 
rewarding hobby, which is cheap, while Paul enjoys photography, which requires 
expensive equipment.212 For Cohen, it is Paul’s misfortune that he does not like the 
cheaper activity, and equality of resources is unfair to him as it would not enable him 
to pursue his preferred hobby as easily as Fred can pursue his. According to Cohen, it 
would be necessary to provide subsidies to those who suffer from bad market luck. 
However, in practice it would be impractical to provide special, individualised subsidies. 
Subsidies would therefore have to take a more general form.213 The example Cohen 
gives in several places is that of public libraries, which may spend more money on 
expensive arts books than the relatively low readership of arts books would appear to 
merit.214 The need for these subsidies would undermine the claim of the market to 
deliver equality.  
Cohen presents a ‘flagship statement’ of his view on luck, preferences and prices as 
follows. He would distinguish among ‘expensive tastes according to whether or not 
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their bearers can reasonably be held responsible for the fact that their tastes are 
expensive. There are those that they could not have helped forming and/or could not 
now unform without violating their own judgment, and then there are those for whose 
cost, by contrast, they can be held responsible, because they could have forestalled 
their development, and/or because they could now quite readily unlearn them, without 
violating their own judgment.’215  
Cohen can answer the examples of Louis and Jude as he does not take a solely welfare-
based metric. Louis desired extra resources because he schooled himself into his 
desires either because he felt he should have more than others or because he felt he 
should enjoy the finer things in life, even if everyone would be worse-off as a result. 
Louis should be held responsible for his tastes if they were generated in these ways, as 
he knew they would require him to have a greater than equal share of resources if 
met.216 By contrast, if Jude genuinely developed a more expensive preference then he 
should receive compensation as Cohen feels he was not using resources to which he 
could have potentially been entitled. Louis had more than a fair share of resources to 
begin, but Jude did not. This strikes me as something of a fudged job; Cohen can get 
around the problems of any given metric by appealing to the other when it suits him. 
He feels he can offer a vague metric as it only needs to be sufficient to undermine the 
use of the market to determine equality in equality of resources. In the remainder of 
this section I will attempt to reconstruct, to a degree, Cohen’s position, by considering 
the examples he gives. Cohen does not specify the relationship between the several 
parts of his metric, but fortunately it is not necessary to do so for Cohen’s purposes or 
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mine. I will show that his examples gain any power that they have from the notion of 
need.217 Indeed, Cohen asserts that need is an ‘important element’ in his view.218  
I will now consider the examples that Cohen gives in order to show how needs play an 
important role in them. I have already mentioned the example of Fred the fisherman 
and Paul the photographer. I contend that the example only has any traction if we 
assume that everyone has a need to have a fulfilling hobby and that Paul is therefore 
disadvantaged compared to Fred. The same might be said to apply to the library 
example also mentioned above; everyone should have access to the reading material 
that they might want, irrespective of cost differentials. This presumably arises because 
of an equal need for people to have access to the educative material they desire, or to 
follow leisure pursuits; where education and leisure count as fundamental needs.219 
The other examples Cohen gives are of food. Cohen describes Harry, who hates eggs 
but lives on an island on which eggs are the only cheap food.220 Cohen also asks 
whether he should be asked to pay the full price of figs to others if he does not like 
cheaper apples.221 The power of these examples arises because of the need for food 
and sustenance. However, in these cases the unfortunate individuals can meet their 
needs for food at the same cost as others, but only if they suffer displeasure. They can 
avoid the displeasure only by taking resources that they might have used for their other 
needs or wants. Cohen’s examples work by ring-fencing each need and specifying that 
everyone should have that need met as cheaply as possible given their reasonable 
requirements, which includes tastes. I will now express my concerns regarding Cohen’s 
approach and arguments.  
                                                        
217
 Need is a concept that plays no role in equality of resources, except of course where hypothetical 
insurers would take account of what they consider to be their needs when considering policies.  
218
 Cohen, 'Expensive Tastes Rides Again',  at 17. 
219
 Dworkin’s response to the library example is that we would have different reasons to provide arts 
books, such as that they help achieve the public good of an educated citizenry, Ronald Dworkin, 
'Ronald Dworkin Replies', Ibid. at 343. 
220
 G.A. Cohen, 'Expensive Tastes Rides Again', Ibid. at 8. 
221
 Ibid. at 18. 
77 
 
2.5 Arguments against Cohen’s welfare-inclusive view  
I have expounded Cohen’s metric of access to advantage, his view of responsibility, and 
his reliance on the notion of needs in his argument. His argument against equality of 
resources is that people have bad luck in the price of satisfying their preferences for 
things which they need, and that where this is the case they should receive a greater 
than equal share of resources in order to maintain equality. In this section I will argue 
that it is wrong to compensate people for their bad price luck. First of all, I will consider 
that bad price luck claims would violate the continuity test. I will then consider an 
alternative Cohenian continuity test and argue that this test is inferior to the resources-
based continuity test. 
I said above in response to the problem of bad preference luck that equality of 
resources implies that people should be held responsible for the true opportunity costs 
of their activities; for what is expressive of their personality and not simply their 
circumstances. This can be generalised into a test for disadvantages that are worthy of 
compensation—for which people should not be liable. This continuity test indicates the 
limits on the kind of compensation that people can request from others. According to 
this test, only claims that are continuous with one’s ethical commitments are 
acceptable.222 Paul the photographer’s claim that he is disadvantaged by his expensive 
leisure pursuit is discontinuous with his beliefs. If Paul claims that he needs additional 
resources to meet his more expensive preferences he would need to claim that 
preference satisfaction is his aim in life.223 However, if he were really interested in 
preference satisfaction he would presumably want to make his preferences as cheap as 
possible. Instead, Paul wishes to claim that his particular preference is a disadvantage, 
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while not accepting preference satisfaction as his aim in life. If it is continuous with his 
ethical beliefs, and he has assignment responsibility for his ethical beliefs, then it would 
be wrong to limit his liability-responsibility for the pursuit.  
Complaints about resource inequalities do not fall foul of the continuity test because 
they do not involve any ethical commitments on the part of the parties involved; Jude 
can complain that he envies the resources of others in his society who could afford to 
go on holiday—to do what he wants to do—while he cannot. Jude is only claiming that 
he has fewer resources.  
Cohen argues that people can regret the price of their preferences without rejecting 
those preferences. He therefore appears to be accepting the idea of a continuity test, 
but specifying it differently. I will now consider two alternative interpretations of the 
continuity test, both of which are suggested to me by his discussion. The first is 
suggested by Cohen in his response to the continuity test. This is that people should 
phrase their complaint not in terms of what they themselves count as important, but in 
terms of what is important tout court.224 This tout court continuity test would appear to 
be self-defeating, however, since it would appear to provide an external answer to 
questions of justice; why do we need to ask people what they envy about others if the 
answer is always in terms of what is taken to matter tout court?225 Such a test would 
give up on attempts to determine equality based upon the values and choices of each 
individual. Since it would require a notion of what matters it is perfectionist. After all, it 
would need to say what forms of welfare and needs matter and to what extent in order 
to determine whether the envy that someone has is legitimate or not tout court.  
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The second alternative interpretation of the continuity test is a needs-based continuity 
test.226 Paul can reject not the taste itself, nor the desires of others as calculated in a 
market process, but the greater expense of meeting his need for leisure than that faced 
by others.227 Since the needs-based test focuses on needs rather than the particular 
taste in question, it would appear to avoid the problem that Paul would have to reject 
his self-affirmed desire to make photographs as part of his fundamental ethical 
commitments. This needs-based test would also allow Cohen to provide a different 
answer to the expensive tastes of Louis to that of Paul, since Louis’ tastes do not relate 
to his needs.228 Put in terms of an envy-test, people envy others’ cheap needs, not 
cheap tastes. Either one would problematize the use of the market, but the former is 
much more reasonable than the latter. It is on the basis of this needs-based continuity 
test that Cohen’s examples gain their traction. This continuity test is more attractive 
than the previous one on the basis that we might not begrudge others greater 
resources than ourselves if it is necessary in order for them to meet needs, while we 
would feel aggrieved at missing out on resources in order for another person to obtain 
what they simply desire. 
There are many problems with this needs-based test, however. The first is that is a 
controversial issue as to what counts as a need, and what the specific nature of this 
need is. It is fairly straightforward in biological cases, such as the need for food, to say 
that a human needs x calories and y litres of water a day in order to survive. However, 
to the extent that we can un-controversially accept some matters to be needs, equality 
of resources would provide for these. People would have an equal amount of resources 
to others to meet these simple needs. In addition, the requirement that people have 
freedoms and authenticity in order to ensure that true opportunity costs are met 
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means that people would have a decent starting position in which their needs are met. 
Furthermore, if people cannot take care of their needs through their resource share 
they would also have had the option to purchase hypothetical insurance to cover the 
costs of their needs. Most people would insure for homeless shelters and soup-kitchens 
in case they should find themselves destitute.  
Unlike the simple cases of need described above, in the cases of leisure activities upon 
which Cohen appears to rely it is less obvious what the need is. With the exception of 
the biological requirements for survival, the extent to which different parts of life 
generate needs is bound to be controversial.229 Some people may feel that they should 
go without leisure activities altogether and dedicate themselves to their careers and/or 
loved ones. How much leisure should each person have? Should there be a limit on the 
cost of a leisure pursuit—should someone whose only leisure interest is to visit outer 
space receive the required compensation? In Paul’s case, is it enough that he can read 
about professional photographers and observe them as they go about their activities, 
or does he need to have his own camera, film and dark-room? Paul’s assignment 
responsibility over his life implies that he should decide upon his leisure activities based 
upon the resources available to him.  
2.6 Advantage to Resources? 
I will now review why the resource-based continuity test works as it does and why it is 
so crucial. To begin, I consider Dworkin’s arguments against the claim that someone 
suffers from bad price luck. Dworkin counters with the claim that everyone has bad 
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price luck in the sense that the world could have been different in such a way that their 
preferences could be more cheaply fulfilled.230 However, according to equality of 
resources—and as should be apparent from the previous chapter—justice is 
relational.231 It specifies a situation in which people can judge whether they are better-
off than others while allowing people to judge for themselves what makes their life go 
well. This is why people are asked to judge for themselves whether they are worse-off 
than others from a position of initial equality. Each person has to take the definitions 
that other people have of what matters, and the resources that they would therefore 
desire, as a given factor when determining their life plans and the resources they need. 
Equality is built into equality of resources as everyone is involved in the process 
through the equal and neutral market.  
I will now show why Cohen’s indeterminate advantage metric cannot be used in an 
egalitarian way, while taking into account the value that resources have to others. 
Equality of resources sets a clear baseline position of equality from which people can 
secure resources based upon their values and plans. Cohen does not specify how his 
multifaceted notion is composed, which precludes the possibility of coming up with 
counter-examples. However, its multifaceted structure precludes an egalitarian 
valuation akin to that undertaken in equality of resources.  
Consider how it would be possible to use the metric in order to determine some level 
of equality beyond which people can be held responsible for their actions. This could 
either be done by imposing one composite of the various welfare-considerations and 
resource-considerations upon everyone, or by allowing each individual to define their 
own composite. If the same composite were applied to everyone, then it would require 
the imposition of a certain form of valuation of the different elements in a way that 
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each individual would find alien. People could complain that they have not been shown 
equal concern in the generation of the composite. 
However, if each individual can determine their own composite based upon their 
values or preferences then the proposal becomes unwieldy. Pairwise interpersonal 
comparisons would be made on a different basis on each side: Rachel would value the 
advantage of Sophie in terms of the hedonic pleasure it would bring her while Sophie 
would value Rachel’s resource advantages. It is not clear how it is open to anyone to 
say that they are treated unequally as both parties could say they are worse-off than 
the other. Indeed, allowing each individual to utilise their own composite could even 
result in an impossible situation,232 whereby improving Sophie’s position relative to 
Rachel could make everyone else envious of Sophie, requiring further adjustments ad 
infinitum. There would certainly be no basis on which people could set their 
preferences or determine what they want in life in a way that reflects the equal 
position of others.233 There is, therefore, no way to apply Cohen’s approach in order to 
work out equality in the way that equality of resources does.234  
Equality of resources represents a particular ideal of justice, whereby all individuals in a 
community come together to work out what fair shares each should have.235 As a result 
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of that process, that outcome is justified to all, since it will not violate the continuity 
test of anyone. There is an answer to anyone who claims he has received less than he 
should from society; that giving him more of what he wanted would violate the equal 
share to which others are entitled. All of the relevant considerations are thereby taken 
into account in the determination of equal shares, according to the wishes of the 
members of society.236  
I have answered the challenge that welfare should be either the basis of, or included in, 
the metric of distributive justice. I have considered the rival metrics of equality of 
welfare, equality of opportunity for welfare, and equality of access to advantage. When 
we see that welfare is not a simple notion, but rather can mean one of a number of 
contentious things, the apparent appeal of the metric recedes. Furthermore, attempts 
to include the notion of welfare would violate the continuity test, whereby a person 
can only request compensation for what he considers a disadvantage. An alternative 
needs-based continuity test which includes bad-price-luck does not work as it imposes 
a definition of what aspects of life count as needs and the extent to which particular 
aspects of welfare and resources should matter to people. I will now turn to another 
rival metric, that of capabilities.  
2.7 The Capability Approach  
I will now defend equality of resources against the claim that fair taxation should be 
determined using the capability metric. In order to do so I will explain the capability 
view, before considering whether—and how—it is distinct from equality of resources. 
One difference is that the capability approach proposes a clear way to challenge social 
norms, a difference I will argue does not lead us to prefer a capability approach to 
taxation. Another difference is that the capability approach can accept violations of the 
continuity test. I will differentiate several alternative capability-based approaches that 
could be utilised as a guide to tax policy, and show how each of these alternatives fails 
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to meet the starting assumptions set out in the previous chapter. I will end by 
highlighting the advantages of equality of resources over capability approaches.  
The capability metric was first proposed by economist and philosopher Amartya Sen in 
the late 1970s as an alternative to welfare and resource-based metrics.237 Sen 
presented his proposal as a combination of the best of these rival views, while avoiding 
their problems.238 Sen criticised Rawls’ (resourcist) primary goods bundle metric on the 
basis that it is that it is not attuned to the specifics of the individual, and what she is 
able to achieve with her resources. His criticism of welfarism is similar to that 
presented by Dworkin.239  
Sen uses the example is of a severely disabled individual, who is contented with his lot, 
but who is unable to get around. Sen’s argument is that neither the primary goods nor 
the welfarist approaches can explain our intuition that the crippled individual requires 
additional resources. Sen proposed ‘basic capabilities’ as a shift ‘from goods to what 
goods do to human beings.’240 That is, the focus should be on what sets of functionings 
individuals are capable of achieving.241 The functions might therefore be the ability to 
have good health, to move around, to interact with others. These capabilities are not 
commensurable with one another, meaning that they cannot be valued on the same 
scale.242 Furthermore, Sen does not describe how these alternative sets of capabilities 
(or their attendant functionings) are to be valued, though he points towards his social 
choice approach and democratic deliberation as the means to make these difficult 
decisions. I will return to this latter issue in section 2.10.  
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For the moment, it should be mentioned that other philosophers have adopted the 
capabilities approach. Aristotle-influenced Martha Nussbaum has utilised the 
capabilities metric in developing a list of basic capabilities that are required for ‘truly 
human functioning.’243 Her list of ten basic capabilities includes the capabilities to live, 
to be healthy, to have bodily integrity and to have the practical reason required in 
order to form a conception of the good and a rational plan of life. Nussbaum admits 
that her list may be subject to later amendment, but criticises Sen for being so 
reluctant to commit himself to a particular list.244 For Nussbaum, the list should be 
universal, though the interpretation of it may change slightly in different locations.245 
Sabina Alkire also proposes to develop a list of capabilities, but based upon practical 
reasoning about the true ends of human activity.246  
It should be made clear that Nussbaum’s theory is a partial theory of justice, in contrast 
to a complete theory such as that of Rawls or Dworkin. Partial theories do not provide a 
full explanation of what to do once the basic capabilities are met. A similar position is 
taken by Elizabeth Anderson, whose broader view is that everyone within society 
should be respected by others as an equal.247 Rather than a partial theory of justice, 
Anderson appears to take a pluralist position. This is sufficientarian initially,248 and then 
would require other principles once the basic capabilities were sufficiently met.249 
Anderson even allows that taxation should be determined according to additional 
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principles, not according to the capability approach.250 As such, Nussbaum and 
Anderson’s views on the capability approach do not necessarily contradict the resource 
egalitarian position on the determination of taxation-related issues, though they clearly 
disagree in some areas.251 Furthermore, Nussbaum’s approach at least is avowedly 
perfectionist—it has its foundations in the desire for human flourishing—and so falls 
foul of the anti-perfectionist starting assumption.252 I will therefore focus on Sen’s 
views for the most part from here.  
As is perhaps already apparent, adopting the capability metric does not require a 
commitment to one particular distributive approach. Just as one could maximise or 
equalise utility, capabilities could be applied on an equalising, sufficientarian, 
maximising, or prioritarian basis. Indeed, as Anderson proves, it is possible to be a 
pluralist capability theorist, taking a sufficientarian position below a certain threshold 
and an alternative view above it. What the capability approach offers is a particular 
“evaluative space” for analysing distributive justice, not a complete theory in itself.253 It 
therefore needs to be combined with a distributive approach to create a theory that 
answers distributive questions.  
Sen also attempts to avoid the creation of a complete theory, but for different reasons. 
Not only does he fail to endorse a particular list of capabilities, he does not specify the 
trade-off between various considerations against one another. Sen presents his social 
choice theory approach as a method of determining rankings involving sets of 
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incommensurable goods.254 Furthermore, for Sen deliberative democracy and public 
reason should determine the correct choice between outcomes in practice.255  
Sen’s view would imply that the capability approach should guide taxation decisions, 
though I am not aware of any capability-based taxation proposals. Capability-based 
taxation would either require the direct linkage between a person’s taxation and her 
capabilities, or would require some resource-based proxy.256 The former would require 
the valuation of each person’s capability sets and using that to calculate the taxation 
that would reduce the capability set of some in order to fund improvements to the 
capability sets of others. How could such a capability valuation be applied to taxation? 
People could have their individual tax-rates determined by their personal capability set, 
and how it was considered to be more valuable than that of others. This would require 
a list of capabilities with fully specified weightings between them,257 which would then 
contradict Sen’s ideal of utilising his social choice approach to deal with 
incommensurable values.  
Before further considering the distinction between resources and capabilities, I will 
briefly mention the distinction between capability views and opportunity for welfare 
views.258 The capability view combines two aspects that are separated out in 
opportunity for welfare views. One is the fact that capability is concerned with the 
ability to do something, not the actual achievement of a given outcome. This 
corresponds to the distinction between opportunity for welfare views and welfare 
outcomes simpliciter. On the other hand, there is the distinction between the single 
notion of welfare as the outcome as opposed to that of capabilities for numerous 
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functionings in the capability approach. Some have discussed the extent to which these 
are equivalent, but it appears that the outcome of functionings can be distinguished 
from the outcome of welfare achievement.259 If the referent functionings within the 
capability approach were solely welfare-based, such as the ability to be happy, then the 
view would be equivalent to opportunity for welfare. However, functionings are likely 
to be broader than this—such as the ability to move about irrespective of its welfare 
effects—and therefore the view can be distinct from opportunity for welfare.260 
Sen claims that capabilities are distinguished from resource-based approaches, with 
particular reference to the Rawlsian primary goods approach, because resource 
comparisons pay no regard to the functionings that they enable individuals to 
achieve.261 For example, a pregnant woman may obtain less from the same resource 
bundle as a non-pregnant woman. By focusing on the functionings that resources 
enable rather than the resources themselves, there is scope for difference between the 
capability approach and Rawls’ position.262 As Sen puts it, there is a difference between 
the means of freedom—resources—and the extent of freedom—capabilities.263  
However, while this complaint may apply against a simple primary goods approach, it 
does not have as much traction against Dworkin’s equality of resources. This is because 
Dworkin includes the notion of personal resources, as well as impersonal ones. The 
hypothetical insurance scheme is designed to determine just compensation for 
personal resource deficits such as poor health, bad market luck, and bad luck in social 
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background.264 This allows many “capability-disadvantages” to be compensated under 
the heading of impersonal resource deficits. As a result, the complaint against resource 
egalitarianism must take a different form to the complaint against other resource-
based metrics. 
The discussion of the capabilities approach is somewhat hamstrung by the lack of 
agreement on either a list of valuable capabilities/functionings or their applicability to a 
complete theory of justice. As such, there are no immediate candidates in helping us 
determine fair taxation according to the capability approach.265 Nonetheless, we would 
want to develop a capabilities-based approach to taxation if the approach is superior to 
the resource-based approach. I contend that it is not a superior guide to equal taxation. 
In order to do so I will consider the extent to which the approaches differ and to which 
these differences are telling (sections 2.8-2.9). In section 2.10 I will discuss Sen’s 
arguments against equality of resources, and will assess the prospects for a capability 
approach to taxation in 2.11.  
2.8 Are capabilities distinct from resources? 1. Social Norms 
I have mentioned that Sen’s arguments against resource-based metrics apply much 
more readily to Rawls’ primary goods than to Dworkin’s resourcist view. Dworkin takes 
this point further and argues that the capability view is either identical with the 
resource egalitarian view or with equality of opportunity for welfare. This is because 
resource egalitarianism allows people to value their personal as well as impersonal 
resources and it is these together that enable people to ‘do what they want.’266 
Dworkin suggests that in order to avoid a collapse into equality of resources, Sen must 
insist upon a strong outcome-based position, comparing the outcomes people are able 
to achieve, which would then be equivalent to equal opportunity for welfare. However, 
there are reasons to think that they are different. Andrew Williams presents two areas 
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in which the two approaches appear to differ; social norms and the continuity test. I 
will discuss the first in this section and the second in section 2.9.  
Williams presents the example of Ann and Bob, twins who are similar in every way 
except their gender. Both wish to have a family and a career, but it is harder for women 
to find a partner who is willing to share parental duties than it is for men. As such, Ann 
is worse-off in capability terms than Bob, despite their otherwise equal personal and 
impersonal resources.267 Capability theorists emphasise that social norms can affect the 
relationship between goods and functionings.268 A further example is the subservient 
role of women in many societies, which greatly reduces the relative capabilities of 
women compared to men. It may be considered that women have internalised these 
roles, or would face censure if they acted in certain ways that are acceptable for men, 
such that women would be more limited in their capabilities even if they had equal 
resources. Capability theorists can therefore argue that their approach is better able to 
take account of social norms that cause inequalities than equality of resources.269 I will 
discuss this issue fully at this point as I will argue that social norms neither undermine 
the case for equality of resources nor require consideration in later discussions of tax 
policy.  
Dworkin’s immediate response to Andrew Williams’ example was to insist that this 
must rest upon a welfarist notion. This is because it refers to the preferences of the 
‘community at large,’270 something which equality of resources generally takes as fixed 
factor around which people are held responsible. As such, Ann’s lesser capability is 
based upon the desires of others, and the only way to determine that her capabilities 
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are less valuable is to value them in a welfarist fashion. Dworkin makes the point that 
both have the same capabilities given the costs of their preferences to others; it is just 
that Ann’s preferences are more expensive given the preferences of men in her society. 
I am not convinced that this is an adequate response as it seems that Ann and Bob have 
the same desires and the interplay of their biological sex and social norms are all that 
makes a difference.271  
It appears that the capability approach readily allows assessment of social norms while 
equality of resources appears to acquiesce in whatever social norms exist. So for 
example, according to the capability approach it is possible to say that the social norms 
in Afghanistan are unequal as men and women do not have an equal capability to go 
out in public. Since it focuses on legitimate applications of authority (i.e. government) 
rather than overall justice in society, it is not clear how equality of resources can make 
parallel claims. I will now consider whether this undermines a resource egalitarian 
approach to taxation.  
What are the implications of this difference between capability and resourcist metrics? 
One claim against equality of resources might be that it is an inadequate theory of 
equality if it is unable to criticise social norms that are obviously unequal and damaging 
to those who suffer from them. However, this would be too quick. While Dworkin 
presents equality of resources on an island with no prior social prejudices with which to 
deal, and has not proposed practical responses to troubling social norms, he has 
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indicated that he thinks equality of resources can deal with such issues.272 Indeed, in 
order to take seriously people’s choices it is necessary for them to be sufficiently 
authentic,273 which might not to be the case where victims of damaging social norms 
have been forced to internalise the oppressive norms of their society. More specifically, 
Dworkin proposes a principle of independence, which insists that prejudice will 
interfere with market-based equality and is hence an issue to which to respond.274 
Others have taken these few remarks on in order to develop a stronger response to the 
problem of social norms.275  
Equality of resources may be able to respond to social norms, and hence the above 
argument, but it is not as powerful as the capability approach in this regard. In 
response to this, I would claim that equality of resources is sensitive enough to the 
issue of social norms, as it could be used to deal with the most serious problems of this 
type without straying into perfectionism. I mentioned above that equality of resources 
appears vulnerable to the issue of social norms because it focuses on the preferences 
that people have and the choices they accordingly make. However, it is not clear how 
the capability approach can avoid going too far in the opposite direction, for example if 
the state encourages the values that would maximise capabilities. The encouragement 
of these values would interfere too much in people’s view of the good life, overriding 
the assignment-responsibility people have to determine for themselves their good in 
life.  
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Kamm expresses this concern as being that the capability approach struggles to 
distinguish capability inequalities that are problematic from the perspective of justice 
from those which are not.276 An example given by Browne and Stears is that of Amanda 
and Brian.277 The society in this example has gender differences regarding whether 
people are talkers, listeners, or conversationalists.278 The ratios of each are not even 
such that women are more likely to be conversationalists and men are more likely to be 
talkers. Browne and Stears consider the impact of this on the marriage market, where a 
woman will find it much harder to find a partner who is a conversationalist than a man. 
However, I do not think this an injustice that needs to be rectified.  
Taking this further, I would question the role that the state should play in adjusting the 
behaviour of its citizens.279 This seems to have the potential to stray perilously close to 
government interference in the development of conceptions of the good. Of course, no 
one develops their theory of the good in a vacuum, and their surrounding society will 
be very important in developing such a theory. Indeed, people often try to influence 
others in their choice of what is good in life, and perhaps the capability approach is 
useful to us as private citizens in our deliberations about the effects and desirableness 
of the theories of the good in society.280 However, the capability approach does not 
seem to be able to specify a line whereby interventions in the name of equalising 
capabilities are unwelcome and unnecessary interferences with people’s autonomy. 
Equality of resources suffers from the same problem but from the other direction; it is 
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difficult to determine genuine preferences from those that are determined by 
unacceptable social relations. Drawing these lines is a big problem for both approaches.  
Fortunately, it is not necessary to consider social norms further in this work. To the 
extent that it is the place of the state to interfere in social norms, it is not clear what 
impact this would have on redistributive taxation. One possibility would be that those 
who suffer from discriminatory social norms should be given special tax-breaks as a 
result. Alternatively, “sin” taxes could perhaps be imposed on products related to 
problematic social norms. The advantage of this approach over direct payments or 
advertising is an empirical matter relating to government administration.281 However, 
even if taxation was the best available response, such policies would be ad hoc and 
personalised or issue-specific. Therefore, they would not impact on the tax system 
options I will discuss in later chapters. At this point it is possible to conclude that the 
issue of social norms does not undermine the case for equality of resources, and that 
social norms do not have any general implications for the tax system. Having dealt with 
this diversion, it is now possible to return to the question of the ways in which 
capabilities are distinct from resources.  
2.9 Are capabilities distinct from resources? 2. The continuity test 
The second of Williams’ examples to highlight the difference between capability and 
resourcist metrics is that of Dan and Ella. Dan and Ella are deaf in a society in which 
most people can hear. However, while Ella abhors her condition, Dan does not feel any 
envy towards those who can hear. This is because his deafness allows him to be a 
member of the deaf community, which he values very highly. According to the 
continuity test,282 Dan does not have a resource deficit in this case, while Ella does. This 
is because Ella can claim hypothetical-insurance based compensation for her 
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disadvantage while Dan cannot, since Dan does not envy those with hearing. The 
capability approach, on the other hand, insists that both individuals are disadvantaged. 
The challenge to equality of resources is therefore that the capability approach can 
propose to compensate the disadvantaged in cases which resource egalitarianism 
cannot. Dworkin responds to Williams’ example by insisting that most hypothetical 
insurance outcomes will be offered in kind, which Dan could therefore choose not take 
up.283 This response highlights that the case is not particularly troubling; people have 
assignment responsibility over their lives and can reject compensation that others 
receive. Since compensation that would increase capabilities would usually be offered 
in the form of services rather than money it is not clear that anyone would receive 
resources for reasons that they would not approve.  
The issue would be troubling in severe cases, of course, in which people rejected what 
might be considered fundamental capabilities. In the unlikely case that an individual’s 
autonomy were threatened by his lack of the capability, then—of course—his capability 
would be restored in order to ensure the authenticity of his decisions.284 However, as 
long as the autonomy of the capability-rejecting individual is not violated we need not 
worry that he might reject capabilities that most other people would value. 
The continuity test is one area in which there is a clear distinction; it is possible to value 
resources on the basis of the continuity test, but valuing capabilities and welfare in 
such a way is problematic. This also provides an advantage for the resourcist approach. 
Incommensurable capabilities cannot be valued on a personal basis from a position of 
equality, as it is impossible to consider an auction-like device whereby people can trade 
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and value their own capabilities and the cost of their capabilities to others.285 This, 
then, relates to the differences in the valuation exercise in the capability and resource 
approaches. If it is possible for people to place their personal value on capabilities in a 
universal fashion, then the approach can be equivalent to equality of resources. 
However, this need not be the case, in which case the points raised in this section and 
the previous section mark differences. However, these differences do not establish that 
the capability approach is a superior approach to distributive justice and taxation. 
It is thus possible to pick out several dimensions in which the capabilities approach 
differs from equality of resources. The first is that the capability approach has a greater 
ability to make a direct attack on social norms. However, I have shown that this issue 
should not make us give up on equality of resources as an approach to taxation. The 
second difference is that equality of resources allows people to value resources 
themselves according to their personal plan of life (or theory of the good), while the 
capability approach is less amenable to such valuation. The third difference is that 
equality of resources is arranged in such a way that equality is integral, while this is not 
necessarily the case with the capability approach. In the following section (2.10) I will 
consider capability-based attacks on equality of resources, and then assess the case for 
capability-based taxation in section 2.11.  
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2.10 Sen’s criticism of resource egalitarianism: Transcendental 
institutionalism  
Sen takes a rather different approach to justice to that of Rawls and Dworkin, whom he 
accuses of engaging in what he calls ‘transcendental institutionalism.’ The first aspect 
of this complaint is that theorists of justice specify an ideally just situation and then 
attempt to get the world to that situation. This approach is problematic, for Sen, 
because if you cannot achieve the ideal then it does not necessarily make sense to say 
that you have got closer to it. Sen considers whether the transcendental approach is 
necessary or sufficient for the purposes of comparison and argues that they are not. He 
argues on this account that we can say that if we accept that the Mona Lisa is the ideal 
painting, then this does not help us to rank a Picasso against a Van Gough.  
Sen’s position is that it is possible to determine how to make the world more just 
without any reference to the ideal. We might refer to this as the comparative 
improvements approach. I explained my position on ideal theory in the introduction, 
which is that we should utilise ideal theory, but that it should be appropriate for the 
question at hand.286 I will return to this issue below after explaining Sen’s critique of 
institutionalism.287  
In Sen’s view, institutions are a means to the promotion of justice within society. He 
contrasts this with the Rawlsian idea that the principles of justice apply to the basic 
structure of society, which primarily relates to institutions. Sen feels that the focus 
should instead be upon realizing just social outcomes. While it is possible to determine 
ideally just institutions through a “one-shot” procedure, this is less plausible when 
attempting to determine an ideally just overall outcome. In this section I will argue that 
there are strong reasons to focus on the basic institutions of society when considering 
issues of justice.  
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The first challenge to Sen is that it is not clear that judging or comparing outcomes 
enables us to distinguish justice from injustice. On the institutional approach to justice 
it is possible to rank outcomes independently in terms of their justice and other factors. 
Thus we may say that of two societies in which the institutions and relations between 
individuals are just, one is preferable to the other—because the society is much richer 
for example. However, Sen appears to go further, and say that the preferable society is 
more just as well. This overlooks the fact that justice must be relational; it must be able 
to consider whether some groups or individuals are unfairly favoured over others. If 
Sen is suggesting that outcomes are all that matters, then it seems he is either 
discussing justice with other concerns, or he is not discussing justice at all. 
Alternatively, if Sen is concerned with relational justice, then it is not clear how his 
theory can distinguish between societies which could be made more just and those 
which could just be improved. This is an issue to which I will return.  
Obviating any ideal, it is also harder to answer other important questions relating to 
justice. How are we to judge any institution or individual action as having helped or 
hindered the achievement of justice without an ideal of justice to which to appeal? 
Kamm suggests that Sen may have an answer to this, namely that all parties should aim 
to consider in good faith the consequence of their actions on the capabilities of others, 
and to limit their activities to those which an impartial observer would approve. 
However, this would then introduce an idea of perfect justice; where everyone acts in 
accordance with this ideal.288  
In order to answer questions of social justice and equality without invoking 
transcendental idealism, Sen suggests it is possible to make local comparisons using the 
ideals of public reason, deliberative democracy, and the notion of the impartial 
spectator. However, this reliance of public reason and democracy leads to the question 
as to what role the capability approach should play. If public reason and democracy are 
                                                        
288
 Kamm, 'Sen on Justice and Rights: A Review Essay',   at 95. 
99 
 
so important, why insist on a particular metric of justice at all? It seems to logically 
follow that all such decisions should be left to the public themselves.289 Furthermore, 
Sen’s reliance upon public reasoning as the means to determining just outcomes 
appears optimistic. There are many potential problems with democratic decision-
making, such as mistakes in reasoning and various forms of power imbalance.290 
Supporters of the capability approach would no doubt wish to remove these forms of 
imbalance, but it is not clear how far they can criticise any outcomes if they do not hold 
up a further ideal of equal democratic power as a form of equal concern at this level.291 
A democracy-based approach to distributive justice, however, can result in inegalitarian 
relations; a majority could vote in its favour against a minority. 
Perhaps Sen intends the impartial spectator device to be useful in determining 
appropriate democratic decisions. However, as Dworkin points out, the ideal spectator 
does not provide any kind of guide in itself. While the spectator may be impartial, she 
has to decide on behalf of those who are affected. This spectator therefore needs to 
have a method of making these decisions, whether utilitarian or based on equality of 
resources, and this is the important issue of justice that needs to be determined.292  
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There is a further problem with focusing on outcomes rather than institutions, namely 
that private citizens will be agents creating just outcomes along with institutions. This 
would create duties293 for agents to improve the capabilities of others in accordance 
with the democratic will.294 This duty is much more involving and far-reaching than the 
duty to comply with just institutions, since in it will additionally involve duties that 
require co-ordination with numerous others. If such a duty would not violate the anti-
perfectionist starting assumption, it would certainly violate the continuity test.295 Sen 
does not wish to say what value society would place on the various capabilities. 
However, such valuation would have to take place in order to assess what capabilities 
to improve.296 Duties to the basic institutions of society are much less troubling.297 
Supporting these institutions does not relate in any way to a particular social outcome 
which may not be continuous with the ethical views of a particular member of society. 
In the introduction I explained that each theory of justice should be applied with the 
relevant level of idealisation for the issue at hand. Sen’s proposal to take a comparative 
approach appears unnecessary with regard to distributive justice. With the issue of 
taxation and benefit regime, it is possible to determine very precise levels of taxation 
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and benefit payment.298 It is much easier to both determine and achieve the ideal 
where the subject is the major institutions of society—such as the tax system—rather 
than a description of the society as a whole. With regard to this fundamental 
institution, then, a transcendental justice approach appears unproblematic. Given the 
precise determination of taxation readily available to governments, it seems an ideal is 
actually required in order to provide specific guidance.299 The incremental approach, on 
the other hand, appears indeterminate, conceivably failing to give detailed guidance in 
many cases.300 It seems implausible for an incremental approach is a virtue in all 
possible cases. Therefore, it must only be a virtue where we cannot specify the ideal, 
presumably due to the complexity and openness of the situation or the limits in coming 
up with a suitable ideal. There are good reasons to limit the issue of justice to 
institutions, regarding which the degree of idealisation I have engaged in is 
unproblematic. 
The arguments in favour of the capability metric considered in this and the previous 
section are based upon an attack on the broadly Rawlsian approach to justice adopted 
by Dworkin. I have shown this attack to be unconvincing. The discussion of capabilities 
and resources has been multifaceted and complex, but I will now pull all of these 
various threads together.  
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2.11 Capability Assessment  
I have highlighted the differences between the capability and resource-based 
approaches to distributive justice. I will now assess the attractiveness of the capability 
approach, with regard to the starting assumptions of this thesis. As I have made clear, 
there are many variations on the capability approach, and so on some measures a 
particular variant may appear attractive while it would not on others. Two distinctions 
can be considered. The first is whether capabilities are to be equalized or to be judged 
in accordance with another distributive principle or principles. The second is whether 
each individual is to value her capabilities relative to others, or if comparisons are to be 
made in accordance with some list.301  
The first principle was that of equal concern. As I made clear, capabilities can be allied 
with any distributive principle or combination of those principles. One option is to 
attempt to equalise capabilities, though capability theorists appear to have withdrawn 
from such a view. Equalising capabilities would be unattractive, however, as it may 
result in levelling down. It would require capability transfers even where the parties 
involved would not think it worth the cost in other capabilities to correct them; for 
example that they should receive expensive treatment to alleviate an illness even 
though it would cost so much that other capabilities, such as for example the capability 
for people to have leisure time, would have to be sacrificed. Other interpretations of 
the capability approach may be considered broadly egalitarian despite the lack of an 
obviously egalitarian principle.302 However, it is hard to judge the egalitarian 
credentials of this capability approach in the abstract.  
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The second principle is that of anti-perfectionism. On the one hand, the focus on 
freedom rather than outcome implies that people would not be forced into any 
perfectionist form of life. However, Dworkin’s argument is that the capability approach 
requires the illegitimate imposition of a definition of the value of capabilities that do 
not reflect the value that the individual would place on them according to their plan of 
life or theory of the good.303 Therefore, even if the approach is not perfectionist, it 
would certainly violate the continuity test. This is because society must determine a 
fully weighted list of capability values in order to make universal comparisons between 
persons. The list would have to be fully specified and valued with the relative weighting 
for each distinct functioning in order to enable comparisons between the disparate 
capabilities that people have. The problem here is that this is fully weighted list will not 
accord with the value that actual people place on the capabilities they might have. As a 
result, resources could be taxed from individuals on the basis that they have greater 
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capabilities they do not particularly value in order to provide compensatory resources 
to individuals for capability deficits those recipients may not find disadvantageous.304  
Sen may feel that over-riding personal valuations in this way is acceptable as long as 
the society has determined this list of valuable capabilities in a suitable fashion. This 
might distinguish his democratic approach from the more obviously perfectionist 
philosophical approach. However, as I argued in the section 2.11, Sen is too optimistic 
regarding democratic capability lists. Sen suggests that there should be public decisions 
about the trade-off between equality (of capability outcome) and other values such as 
efficiency,305 but those decisions are taken by society as a whole—with all of the vested 
interests and so on—rather than on the basis of what individuals would choose. 
Equality of resources eschews this problem entirely, by avoiding the need to select a 
view of what functionings matter in life for the purposes of comparison.306 Equality of 
resources ensures that everyone’s valuation of resources for the purposes of 
distributive justice accord with their ethical commitments, while the capability 
approach does not.  
The third principle is that of special responsibility. This requires that people determine 
their own notion of the good, something the capability approach seems to allow—
people can act or not on the capabilities that they have, and the approach implies a 
degree of freedom. However, it is harder to see how the capability approach would 
determine liability responsibility.307 A resource metric lends itself much more readily to 
a stable and consistent property entitlement regime than a capability based 
                                                        
304
 Williams, 'Dworkin on Capability',   at 34-8.  
305
 Sen, The Idea of Justice  at 232-3, 95. 
306 The fact that the focus is on capabilities (perhaps, opportunities for functionings) rather than 
functionings does not get around the problem, just as the addition of opportunity for welfare does 
not get around the problem of the imposition of a view of welfare. It is true that nobody has to live 
their lives according to this view of the right purpose of life, but the determination of shares 
according to these criteria is inappropriate. This is the case even if the individual is better able to live 
the life he prefers than he might have been if his preferred view was chosen as the form of 
comparison for distributive justice.  
307
 Kamm accuses Sen of saying too little on responsibility, Kamm, 'Sen on Justice and Rights: A 
Review Essay',   at 101. 
105 
 
approach.308 Furthermore, it is not clear how it would be possible to create capability-
based tax rules.309 However, if capability sets were used directly to determine taxation 
it would make taxation very complicated, which would make it much more difficult for 
people to manage and plan their affairs. Taxation needs to be reasonably predictable 
and capability based resource adjustments could well be very irregular and 
unpredictable.310 This would make it harder for people to make and carry out their 
plans. Capability valuation based taxation would also be unfeasible and intrusive, as it 
would involve the collection of very detailed information about each individual. 
If the capability approach would rest on pre-existing types of taxation, then it would 
offer little guide to the determination of precise tax and benefit rules and rates. 
However, a direct capability-based approach to taxation would threaten to undermine 
liability responsibility. This would occur if it would insulate property rights from the 
decisions that individuals make about their property. To illustrate, we can imagine that 
someone who spent their resources, thereby reducing their capability set, would get 
additional resources at the expense of others whose capability set was not diminished 
because they saved their earlier resources.311 As it is an entitlement theory, equality of 
resources does not have any such worries.  
This relates to the broader concern that I have raised at several points in the discussion 
so far; that the capability approach appears to be indeterminate and unhelpful. The 
approach does not offer the fine-grained answers that are required for the setting of 
tax-rates and levels of compensation for misfortune. Sen’s examples are usually pretty 
uncontroversial, such as slavery,312 and he does little to suggest how the approach 
deals with the difficult issues for which equality of resources is designed. Finally, to the 
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extent that capabilities matter to people, and affect resources, they will be factored 
into hypothetical insurance decisions.313 
I do not wish to overstate the incompatibilities between capability notions and equality 
of resources. Firstly, there is a strong case to insist upon limits on the application of 
ambition sensitivity. Dworkin applies these to the baseline conditions, where people 
would need to be authentic in order for their ambitions to be taken seriously in order 
to work out their equal share.314 As such, someone should not be permitted to choose 
to live their life in such a way that their autonomy would be undermined. Dworkin also 
emphasises the role of democracy, which requires what might be considered the 
capabilities necessary in order to take part in democracy as a partner.315 We might 
express this in terms of capability, as Rawls more explicitly does,316 thus requiring 
baseline capabilities. However, while this may allow a role for capabilities, it is a very 
small one that is subservient to the wider goal, and does not provide enough to guide 
taxation policy. Nevertheless, it shows that the differences between the views 
regarding “basic capabilities” can be overstated.  
I have argued that the capability approach would not be appropriate as a guide to 
egalitarian taxation, despite its merits. I would accept its usefulness as a guide to 
development statistics, decisions for development charities, international aid 
departments of aid donor governments, and even for private citizens considering their 
interactions with the social norms within their society. However, it is not a suitable 
guide to egalitarian taxation. In order to be used for the purpose of taxation, a fully 
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weighted list of capabilities would be required, which would then need to be imposed 
upon people who would not agree with such a list. The development of such a list will 
not treat people as equals, even if they have all had a say in the list, as it will not leave 
people equally as free as others to pursue their plan of life subject to the requirement 
that they bear the responsibility for that life.  
2.12 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have considered two prominent alternative metrics for justice. Both 
capability and welfare metrics have an opportunity element, which means they are not 
explicitly perfectionism, and also makes room for holding people responsible for 
achieving their self-determined ends. They thus appear to meet the starting principles. 
However, they do not take seriously the value that people put on the different areas of 
their lives. The move to opportunity or capability-based approaches has appeared 
attractive as equality of resources because it allows people freedom to set and pursue 
goals, and holds them responsible for achieving those goals. However, while this 
removes the issues of use-level imposition of values into justice, it still leaves them at 
the calculation-level. Since such calculations need to take place in order to consider 
whether people have been shown equal concern, there is no way to include either 
welfare or functioning values without imposing valuations that do not match—are not 
continuous with—the valuations that each individual places on what matters to her. I 
have argued that the arguments against equality of resources from supporters of these 
alternative metric are misplaced, and that arguments for them overlook important 
advantages of equality of resources.  
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 Bad Market Luck and Ex Post Responses Chapter 3
 
In the first two chapters I have argued that equality of resources is the best approach 
to distributive justice. This is because it takes seriously not only the values and choices 
that people make about how to live their lives, but also the true opportunity costs of 
these actions to others. In order to achieve this, it utilises a neutral market in which the 
value of the items is given by the ambitions of the individuals in the society. I will now 
consider a putative problem for this view that stems from so-called market luck. 
Market luck refers to the different fortune that people have in obtaining resources 
from others, and from market transactions. The former relates to the differing social 
backgrounds that influence wealth. The second relates primarily to marketable skill, 
but is also influenced by other forms of good fortune. Some people are more able to 
obtain resources, satisfy the preferences of others in market transactions, due to good 
fortune. Luck is an important issue to resource egalitarianism as it challenges the 
fairness of utilising the market to determine equal shares. I will explain the issue of 
market luck in greater detail in section 3.1. 
In this chapter I will explain this problem of differing market luck, and then consider, 
what I shall call, ex post egalitarian responses to it. In chapter four I will consider the ex 
ante egalitarian response to inequalities in earning talent. The idea of ex ante equality 
is to consider equality from the most appropriate initial starting position. Dworkin’s 
island auction is an example of this, but he suggests that for those issues where there 
was no equal starting point that we should ask how much insurance people would have 
purchased against bad luck in a hypothetically equal position. I will describe how this 
works with regard to market luck in section 4.1, and will describe it in even more detail 
in chapter five.317 The ex post responses I consider here propose to respond to bad 
                                                        
317
 Where I present a holistic, policy-focused, interpretation of the approach which differs from 
Dworkin’s. 
109 
 
market luck without reference to this initial starting equality, or with a different and 
less attractive comparison point. I will argue that the proposals considered in this 
chapter are unattractive, or that they cause concerns about unfairness that the ex ante 
response can resolve. I will argue against the ex post approaches in this chapter, but 
emphasise that the strongest arguments against the more attractive ex post proposals 
come out when considering them against the ex ante alternative. 
I will begin by explaining how different forms of market luck—social luck, talent luck 
and investment luck—impact upon free market exchanges to the advantage of the 
fortunate and the disadvantage of the unfortunate. In section 3.2 I explain in more 
detail what benefits are available to those with marketable skills. The ability to gain 
extra income is an obvious benefit. However, I will show that talent inequality can 
affect leisure as well as income, and furthermore that it is possible to consider the less 
talented as envying the job and careers available to the more talented.  
There have been several types of proposal designed to respond to this issue, and in this 
chapter I consider ex post proposals. Ex Post proposals attempt to preserve equality 
after transactions. I have split the proposals into three broad groups for convenience. I 
will first discuss what I refer to as radical responses. These redesign the job market in 
order to improve the relative position of those with less good market luck and natural 
talent, which will affect consumers and employers. The first radical response (3.3) holds 
that since talent inequality undermines the idea of allowing people to keep their above 
average market-income, it is necessary to equalize income. This is achieved by 
interfering in the motivations that people have to engage in the market, by inculcating 
moral motivations within the population. The idea that people envy the jobs that more 
talented persons can obtain suggests an alternative radical response to the problem of 
unequal talents, the possibility of avoiding job-envy, which I consider in 3.4. I argue that 
these approaches violate the ideal of equal opportunity costs and in some cases rely on 
perfectionism.  
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The second type of proposal I consider, in section 3.5, is one that would attempt to 
mimic a situation in which talents were equal. Unfortunately, it is not possible to mimic 
this situation while respecting the differently talented persons as they really are. The 
third type of ex post proposal focuses on the suppliers of labour. The most extreme 
version of this is one I will refer to as the Stalinist forcing approach (3.6), but I will also 
consider less extreme versions. These are the idea of including labour earning talent in 
a Dworkinian auction (3.7), an endowment tax (3.8), and the Earning Subsidy Scheme 
(3.9). I will argue that while each successive response is preferable to its predecessor, 
all have problems as a result of the claims they make against the more fortunate. This 
concern about the costs of policies to the more fortunate does not arise with the ex 
ante approach defended in chapter four. 
3.1 Bad market luck  
The first task is to explain why market luck presents itself as a problem for equality of 
resources. There are several forms of good fortune that can influence the resources 
that individuals acquire. Several of these are what I will refer to as locational luck; 
about being in the right place at the right time. The first two are more straightforward, 
however.  
Firstly, people will have better and worse fortune in the investment market despite 
paying equal attention to the information; imagine you and I both invest in technology 
companies and the researchers of your company patent the next generation of 
products ahead of my apparently equally placed company. Dworkin refers to this as 
investment luck.318  
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In this work I will focus more on natural talents, which Dworkin refers to as personal 
resources,319 and how they affect market interactions. This can be expressed in terms 
of ‘wealth-talent, that is, his innate capacity to produce goods or services that others 
will pay to have.’320 Dworkin illustrated this with the example of Claude in his initial 
presentation of equality of resources. He describes Claude as having similar ambitions 
to Adrian the farmer, but as suffering from a ‘black thumb.’321 It is not necessary to get 
bogged down in discussion of the nature of natural talents.322 Most people agree that 
different individuals are more naturally able in some areas than others, presumably 
due to genetic reasons beyond their control.323 However, any genetic differences are 
compounded by environmental and social differences; the particular experiences that 
each individual has and how they happen to respond to those.324 These differences in 
talent could not be removed even if it were desirable to do so.  
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there is such a thing as natural inequalities as distinct from social ones; Tim Lewens, 'What Are 
'Natural Inequalities'?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 60/239 (2010), 264-85. This is because the value 
of a genetic ‘advantage’ may be enhanced or dulled depending upon the social environment in 
which it is nurtured. Another reason not to focus solely on natural differences is that they are not 
sufficient on their own for success—talents are relative potentials that need to be nurtured and 
developed. This development will occur based upon the character of the individual, but will also be 
influenced by the environment in which someone grows up. 
324
 If some of those items that I delineate as natural talents were proven to be entirely 
environmental, this may still challenge the fairness of free-market outcomes, since people have no 
control over their environment during the crucial formative stage of life. This is true in the case of 
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Markets make rare but highly desired factors of production expensive,325 while making 
cheap those factors of production that are less popular and in ready supply. In 
economic interactions, therefore, those with rare natural talents which produce 
something economically desirable will have a lot of market power, while those without 
any special talents will have very little. The same process applies to skills, which are 
learned rather than innate. However, talents have an influence over the development 
of skills. This is because there are general transferrable talents such as intelligence 
which makes their bearer a more attractive investment for society and employers. All 
else equal, those with talents are very likely to end up in the mostly highly sought 
positions, since they will often receive early recognition and support.326  
                                                                                                                                                            
natural assets the development of which depends upon environmental factors, and also of the 
advantages of upbringing. In some cases these advantages are intentionally sought by parents, such 
as giving encouragement and support to the development of skills. However, sometimes there are 
inadvertent advantages that just prove to be useful, such as the early access to rare computer 
terminals described in footnote 329. It is worth emphasising that the existence of environmental 
fortune does not undermine the role of natural assets. Some natural assets are broadly uninfluenced 
by environmental factors, such that even if everyone’s upbringing were to realise their full potential 
development there would still be natural differences which would challenge market outcomes. 
325
 Where workers have unequal talent, some will be able to produce more than others in a given 
period of time. The productive efficiencies brought about by the division of labour and economies of 
scale, as highlighted famously in Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (New York: P F Collier and Son, 1909 [1784]). This is much more productive for the society as 
a whole. This division of labour also means that each individual only needs to learn a limited number 
of skills, rather than investing in a full set of skills required to produce all that they want and need. 
This will create differential positions, where there is a limited supply of highly sought positions. 
This limitation on the supply of complex jobs and its effects is emphasised in Gomberg, How 
to Make Opportunity Equal  at 30-8. Unfortunately, there is not room here to discuss Gomberg’s 
interesting, though sometimes vague, arguments and proposals beyond my variation of his proposal 
presented in section 3.4. I would certainly be less optimistic than him that his proposals could be 
effective at creating a society that would be able to do more than take care of the most basic needs 
of a small number of individuals. Gomberg’s argument for his practical proposal fails to meet the 
starting principles of this thesis because his view is avowedly perfectionist: it assumes that having a 
complex job is a requirement of a good life whether or not people actually accept this; Gomberg, 
How to Make Opportunity Equal  at 20-5, 45-52, 66-7. Gomberg’s response is that resource 
egalitarianism is perfectionist in assuming that the good life is one that can be bought with money; 
Gomberg, How to Make Opportunity Equal  at 151. This criticism is unwarranted, since resources are 
merely an all-purpose good which people can use to support whatever communal contribution the 
person wishes to make. I will consider whether a more liberal variant of his proposal would be an 
attractive response to bad market luck in section 3.4. 
326
 This is because highly talented individuals are more likely to receive support from teachers and 
parents, as well as bursaries and scholarships. More importantly, they are better candidates for 
investment in personal capital. From their own perspective, any investment they make, whether 
through loans or time and effort spent training, is much more likely to pay off. Financial institutions 
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Those with rare natural talents that enable them to perform highly sought tasks will be 
able to obtain a market premium for them. Employers327 will bid against one another to 
get the most talented or skilled workers, pushing up their wages.328 On the other hand, 
competition acts to drive down the wages of jobs that do not require valuable skills and 
talents. This is because the jobs available to those without any sought talents have a 
wide pool of potential applicants, where these applicants will have few attractive 
alternative opportunities if any. The result is low wages and poor job security.  
The other forms of good fortune are locational. One person might be in the right place 
at the right time. They may live in an area that is booming while others are in decline, 
with the attendant employment and investment opportunities. An individual may also 
just happen to meet the right person at the right time, such as John Lennon and Paul 
McCartney. Social connections can open doors to the development of careers, skills, 
and investment opportunities. Some people may happen to be taught—or have the 
rare opportunity to learn—skills which later become very valuable, such as computer 
software pioneers.329  
It is possible to express an important feature of markets noted above differently, that 
they are often winner-take-all.330 This means that those who obtain the scarce position 
                                                                                                                                                            
will be happier to loan money to those who have shown themselves to be more talented. Also, 
employers are much more likely to invest in more talented individuals, giving them opportunities to 
practice and develop their skills, and supporting them in the pursuit of further skills and 
qualifications. 
327
 Or the final consumers, we might say. 
328
 This process has certainly happened over recent decades, with a widening gap in hourly income, 
Mirrlees and IFS, Tax by Design : The Mirrlees Review  at 54. This process is driven by the idea of 
capturing “superstars,” see Sherwin Rosen, 'Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments', The 
American Economic Review, 76/4 (1986), 701-15, Sherwin Rosen, 'The Economics of Superstars', The 
American Economic Review, 71/5 (1981), 845-58. 
329
 Computer software innovators Bill Gates and Bill Joy had access in their youth to rare computer 
terminals; Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers : The Story of Success (London: Allen Lane, 2008). These 
advantages gave these two individuals a huge head-start in the personal computer revolution, in 
which they both had prominent roles. Of course, we do not always know which skills or talents will 
become useful, and we may be lucky and find that we happen to have an unusual advantage over 
others. 
330
 Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society : How More and More Americans 
Compete for Ever Fewer and Bigger Prizes, Encouraging Economic Waste, Income Inequality, and an 
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get all the goods that follow and will thrive, while those who do not have the fortune 
enabling them to obtain the goods will struggle. In free-market capitalist economies 
wealth can be utilised to generate further income and those who are required to spend 
a large proportion of their income on subsistence will not have such opportunities to 
invest, denying them the chance of further fortune.331 Furthermore, possessing one or 
more forms of good fortune increases the chances of other forms of good fortune, 
through the process of accumulated advantage.332 Examples of this I have mentioned 
are that the talented and socially fortunate often receive more opportunities earlier on, 
which they can then use to gain further advantages over others. Accumulated 
advantages also occur in investments, where those who have earned more can invest 
their surplus and have the potential to obtain further good fortune. Market luck can 
therefore lead to exponential increases in resources over time, but this does not mean 
that income is the only measure of market luck, as I will emphasise in the following 
section.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Impoverished Cultural Life (New York: Free Press, 1995). This relates to the notion of accumulated 
advantage, described below.  
331
 In the absence of progressive income taxation or wealth taxation this market process is likely to 
result in widening gaps between the wealthy and the less wealthy, as has occurred since the early 
1980s; Edward N. Wolff, Top Heavy : A Study of the Increasing Inequality of Wealth in America (New 
York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994) at ch 3. 
332
 It is also related to a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “Matthew Effect,” as it seems to 
be referred to in the gospel of Matthew (25: 29); R.K. Merton, 'The Matthew Effect in Science ', 
Science, 159/3810 (1968), 56-63. This occurs in the careers of those who have initial success, as they 
receive more recognition for their later work, even if it is no more remarkable than that of less well-
known rivals.  
A similar effect is highlighted in Clare Chambers, 'Each Outcome Is Another Opportunity: 
Problems with the Moment of Equal Opportunity', Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 8/4 (2009), 374-
400. Chambers uses this point to destabilise the notion of equality of opportunity, since this must be 
applied at a particular moment, despite the fact that prior inequalities will continue to influence 
outcomes after the moment. This is less of a concern for the approach I propose here, since that 
places little emphasis on the outcomes of equal opportunity, instead seeking to determine the 
appropriate remedy for inequalities that will follow despite the imposition of a preferred notion of 
equality of opportunity. 
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3.2 The advantages of talent 
I will now consider in more detail the nature of the advantages available to those with 
more highly valued talents and skills,333 and the wider job and career options that 
follow from these. Those with scarce and valuable skills and talents will have a 
significant advantage in obtaining the most highly sought jobs and careers. These 
positions maybe highly sought because of their high wages, relative freedom, and/or 
opportunities to be creative.334 Economists have attempted to capture this with the 
idea of equalizing differences, which states that the ‘actual wage paid…is the sum of 
two conceptually distinct transactions, one for labo[u]r services and worker 
characteristics, and another for job attributes. The positive price the worker pays for 
preferred job attributes is subtracted from the wage payment.’335 Those with greater 
abilities therefore have the opportunity to obtain jobs which either pay more, or, that 
they and others would feel effectively pay them more once the attributes of the job are 
included.336 Of course, I have ruled out theories of justice that rely on welfarist 
comparisons implied by equalizing differences. However, we need to be aware that 
people will be taking account of their preferences over jobs, and that better job 
attributes—as well as are an advantage that is also available to those with better luck. 
Having more options therefore means the talented are more likely to find satisfying or 
fulfilling work than they would if they had fewer options, as well as providing greater 
opportunities to gain more resources than others as time goes on. However, it is worth 
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 I will use these terms interchangeably in this section. Talents are innate, whereas skills may result 
from innate advantages. However, skills are still relevant to the discussion as greater skills can be the 
result of greater talent and other forms of good locational or environmental luck, as well as from 
hard work in acquiring the skills.  
334
 As well as social esteem, both from the money earned and the positional good of having a highly 
sought job; Gomberg, How to Make Opportunity Equal. I discuss positional goods in section 5.3. 
335
 Sherwin Rosen, 'The Theory of Equalizing Differences', in Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard 
(eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics (Volume 1; Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1986), 641-92 at 643. It does 
not seem that it would be possible to place universal monetary value on these un-monetised 
attributes in a way that would allow them to be compared between individuals. However, each 
individual would be able to calculate their trade-off between positive attributes of the jobs available 
to them with the pay that each offers. 
336
 Ibid. at 671-2. 
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noting another advantage that complicates comparisons; that in a market society the 
more talented have greater opportunities for leisure alongside income. By this I mean 
that those with more career and job options have more options to choose their 
preferred bundle of income and leisure. As such, it might not be enough to consider 
only income differences, but also job satisfaction and leisure.337 In this section I will 
illustrate this with a focus on leisure.  
Let us imagine a society with several jobs, in which people fall into one of two talent 
levels. Some jobs are available to all members of the society—which I refer to as jobs A-
F below. Some jobs are available only to more talented individuals—jobs G-K.338 All the 
jobs have flexible hours, with pay adjusted accordingly. Let us further assume that no-
one can, or would, work for more than fifty hours in a week. There are 168 hours in a 
week, and individuals can choose to have anywhere between 118 and 168 of those as 
leisure-time, which is defined as time spent not in paid employment. We can graph the 
options available to the less talented in figure 3-1, and for the more talented in in 
figure 3-2.  
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 Rawls accepted this point after a challenge from public economist Richard Musgrave, who 
questioned his focus solely on income and wealth as a sign of relative disadvantage; Richard A. 
Musgrave, 'Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
88/4 (1974), 625-32. This led Rawls to attempt to add leisure and work as factors in his primary 
goods list; Rawls, 'Reply to Alexander and Musgrave', John Rawls, 'The Priority of Right and Ideas of 
the Good', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17/4 (1988), 251-76, Rawls, Political Liberalism  at 181-2 
fn9, Rawls, Justice as Fairness  at 179. One possible solution presented by Rawls is to assume full-
time work as his benchmark, and to require a willingness to engage in full time work in order to 
qualify for public funds. This approach seems to me to be unduly inflexible. Stuart White offers a 
more leisure-sensitive approach which I will discuss in section 3.9. I propose a similarly leisure-
sensitive approach in section 6.2. 
338
 There are several possible reasons for this, such as the requirement in the latter jobs for 
professional qualifications that not all individuals are capable of attaining. Alternatively, it could be 
because the less talented individuals would not be able to compete in a winner-take-all job, or it 
could be because the less skilled have not had an upbringing that renders them able to compete in 
the field. 
117 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Weekly Income and Leisure options for jobs available to less skilled. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Weekly Income and Leisure options for jobs available to more skilled. 
It is easy to see by comparing figures 3-1 and 3-2 that the more skilled have all of the 
options that the less skilled do, along with some others that are unavailable to the less 
skilled. We can say that the less talented could envy the choices of the more talented, 
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and they can certainly envy the additional choices of income and leisure available to 
them. This is problematic for equality of resources as the envy test is the primary 
means to test the equality of resources—in this case jobs. I will describe some 
members of the above society, and consider their choices based on their preferences 
and the opportunities open to them. In doing so, I show the problematic nature of 
envy-comparisons which focus on one aspect of a job. 
Figure 3-3 depicts the choices taken by two individuals, Bertrand and Cassandra, who 
both generally find all of the jobs equally enjoyable. Bertrand is a more skilled 
individual, and can choose any of the jobs available, choosing job K from the above 
options. As Cassandra is less skilled she can only choose from jobs A to F and obtains 
job F. Cassandra generally prefers income to leisure, and so works full-time. Bertrand 
likes to read literature, and therefore works part-time in job K, which provides enough 
income to survive and access books.339 Cassandra earns more money than Bertrand 
even though he has the greater talent and job opportunities. Bertrand clearly considers 
his choice better than that of Cassandra, since he could have chosen Cassandra’s 
employment. We cannot say what Cassandra would have chosen if she had Bertrand’s 
choices, but we can draw certain conclusions. First of all, if Cassandra were able to 
work job K she would be able to earn the same amount that she does in job F but with 
twelve extra hours of leisure. Alternatively, she could work the same number of hours 
as she presently does, and earn an extra one hundred units of income. If Bertrand were 
only as talented as Cassandra he would have to work an extra eight hours in order to 
earn the same money, leaving him with eight hours a week less to read Tolstoy.  
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 We might refer to Bertrand as a leisure-lover, anticipating a term I introduce in section 5.9, and 
utilise in chapters six and seven. 
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Figure 3-3: Job-type and hours chosen by two individuals 
In these examples we can say that Cassandra will envy the opportunities that Bertrand 
has; we might say that she envies the job resources available to Bertrand. It is also very 
likely that she will envy the additional income and/or leisure that Bertrand can attain. 
Income is clearly an important resource, and one that Cassandra has less access to than 
Bertrand. However, as this example clearly illustrates, income can be a very poor 
indicator of advantage. Bertrand is the better-off individual, in that he clearly prefers 
his position to that of Cassandra, while Cassandra will envy the income and leisure 
possibilities that Bertrand has. However, it is Cassandra who earns more; she will 
almost certainly consume more, and have more valuable assets as time goes on as well. 
If we compare Bertrand and Cassandra in terms of income, consumption or wealth, 
then Cassandra incorrectly appears to be better-off than Bertrand. Income, 
consumption, and wealth are the standard tax bases,340 but these do not adequately 
capture our intuitions about who is worse off as a result of talent inequality where 
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 I will discuss the choice of tax-base in sections 7.1 to 7.6. 
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individuals can choose the number of hours they work. One response might be to insist 
that everyone works full-time, but this is unduly inflexible.341  
I will now introduce two further individuals in order to illustrate the difference that 
high ability makes. Consider Angela, who has the same preferences over leisure and 
consumption goods as Cassandra, but has a much higher earning talent. Angela works 
as many hours as Cassandra, but obtains an income worth a third more than that which 
Cassandra obtains. The difference between Angela and Cassandra has been covered 
above. The example of Derrick is more telling, however. Derrick has the same work and 
income preferences as Bertrand, but has the job options available to Cassandra. As 
such, in order to obtain the same subsistence income as Bertrand, he has to work an 
additional twelve hours a week. Derrick is clearly worse-off than Bertrand; he envies 
the leisure that Bertrand can enjoy. The envy and possible envy between these 
individuals are depicted in figure 3-4.  
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 It would violate the principle of abstraction, described on page 34-6. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that barring part-time work would still offer Bertrand the chance to obtain more leisure than 
Cassandra if he were to save up his greater income and then retire long before Cassandra does. 
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Figure 3-4: Envy between four Individuals 
To add further complication, we can consider the case of Edith. Edith is as talented as 
Angela, but has a strong preference for a particular job—job G—despite its lower pay. 
Edith therefore does not envy anyone, despite her lower leisure and income than 
others. Frank, on the other hand, also has strong job preferences, but only has the low-
skill job-set. He prefers job D to job F, despite the lower pay. Therefore, he does not 
envy Cassandra and Derrick. However, Frank would like to have more leisure and 
income, but not so much that he would work in job F. However, he would prefer the 
jobs available to the more talented, along with the greater leisure and income that he 
could obtain from them. He therefore envies Edith, Bertrand and Angela, as shown in 
figure 3-5.  
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Figure 3-5: Envy with job preferences 
The above examples show why we should be wary of treating income, consumption, or 
wealth as indicators of talent endowment, as leisure is a further indicator.342 However, 
leisure cannot be the sole indicator; it has to be leisure in conjunction with external 
resources. This may imply that we need a complex of income and leisure as a measure 
of advantage. It is necessary to include a function of leisure and income as a large 
amount of either on its own may be of little value to individuals.343 Furthermore, 
focusing on such a composite is not appropriate, as the example of Frank shows. Frank 
does not envy two people with greater leisure (Derrick) and income (Cassandra), but 
does envy others with better job options even though they do not have more leisure 
(Angela and Edith) or income (Bertrand).  
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 Similar graphs, though with the axes switched, are used to reach the same conclusion in Daniel 
Shaviro, 'Inequality, Wealth, and Endowment', Tax Law Review, 53/3 (2000), 397-422 at 404-6, 
Daniel Shaviro, 'Endowment and Inequality', in Joseph J. Thorndike and Dennis J. Jr. Ventry (eds.), 
Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2002) at 130. Shaviro 
argues for an endowment tax from a utilitarian starting position, though he suggests that it follows 
from—an overly simplified version of—liberal egalitarianism as well, Shaviro, 'Inequality, Wealth, 
and Endowment',   at 416-20, Shaviro, 'Endowment and Inequality',  at 140-3. I discuss utilitarianism 
in footnotes 12 and 179, and will discuss the attractiveness of endowment taxation as an ex post 
response to market luck in section 3.8 and from my preferred theoretical approach in section 7.1. 
343
 The image here is of someone with no time to spend the money they earn, or someone who is 
involuntarily unemployed with lots of time and little income. 
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This difficult issue of leisure will recur throughout this work.344 For now it is enough to 
conclude that leisure time, or discretionary time,345 is an important consideration that 
must not be overlooked when considering the effects of market luck. In the remainder 
of this chapter I will consider some ex post proposals designed to respond to talent 
inequality and bad market luck.  
3.3 Equal income response  
There are many potential responses to bad market luck and talent inequalities, and I 
will discuss the most promising ex post proposals in the remainder of this chapter. The 
first two responses are rather radical, and I will discuss the first of these in this 
section.346 The first radical approach holds that the inability of markets to track 
ambitions given differential talents means that people should not receive the income 
they are paid on the market. Instead, everyone should receive the same income. 
Market outcomes are considered inappropriate for the purposes of distributive justice, 
though market institutions may be necessary for practical reasons. However, it is 
difficult to see how markets can perform this task while market outcomes are blocked; 
in order for markets to work at all, people must have certain kinds of motivation, 
namely, to exchange goods in accordance with their preferences.  
                                                        
344
 A pluralist function of income, leisure, and job preference would be problematic. We can 
measure leisure relatively easily in terms of hours, but how do we then combine this with a notion of 
income to form a composite value? It seems impossible to claim in the abstract that £250 a week 
and 120 hours of leisure are more or less valuable than £200 and 135 hours of leisure. I will discuss 
attempts to resolve this problem in this chapter and the next. 
345
 Discretionary time is proposed as a more nuanced understanding of leisure time in Robert E. 
Goodin, Discretionary Time : A New Measure of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). This view focuses on the amount of time that people are likely to have at their discretion 
given their likely commitments. However, some of the considerations that are counted as 
discretionary, such as having children might have been considered choices. As such, potentially 
controversial value judgments are perhaps unavoidable when attempting to develop a more 
nuanced view of “true” leisure time. A further problem with the discretionary time approach is that 
it does not take account of the lumpiness (or discreteness) of the choices available to people—it may 
only be possible for someone to earn a large income as a lawyer if they work a large amount of 
hours (thanks to Ed Page/Zosia Stemplowska for highlighting this last point).  
346
 I will discuss the second—job-envy-reduction—in section 3.4. 
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Joseph Carens proposed a solution to this problem. This would require the alteration of 
preferences within society such that people engage with the market as producers not 
just in their self-interest, but also according to moral motivations.347 On Carens’ 
proposal, everyone would receive the same—average—income and no more, but each 
would want to earn as much as they reasonably could in order to satisfy their moral 
desire to contribute to society and the lives of others. This means that people would 
want to earn more money even though they would not personally benefit from it. 
People would be socialised in order to desire to produce market income from their 
labour and investments even though the benefits would be shared with everyone in 
such a way that the producer will receive no discernible personal benefit.348  
This equal income proposal has a superficial claim to meeting the starting assumptions 
from section 1.1. No one would envy the resources that others receive as all would 
receive the same every month; market luck would have no influence on what people 
obtain. Furthermore, people are free to do what they wish with the resources they 
purchase, and have liability for their use of those resources—people will not get 
additional resources if they later regret their resource usage. 
There are practical problems with such a system. It would certainly be difficult to alter 
the motivations of people in society from considerations of self-interest to some kind 
of social interest.349 Carens envisages that teachers and other professionals will alter 
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 Carens, Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market  at 8, for further developments on his view, 
including a comparison to Dworkin's position, see Joseph Carens, 'Compensatory Justice and Social 
Institutions', Economics and Philosophy, 1/1 (1985), 39-67, Joseph Carens, 'Rights and Duties in an 
Egalitarian Society', Political Theory, 14/1 (1986), 31-49. 
348
 An additional point regarding Carens’ proposal occurs to me. It seems that it would be equally 
possible to morally motivate people to limit their consumption rather than increase their labour, as 
Weber alleged to have happened as a result of a protestant work ethic, Max Weber, The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner, 1958). People’s motivations could presumably 
be modified in a number of different ways. So why not allow people to keep their wages, but 
encourage them to donate the returns to their good market fortune to public funds? The response 
could not be a practical one, since the practical issues apply just as much to the equal-income 
approach.  
349
 In addition, many anti-capitalists would consider Carens’ proposal to be utopian. They would 
think that it would be necessary to introduce a non-capitalist economic system in order to get to the 
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norms in society. However, even if teachers could be convinced to do so, it seems 
unlikely that all students would listen to their teachers. If some people were to refuse 
then others would feel less inclined to follow; an issue which relates to the problem of 
publicity.  
The publicity worry is that if the requirements of justice are vague then people cannot 
know they or others are acting in accordance with justice. With reliance upon moral 
motivations, it seems impossible that for everyone to know that everyone else is 
interpreting her moral requirements in the same manner. How is someone to know if 
doing a hated job for five hours is as onerous to them compared to someone else doing 
a job they greatly enjoy for eight? If the jobs are paid the same then each worker may 
have a tendency to feel others are not doing as much as them, undermining the moral 
motivation on which the proposal depends.350  
A more philosophical problem with this approach is that it is not sensitive to people’s 
ambitions. If everyone wanted to earn the same as everyone else then it might be fair 
to provide equal incomes, but clearly some people tend to prefer material income over 
other things like leisure and job satisfaction, while others do not. People do not have 
the choice to do extra in order to earn more—or to do less work and earn less—than 
this average amount should they wish to.351 Some might prefer to contribute more or 
less in exchange for a correspondingly larger or smaller share of income. It would 
appear that everyone is forced to want to ensure that all have the average amount of 
                                                                                                                                                            
ideal of moral motivation, since capitalism undermines such motivations. Marx thought that all 
history progressed as a result of material (i.e. economic) conditions, in which case the “super-
structural” ideas and motivations that people have would depend upon the “structural” nature of 
economic relations. As a result, according to Marx any attempts to change motivations and ideas 
would be futile; see David McLellan (ed.), Marx, Karl: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977) at 388-92, Karl Marx, Capital : An Abridged Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History : A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). 
350
 This is a practical problem, but also a problem of justice if we include publicity as an aspect of 
distributive justice, Andrew Williams, 'Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity', Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 27/3 (1998), 225-47. 
351
 Or, at least, to attempt to do so. 
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income and that everyone should do the average amount of work done required from 
someone of each level of talents and skills in order to obtain this average.  
A modification of the proposal therefore presents itself. This would be to allow 
variations on income in accordance with the amount of time spent in work rather than 
leisure, effectively providing an equal hourly wage for all workers. Those who wish to 
work and earn more than others could then do so, as could those who desire more 
leisure with less income. Talent would play no part in income since all receive the same 
hourly pay.  
However, this modification does not get around the problem that some people are 
willing to perform very undesirable jobs if greater than the average income and leisure 
is the reward. Take as an example Grant, who is willing to work in a very risky and 
boring occupation—suppose that this applies to deep sea diving—in order to earn large 
amounts of money and have a lot of leisure.352 Everyone in society would prefer Grant 
to be able to perform this, and yet it is ruled out under the equal income scheme. 
Alternatively, imagine a society that consists of ‘consumption-lovers’ and ‘easy-lifers.’ 
The consumption lovers may be happy to work long and hard in unpleasant work in 
exchange for resources for their particular projects, while easy-lifers prefer to work in a 
pleasant environment and are uninterested in consumption. The consumption-lovers 
would want to work and exchange with other consumption lovers, but they have to 
share their product with easy-lifers, who receive the same hourly income. Fixing hourly 
income rather than total income would not allow consumers and producers to trade-
off their desires for products and higher wages with one another. This appears to be an 
unwelcome interference with people in their quest for the resources that they think 
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would make their life go well. It thus fails to show equal concern for those with tastes 
that require less popular work, or for contributing less labour than the average.353  
Equalising income will always favour those who happen to desire the average amount 
of consumption goods within the society, challenging the claim that the approach 
treats all with equal concern. Put differently, it undermines the market as a means to 
calculate the opportunity costs of work to the worker with regard to the resource-
desires of the rest of society. Furthermore, the liability for costs falls on people in 
proportion to their ability to help others, though each can determine for himself 
exactly what costs it is appropriate for him to bear.  
I have hinted at another major problem with all variants of the moral incentives 
proposal; that it interferes with each person’s assignment responsibility over her life.354 
In order for the system to work, people have to be socialised in such a way that they 
desire to benefit others, which is potentially an interference with—and certainly a 
limitation on—their ability to decide for themselves what matters in life. Socialising 
people to seek to maximise their pre-tax income as Carens initially argued355 would not 
leave people with any scope to choose lives that are incompatible with this goal, such 
as leading a leisured existence at one’s own expense. Carens later dropped this 
maximising requirement in favour of a general duty to contribute to society.356 
However, while this is an improvement with regard to ambition-sensitivity, it makes the 
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 Even if the requirement to contribute in proportion to ability is not enforced, it is one that people 
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requirement even more vague and difficult for people to follow while feeling secure 
that others are interpreting the duty in the same way.357 
3.4 Job preferences and job envy  
It becomes very complicated to delineate any relevant counterfactual which would 
guide us as to how to deal with the effects of talent inequalities on jobs and pay. The 
relationship between ambition and fortune is very complicated indeed. However, one 
method is to begin with the fact that more fortunate individuals have greater 
opportunities, which leads to a wider menu of jobs and careers, some of which will 
have much higher market pay.358 Since the problem is that the less talented or skilled 
have fewer job and career options, one solution is to ensure that talent does not 
influence the filling of jobs. A second radical response to talent inequality is therefore 
to interfere in the job market to remove job-envy.  
This response to the problem of unequal career opportunities for the less talented is to 
change the nature of job filling in society. Instead of the capitalist approach of 
employers choosing their preferred employee from the applicants, the society via the 
state could instead choose which applicant should fill the position. The intention here is 
to ensure that the worker who most wants a job will get it, rather than the worker who 
offers the most to the employer.359 There are two ways to do this, through bureaucracy 
or reverse-job-auctions.  
Paul Gomberg presents a utopian ideal of equal opportunity whereby all members of 
society are able to engage in the good of complex labour; jobs that have skill, freedom 
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 The ex ante approach I describe in the following chapters of the thesis will take account of 
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and creativity.360 In order to achieve this, it would be necessary for all members of 
society to do a share of routine but necessary labour, and to teach others their more 
complex skills.361 I refer to this as the bureaucratic method since Gomberg argues that 
the market should not be utilised at all. Either a state bureaucracy would ensure that 
everyone is performing both types of labour or—more optimistically—perhaps people 
can be trusted to perform the labour. However, we can imagine a market-based 
alternative whereby all receive equal money incomes and are directed to jobs in which 
they would contribute the appropriate amount of the three types of labour by a state 
bureaucracy. If everyone spends (roughly) the same proportion of their working time 
doing all three types of activity, then no-one will envy the job of another.362  
The second method is to allot jobs using reverse-job-auctions.363 Employers would 
advertise jobs as usual, but instead of choosing their candidate, the state would run an 
auction for that job and the lowest bidder would obtain the job at the wage they 
offered in the auction. Employers would be forced to employ this worker, but pay-out 
the advertised amount.364 The difference between the initial price and final-bid price 
could perhaps be distributed equally among all members of the society, given to the 
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 Gomberg, How to Make Opportunity Equal  at 66-7. I explained why Gomberg’s arguments for job 
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this response would undermine the job market for those with skills and talents. Instead of bidding 
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schemes below. 
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employer or used as tax revenue.365 To give an example of how the scheme would 
work, imagine I am particularly keen to work for my favourite charity. I could offer to 
work for that charity for less money than anyone else, and the charity would have to 
employ me. The scheme would also presumably need to be extended to self-employed 
sole traders; customers would express a desire for a service and the state would 
determine the worker who most wants the job at the pre-determined price.  
One worry about job-sharing schemes is that they will result in jobs being done by 
people who are not capable of doing them, or much less capable than others. This 
would be particularly problematic in jobs such as surgeons and engineers. A supporter 
of the scheme may respond that this disastrous outcome would not in fact happen. 
Gomberg believes that everyone is capable of doing any job if given sufficient 
training.366 However, this assumption seems to be heroic; at the very least, the scheme 
would have to exclude those with learning disabilities. An alternative response would 
be that we could rely on people to avoid jobs for which they do not have the skills or a 
sufficient level of talent. As a result, they would be assigned appropriately, or workers 
would bid appropriately in the reverse-auction. This would get around the problem that 
people would be doing jobs for which they were not qualified. However, if people did 
not bid for jobs—or get accepted for them—because they were not talented or skilled 
enough it would render the scheme pointless; the same highly talented people would 
still do the same jobs.367 I will therefore assume that workers would end up doing jobs 
for which they were not particularly suited, less competent than other applicants, and 
in some cases incapable of doing the work to a reasonable standard. 
Job-sharing would ensure that talent inequality has no influence on job and career 
opportunities. However, it is very problematic. Firstly, people could envy the talents of 
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others even if they do not want to take that person’s job as things stand due to a 
perceived lack of training or talent. Second, the proposal runs against the idea of 
market exchanges as primarily being agreements between two parties, and it is not 
clear that such a system could function at all. The link between the consumer and 
producer is mediated in such a way that the consumer’s desired outcome and the price 
they pay would not directly link to the work actually done. In an abstract sense, it is not 
clear how a market pricing process could begin. Prices would have to be set centrally in 
order to avoid customers interfering with job choices in the market. As the example of 
self-employed traders makes clear, the price would have to be somehow determined 
based on market expectations, but it is not clear how prices would be accurately 
adjusted as time goes on to mimic free-market prices.  
The third problem concerns the costs of such schemes. Consider the problems from the 
perspective of consumers. The recipient of a service will quite possibly receive a service 
that they value far less than the price which they would have to pay. Indeed, customers 
would presumably be forced to deal with inferior workers. This might mean that work 
would get done, but would take longer than it would if consumers were free to choose 
their supplier. Alternatively, the worker may not be able to do the job to the required 
standard, meaning that it would need to be redone at least once. Now consider 
employment decisions made on behalf of larger employers, which would also interfere 
with the market in unacceptable ways. Institutions forced to take inferior staff would 
be less effective, and in a competitive environment this could be very deleterious.368  
It is possible to distribute the costs of job-sharing in various ways. One way is for the 
customer to bear the cost of any inferior service, assuming that they will have no way 
to select the quality—itself a cost since it reduces certainty in making contracts. 
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Consumers would then bear any costs from repeated purchases. Alternatively, the cost 
could be borne by the employer, in which case the owners and investors would have to 
pay the costs of work done by their assigned inferior employees. Again, this increases 
both risks and costs to investors. The third alternative is for the state to compensate 
consumers or investors who lose out as a result of inferior work, passing the costs on to 
taxpayers and/or recipients of alternative state spending.  
The cost of redoing the work could fall to the consumer, the employer, or everyone via 
the state. The first two of these introduce arbitrary costs into transactions, which 
would conflict with the principle of abstraction in the development of true opportunity 
costs, violating the principle of equal concern. This is because two people in the same 
situation would face a different market due to the imposition of a worker they would 
not choose to employ. In the third—socialised—approach the payment for work to be 
redone multiple times would come at the expense of higher taxes and/or other 
programmes that the state could provide. These costs would greatly reduce the 
resources available in society for other things that people need or value, a huge waste 
of resources. This only accounts for the costs of redoing inferior work; the schemes 
would also have massive administrative and efficiency costs.369  
In conclusion, as well as the problems with calculating equal opportunity costs with 
substantial interference in the job market, the job-sharing schemes would impose 
resource costs on the members of the society. I cannot imagine that many people 
would be willing to pay the costs of the scheme in order to obtain its advantages.370 Put 
simply, people care about other things as well as the work they do. The costs of the 
scheme would fall on the less fortunate as well as the more fortunate, and the most 
important problem for such schemes, is that the beneficiaries of the scheme—the less 
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talented—would not think it worthwhile to pay these costs.371 Many would be able to 
complain that they were not treated with equal concern, as they would prefer to have 
no scheme at all or almost any alternative scheme. This is an issue which the ex ante 
approach described in the following chapter resolves. 
Radical responses would interfere with the job market in the production of goods to 
make it better for those with low talent.372 However, they are not responsive to the 
ambitions that people have,373 imposing costs on the fortunate—and sometimes the 
less fortunate—that they would find less attractive than they would judge their 
potential misfortune from a hypothetically equal position. These criticisms hint at an 
alternative approach, which would attempt to be both ambition sensitive and yet fully 
compensate misfortune. 
3.5 Mimicking a talent-equal world  
Dworkin mooted and rejected another type of solution to the problem of talent 
inequality in his initial discussion of equality of resources. This proposal is, as Dworkin 
puts it, ‘to develop a scheme of redistribution, so far as we are able, that will neutralize 
the effects of differential talents, yet preserve the consequences of one person’s 
choosing an occupation, in response to his sense of what he wants to do with his life, 
that is more expensive for the community than the choice another makes’.374 He then 
asks whether we can ‘fix [tax] rates so as to leave each person with the income he 
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 Gomberg would argue that it would be in people’s interests to bear the costs necessary in order 
to ensure that they do complex work, since this is an important good in itself and because missing 
out on it robs people of other important goods as well; Gomberg, How to Make Opportunity Equal  
at 46-9, 66-7. However, this argument—as Gomberg readily admits—is perfectionist, and therefore 
contravenes my second starting assumption. 
372
 Or indeed, perhaps just a relatively poor start in life. 
373
 They impose workers on employers and consumers. However, the fact that employers and 
consumers should be able to choose who they contract with does not imply that employers should 
be able to discriminate on the basis of race or political convictions. There should be equal 
opportunity in this sense. Dworkin would justify this on the basis of his principle of independence; 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 161-2, Hansen, 'Equality of Resources and the Problem of Recognition'. 
374
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 91. 
134 
 
would have had if, counterfactually, all talents for production had been equal?’375 That 
is, to mimic a talent-equal world. Dworkin argued that it is unlikely that we could 
apportion the income that people receive into fortune and ambition, since the two are 
intertwined. However, resource egalitarian Rakowski argued in favour of such a 
division.376  
In a talent-equal world pay would not be equal, as it would vary in accordance with the 
desirability of the products of work to all members of society and the relative 
desirability of the work to potential workers. Essentially, the mimicking proposal would 
require the state to determine the extent to which the gross (pre-tax) pay received for 
various jobs arises as a result of competition in an unequal-talent market or due to the 
unpopularity of the work. In some jobs, such as those of professors and football players 
perhaps, higher than average pay may come because of competition between 
universities for professors and football clubs for players. In some jobs, such as cleaning, 
the lack of higher-paid options for those with less desirable talents may drive down the 
wages. However, there may be cases—such as the deep sea diver mentioned above—
where high pay is somewhat independent of talent. So in these cases there should 
presumably be transfers from those who work in football and academia, but not from 
deep-sea divers, towards those who clean for a living in order to mimic the wages they 
would receive in a talent-equal marketplace. 
One way to calculate this would be to consider the various types of job and the extent 
to which those doing them would prefer to do others if the alternative jobs are higher-
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paid than theirs.377 This creates a temptation to utilise welfarist comparisons, but I 
have argued against this above.378 An alternative method to obtain the information 
would be survey people regarding their desire for alternative careers. Unfortunately 
this method would be unreliable, as people would be able to tailor their answers in 
order to increase the remuneration for their own job.  
Dworkin rejects the mimicking proposal because the world would be so different and 
the market would not work in the same way. His examples here are rather strange. He 
suggests that ‘in a world in which everyone could hit a high inside pitch or play sexy 
roles in films with equal authority, there would probably be no baseball or films; in any 
case no one would be paid much for exercising such talents.’379 I would have thought 
that people would still enjoy watching baseball if it is a good spectator sport, even if 
the only difference between one team and another would be the preparation of the 
players and staff, along with luck on the day.380 Certainly people would watch films 
even if everyone were equally able to act sexily, though the film industry would be very 
different. The amount that people would be willing to pay to engage in these pastimes 
may, however, drop, which would have a massive impact on the production of films 
and interest in the matches, which would in turn affect the building of cinemas and 
stadia, advertising, and so on.  
What Dworkin presumably means is that there is no way to calculate what prices would 
be paid in a talent-equal world, in order to calculate the transfers required in order to 
mimic such a world. Although we can fairly comfortably say that film stars would 
receive pay closer to that of teachers we cannot change the availability of potential film 
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stars in order to ensure that enough people would be willing to take up this work for 
the same pay as they would in the imagined equal-talent world. In the talent-equal 
world some items of consumption would be much cheaper as people would not have 
to pay the large wages, perhaps for adversarial workers such as lawyers, and people 
would therefore have more money left over for other things. This would alter the 
supply and demand of everything else in the society. As a result, the economy in an 
equal-talent world would be substantially different. Dworkin’s point is that it is not 
possible to mimic the earnings of an equal-talent world as people would make very 
different consumption decisions as well as labour decisions, which would then affect 
prices and work decisions throughout the economy, which in turn would affect 
people’s work and investment decisions.381 Rakowski even admits that his proposal 
would not work in practice, and that it therefore merely implies a progressive income 
tax.382  
I have argued that it is impossible to calculate all the prices that would apply in a 
talent-equal world based upon our talent-unequal market prices. However, the 
mimicking approach would still not be an improvement on the ex ante approach if it 
were possible to do. To see why, imagine that there is a supercomputer which can 
calculate and apply all the talent-equal-world prices throughout the economy. 
However, the computer requires a lot of information about everyone and it costs a lot 
of money to hire many people to get the—seemingly bizarre—information it requests.  
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If the computer required almost everyone in the society to be employed in obtaining 
this information it would not be worth utilising it; the costs—impoverishing everyone—
would exceed the benefits of mimicking. Now, imagine that the computer works out a 
way of obtaining the information itself,383 so that it can apply the mimic without cost. 
In this case, hypothetical insurers would clearly choose to employ the computer as 
their ex ante decision and there is no difference between the implication of the 
approaches. Those who would employ the computer on an ex post approach would 
have to specify a cost-limit in order to avoid the disastrous bankrupting computer, and 
it is not clear how the mimicking approach can tell us the point at which the cost 
becomes unacceptable. The ex ante approach, however, will be able to answer this 
question; the cost of the machine becomes unacceptable at the point where 
hypothetical insurers would prefer an alternative—cheaper—policy. Whether it is 
possible or not, therefore, the mimicking approach will fail to determine equal 
opportunity costs in a fair and neutral manner; to the extent that mimicking is possible, 
its attractiveness—given people’s actual ambitions, and from an equal position—is 
better determined from an ex ante position. 
3.6 Labour-supply solutions: forcing the talented to market 
I have so far considered radical and mimicking responses to talent inequality and bad 
market luck. I will now discuss labour-supply responses, which attempt in various ways 
to force the talented to supply their talents to society in order to avoid the need to use 
unequal market rewards. These can be contrasted with the radical proposals which 
attempt to motivate the talented, though pass additional costs onto consumers. I will 
consider four approaches of this type in this and the following sections; a Stalinist 
approach, including talents in the island auction (3.7), an endowment tax (3.8), and 
finally the Egalitarian Subsidy Scheme (3.9). Each labour-supply proposal I consider is 
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an improvement on its predecessor, but the improved versions do not completely solve 
the problems of the first.  
Let us consider the most extreme labour-supply approach. We can consider a situation 
where those with special talents are forced to use them for the benefit of the rest of 
society, without receiving any compensating income. We could call this a Stalinist 
forcing approach,384 whereby people are ‘dragged in chains’ to their most highly 
remunerative profession.385 Most people would find this suggestion appalling, and 
rightly so. It seems to require an objectionable level of coercion, in such a way that 
people would consider themselves slaves to their society.386  
It is possible to argue against this Stalinist approach from the perspective of liberal 
neutrality and the envy-freeness test. We can see that it would be possible for the 
more talented to envy the position of the less talented in the Stalinist world. Imagine 
someone who could be a successful corporate lawyer, but wants to run an organic café, 
who would be forced to practise law. This individual would envy a less talented person 
who was not forced into a particular profession, and who was free to set up the café. If 
the more talented envy the less talented, we can say that we have gone too far in 
attempting to respond to talent inequality. We have replaced the natural envy of the 
                                                        
384
 I use this term though it is based more on a caricature of Stalin than any specific policies that I am 
aware of. I take the idea from Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality  at 186. Cohen in his later work 
appears to endorse a more flexible development of Carens’ utopian equal income approach 
discussed in section 3.3, see Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
385
 Shaviro, 'Inequality, Wealth, and Endowment',   at 410. 
386
 Though it is likely that not everyone will need to be coerced into their most productive 
profession. After all, people tend to enjoy exercising their talents, and so will be happy to work in 
this job. Thanks to Ed Page and Zosia Stemplowska for highlighting this point. However, the fact that 
some people would have chosen the same job does not alter the fact that they have had their choice 
restricted in a way that others have not. Furthermore, people value things much more if they have 
chosen them, and tend to resent being forced to do things they enjoy; T. M. Scanlon, 'The 
Significance of Choice', in S.M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human values Vol. 8 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 149-216. 
139 
 
less talented for the more talented with the artificially induced envy of the untalented 
from the less talented.387  
We can, however, imagine a Stalinist solution which managed to avoid actual envy 
between workers, by manipulating wages, leisure time, and work conditions. Thus, 
instead of simply maximising output, it would restrain this goal with a requirement that 
no one should envy the work-package of another ex post. However, while this would 
remove the actual envy felt in the society, it would nevertheless violate the principle of 
abstraction. Forcing people into particular occupations, and with pre-ordained 
conditions, would fail to treat people as equals as they would not have the equal ability 
to organise their affairs. This means that the market prices would not reflect true 
opportunity costs and therefore people could not be held responsible for the true 
opportunity costs of their activities. Stalinist approaches are therefore unattractive, 
even if they can avoid direct working-package envy. I will consider a less invasive 
version of this ideal of ex post envy-freeness in the following chapter—sections 4.4-4.5 
and 4.7.  
3.7 Inclusion of labour talent in the island auction  
The second labour-supply approach I will consider was presented by Dworkin as a 
possible solution to the problem of unequal earning talent. This is the idea of including 
the future labour power of all islanders as resources in the equal auction.388 Islanders 
would have to bid against the others for their own labour in order to control it, 
otherwise their labour decisions would be out of their hands. This would be much more 
expensive for some than others, leaving the more highly talented with a lesser ability to 
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purchase other resources. This would put the less talented on a more equal footing 
with the more talented.389  
Dworkin rejects the proposal to include labour power in the auction because it would 
still result in a form of ‘slavery of the talented.’ Dworkin gives the example of Adrian, 
who would have to use all his resources to purchase his labour, which he would then 
have to perform full-time, thus restricting his options.390 This would enslave the 
talented because they would either be unable to afford their own labour, or they 
would have to expend a lot of resources to obtain it. In the former case, their labour 
time would literally be owned by others. In the latter case, the talented would have no 
choice but to earn their maximum amount of income in order to pay for their self-
purchase. In both cases, they would have restricted choice—or even none at all—over 
the type and duration of their work. As a result, the talented would envy the freedom 
of occupation that the less talented would have, which violates the envy-freeness 
required to ensure that everyone is shown equal concern.  
Miriam Cohen Christofidis challenges Dworkin’s argument against including labour in 
the initial auction.391 She argues that Dworkin is too favourable to the more talented, 
as Dworkin applies the envy test at the wrong place; it is supposed to apply to the 
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‘resources that individuals have’, not to be applied at an ex ante stage.392 Dworkin’s 
argument is that Adrian is worse-off when his labour is included in the auction because 
he loses his option to choose to work less and have more leisure time, or alternatively 
that he no longer has any choice of occupation. In both of these cases, Adrian could 
envy those who do have such free choice, and this is certainly problematic. However, 
the proposals considered in this chapter respond to the envy felt by less talented 
persons for the additional leisure, income and career paths open to the more talented. 
Is this envy by the less talented not as problematic as Adrian’s envy when his labour is 
auctioned, showing that Dworkin is prejudiced towards the talented?  
Cohen Christofidis seems to imply that including talent in the auction is acceptable to 
the extent that it would result in an actual-envy-reducing approach.393 Since unequal 
talents upsets ex post envy-freeness the best available option is to reduce the amount 
of envy felt throughout society, by apportioning income, leisure and preferred jobs in 
such a way that no one would envy the package of another. She finds this to be more 
attractive than the ex ante approach. Indeed, Cohen Christofidis suggests that rival 
resource-distributions would have to be judged based on the envy-reduction created 
under different proposals, when attacking Dworkin’s reliance on a single example to 
count against the labour-auction proposal.394  
However, this envy-reduction approach is not an envy-freeness view of the same kind 
as that used by equality of resources. It requires us to judge between the levels of 
different people’s envy instead of the binary distinction between envy and envy-
freeness which enables the equal valuation of resources in a way that all can contribute 
to. This alternative envy-reduction approach would require the valuation of envy, 
which does not seem feasible. However, even if it were feasible, the valuation of envy 
would require a valuation of different kinds of thing, and will therefore introduce 
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controversial comparisons. I imagine that such comparisons would have to be welfare-
based, but—whatever form they take—they would require the imposition of a 
particular valuation that is unlikely to reflect the valuations of all those affected.395  
It is possible to explain the rejection of this actual-envy-reduction strategy differently. 
The actual-envy-reduction approach is appealing because it would appear that there 
would be less ex post envy than on alternative approaches. However, equality of 
resources is not motivated by the thought that envy is a terrible thing, but rather that 
people are valuing resources from an equal position and in accordance with their own 
plans of life.396 There is a difference therefore, between attempting to equalize ex post 
envy of resource-bundles, and equalizing ex ante envy of resource-bundles. To 
anticipate the arguments of the following chapter, the ex post approach does not 
determine ex post envy compensation levels in a way that is fair to all. This is because it 
may provide more compensation than all parties would have chosen from a 
hypothetically equal position. Furthermore, people in the ex ante position can choose 
whether or not to include talents in the scheme, rather than having this decision made 
for them, since such a decision would take place without knowledge of talent, it will 
show equal respect for all. 
The above argument is further bolstered by highlighting the difference between 
Adrian’s complaint at the elimination of Claude’s ex post envy and Claude’s initial 
complaint of ex ante envy. Adrian’s complaint that his life would be limited in order to 
benefit Claude—whether or not he would in the end envy Claude—is stronger than 
Claude’s initial complaint that he had bad luck. Firstly, Claude’s envy is based on a 
natural difference, while Adrian’s claim is based on a socially induced difference. 
Second, there is no way to separate people from their talents, and so if talents are 
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included in the auction, then Adrian’s choices are determined in a way that Claude’s 
are not. We have more sympathy with Adrian’s complaint because it appears that he is 
being used a means to Claude’s ends where he is asked to do more for Claude than 
either he or Claude would have chosen to do in a hypothetically equal position.397 The 
worry here is that Adrian is having his body usurped,398 and used in ways that he could 
choose to do himself—or not. The troubling claim that people are being used as a 
means applies to the endowment-inclusive ex post responses to talent inequality but 
does not apply to the ex ante response.399 This provides a further reason to think there 
is a difference between altering Adrian’s choices in order to remove Claude’s envy and 
finding another method which would still allow the calculation of equal opportunity 
costs.  
In conclusion, including labour power in the auction is unacceptable for similar reasons 
to those against the Stalinist approach. The move from centralised-state forcing to de-
centralised forcing via market ownership does not solve the problem of enslaving the 
talented. I will explain in further detail why Dworkin’s ex ante approach is superior to 
ex post envy-reduction proposals such as that proposed by Cohen Christofidis in section 
4.7. 
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3.8 Endowment Taxation  
The third labour-supply response to talent inequality is to tax people based upon their 
endowment. Endowment taxes are generally preferred by utilitarians and economists 
because of their efficiency,400 but they also have a claim to resolve talent inequality and 
bad market luck. In the latter vein, the revenue raised by such an endowment tax 
would be used for public services for the benefit of all, and/or redistributed to the less 
fortunate. The first question that arises with this suggestion is how to value different 
people’s endowments. I will assume that everyone’s endowment should be valued at 
the amount of income they would earn if they reached their reasonable earning 
potential.401 We may wish to define “reasonable,” as something like 80% of maximum 
earning potential working full-time hours. It would be necessary to value endowment 
in relation to maximum earning potential.402 A tax of 80% would be less demanding 
than the labour-inclusive auction, as people would certainly control their own labour 
and will have a little leeway to slightly increase their leisure or choose slightly less 
highly-paid work.  
An endowment tax would therefore require everyone to contribute a percentage of 
their maximum expected product. I will refer to this as an endowment tax, though 
others have referred to endowment as faculty,403 earning ability,404 and earning 
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capacity.405 Furthermore, if we assume that the tax income will be redistributed equally 
to all then we could equally accurately follow Stuart White and refer to it as a lump-
sum transfer scheme, or LSS.406 To explain how it would work, consider the implications 
of an endowment tax for the examples earlier in this chapter. Bertrand would have to 
pay, say, 400 units in tax while would Cassandra only be required to pay 250. This 
means that Bertrand would not be able to work part-time, as doing so would not 
generate enough income to pay his tax bill.  
There are two well recognised problems with endowment taxes.407 The first is that it is 
very difficult to obtain the information necessary in order to determine every 
individual’s relative earning potential. The information required is immense, and 
individuals would have both the means and the incentive to hide their talents.408 
Furthermore, even with the basic information, it might be difficult to determine a 
specific market value for talent, given that it will be necessary to make many 
assumptions and that market prices are in a constant state of flux. Furthermore, initial 
endowment is not the only source of good or bad fortune. Some people with average 
talents will receive unanticipated advantages by being in the right place at the right 
time, while some people with high ability will struggle.409 
                                                        
405
 Mark G. Kelman, 'Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in An "Ideal" Income Tax 
and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World', Ibid.31/5 (1979), 831-83 at 841. 
406
 Stuart White, 'The Egalitarian Earnings Subsidy Scheme', British Journal of Political Science, 29/4 
(1999), 601-22, Stuart White, The Civic Minimum : On the Rights and Obligations of Economic 
Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at chapter four. 
407
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness  at 157-8, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: 
Taxes and Justice, (Oxford: OUP, 2002) at 122, White, 'The Egalitarian Earnings Subsidy Scheme',   at 
603. White also discusses a third problem, that of parity of self-esteem between citizens, under the 
heading ‘civic egalitarianism,’ see White, 'The Egalitarian Earnings Subsidy Scheme',   at 619-21. 
408
 Dworkin highlights that individuals can ‘hide their talents under a bushel’ when discussing the 
talent auction proposal, Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 100. White attempts to mitigate this problem 
by partitioning individuals into a small number of endowment groups; White, 'The Egalitarian 
Earnings Subsidy Scheme',   at 618-9. However, this seems unsatisfactory because it does not then 
reflect the endowment of the particular individual involved. Someone at the “bottom” of the highest 
group would envy those at the top of other groups, since they would have to pay the highest tax but 
presumably have very limited job options that would enable them to meet that tax.  
409
 Sugin, 'A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model',   at 253-5. Examples of both kinds 
appear throughout Gladwell, Outliers : The Story of Success. 
146 
 
The second problem is the moral problem that plagued the previous proposal, that it 
enslaves the talented.410 Recall the case of leisure-loving Bertrand above; if he had to 
pay an endowment tax he would have to work full-time rather than part-time. Some 
may consider Bertrand enslaved because he is forced to work longer than he would 
like, but on the other hand, so was less-talented leisure-lover Derrick. Perhaps Bertrand 
would still not envy any other individual even with the endowment tax; he would not 
envy others with his talents and preferences as they would also have to work full-time 
and find themselves in the same position. However, he might envy Derrick if Derrick 
also received an additional low-endowment transfer that would enable him to work 
part-time. Before considering endowment taxation further, I will consider a refinement 
of it that responds to this leisure problem.  
3.9 The Egalitarian Subsidy Scheme  
Stuart White has proposed a novel form of endowment tax in his search for a solution 
to the question ‘what is the most ethically desirable form of transfer egalitarianism?’411 
He suggests that in addition to traditional redistributive taxes and transfers and 
endowment taxes—which he refers to as LSS—there is a third option; the Egalitarian 
Earnings Subsidy Scheme (ESS). Instead of requiring a straightforward lump-sum 
transfer from the highly endowed to the less highly endowed, the ESS would take 
account of the number of hours worked by the individuals involved. The ultimate 
comparison point is that of full-time working, such that if everyone works full-time then 
everyone would receive the same income after the transfers.412 However, instead of 
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calculating transfers based on this full-time assumption the transfer is calculated on an 
hourly basis, and thus depends upon the number of hours worked by each individual. 
So if Bertrand works half-time he does not have to pay the full transfer he would if he 
were a full-time worker, but rather half the total transfer. If Derrick were to work part-
time he would not receive the same transfer that he would with a lump-sum 
endowment transfer. So instead of lump sum transfers, transfers in both directions are 
calculated in proportion to the number of hours worked.  
White complains that lump sum transfers do not give people ‘access to the same set of 
income-leisure bundles.’413 As I described above, the LSS would enable Derrick to work 
very little, as most of his expenses would be covered by his lump sum. Bertrand, on the 
other hand, would have to work near to full-time in order to pay his tax bill, meaning 
that Bertrand would envy Derrick. However, under the ESS proposal, Derrick’s subsidy 
and Bertrand’s tax payment would rise in proportion to the hours they work. This 
means that they could both work part-time, giving them a similar leisure and income 
bundle. The ESS proposal gets around the inequality between Amanda and Cassandra 
in the same way as the lump-sum approach, and also between Cassandra and Bertrand, 
and between Bertrand and Derrick. This means that the work duration component of 
the slavery of the talented problem does not arise,414 because Bertrand would not envy 
Derrick as he would under a LSS scheme.415  
In addition, White also recognises the unpleasant job objection, whereby people have 
to work in a job they do not enjoy. The problem with the endowment tax is only not 
the work duration issue—the relationship between Bertrand and Derrick—but rather 
cases such as those of Edith and Gertrude. Gertrude has valuable talents, like Bertrand, 
which could command a high wage. However, she hates all the jobs apart from job D, 
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and much prefers this to jobs E-K despite its lower pay. She is happy to work full-time in 
job D, even though she could earn more in jobs E-K. If Gertrude were forced to pay an 
endowment tax, she could not earn enough in job D to pay the tax, meaning that she is 
effectively forced to work in higher-paid jobs (G-K). Gertrude has to pay costs that are 
generated by her talent rather than her authentic choices.416 She will envy the less 
talented person, and while this would be justified to her if she would have chosen such 
a policy in an ex ante position, it is not justified if it is fostered upon her without such a 
basis.  
White argues that the ESS proposal meets the unpleasant job objection because it 
meets the work duration objection. This is because the scheme responds to earnings, 
and so those who work in a lower-paid job rather than working fewer hours will also 
have their tax—or subsidy—reduced accordingly. Since peak earnings potential is the 
reference point for everyone, the more and less talented face the same type of 
decision.417 Both can choose to work in a job for less than their peak earnings, and 
would face a proportionate loss of earnings as a result. As such, there is a degree of 
symmetry in their respective positions; if Cassandra chose job A rather than F, she 
would be in a similar position to Gertrude in choosing job D over job K.418 White argues 
that while the standard endowment tax, or LSS, would lead to a slavery of the talented, 
his ESS would not. This is because a more talented person could choose to work long-
hours at a less highly remunerated job and this would be accounted for in such a way 
that they would not have to pay the full lump-sum. Since the ESS system reacts in the 
same way as it would if this highly talented person were working part-time at their 
peak-earning job, White concludes that while there ‘is a price to be paid for trading 
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high‐paying work for lower‐paid, more satisfying work, but the price is not necessarily 
higher for the talented than for the untalented.’419 
White’s argument for ESS is not based on equal resources or envy-freeness,420 but 
rather on the idea of democratic mutual regard and an egalitarian principle of 
reciprocity.421 His view is therefore a form of social egalitarianism.422 He relies upon a 
notion of core well-being, or capability for well-being and agency,423 that is similar to 
the views of Cohen and Sen which I argued against in the previous chapter.424 However, 
despite these differences in approach, it is still worth considering whether the 
improvement that ESS makes for a welfare or capability egalitarian would also solve the 
parallel problem for a resource egalitarian considering an endowment tax.425 Clearly, 
the ESS is much more attractive than the other approaches presented in this chapter; 
Gertrude can take job D, though she could not under the other proposals.  
However, while the ESS is much less troubling than the previous endowment-based 
proposals, it is still problematic. Although it suffers much less from the unpleasant job 
problem, it does not fully nullify the issue. Those with valuable talents who desire more 
leisure or a particular job will have a greater chance of it, but they will still face 
different options to the less talented as a result of the talent-referenced scheme. 
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Gertrude would still not face the same options as Cassandra, since for any given job she 
will have to pay a higher tax-rate. If Gertrude takes job D she would receive 
significantly less net pay than if Cassandra took job D, meaning her choice between 
available jobs is not the same as that of Cassandra. This is because the tax that each has 
to pay is referenced to their earning potential, and so they face the same decisions only 
in relation to their different earnings potential. They do not face the same decisions all 
things considered. Gertrude would still envy Cassandra for her lesser talent, a position 
that it is potentially as problematic as the original situation where Cassandra envied 
Angela for her greater talent.  
White would feel this is acceptable since he includes people’s requirement to 
contribute in proportion to their talent in his principle of reciprocity and consequent 
basic work expectation.426 This view therefore has similarities to Carens’ duty to 
contribute in accordance with ability. As I make clear above, I have concerns about this 
duty as it places different requirements on the more and less talented, despite the 
apparent similarity in their treatment. Furthermore, since the requirements of this duty 
are quite vague, if a particular interpretation of this duty were enforced I would worry 
that this is perfectionist. If the duty is not enforced, then it is not clear what advantage 
White’s approach has over the ex ante approach I will present in the following chapter. 
So while the ESS is much less troubling regarding the unpleasant job objection than the 
LSS approach, it leaves open the possibility that talented people will envy the less 
talented. Some talented persons will be able to complain that they have not been 
shown equal concern if they are effectively barred from jobs they would much prefer 
to do and are capable. If the response to them is that they would choose the ESS from a 
position of equality, then this would disarm the complaint, but would also show the ex 
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ante approach to be the dominant method of selecting an egalitarian approach.427 
Furthermore, the policy requires an assessment of the talent-level of all citizens, a 
policy that creates additional costs, and which some people would find invasive. To 
insist on the ESS is to ignore the worry that these costs might be too high, and higher 
than most people would choose to pay in the ex ante position.  
The ex ante approach I will outline in the following chapter avoids all these concerns; if 
hypothetical insurers would find the ESS attractive then they can choose it, and it 
would indicate equal treatment.428 
3.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced the problems of bad market luck and talent inequality 
into the attempt to determine the correct approach to taxation. There are many forms 
of market luck, and even in an idealised island society without any pre-existing 
inequality, people would have differing skills. These skills provide advantages in 
production, securing investment, and in obtaining desired jobs. These enable the more 
talented to have additional income and/or leisure over others. Indeed, one thing to 
notice is the importance of leisure that recurred throughout the chapter. The ability to 
obtain more leisure is an often overlooked advantage available to those with greater 
talent and other form of luck. Another point to note regarding leisure is that all of the 
types of ex post proposals I considered were improved when they took account of 
hours in work and leisure.  
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I considered several ex post proposals that attempt to correct for talent inequality, and 
found problems with all of them that are not present in the ex ante approach. The two 
radical responses I considered were very impractical and costly, to the extent that 
many people would feel the policies are not a price worth paying. Attempts to mimic a 
situation in which talents were equal are fraught with difficulties as it is not possible to 
simultaneously mimic all aspects of the talent equal situation. Labour-supply responses 
suffer from the problem that they enslave the talented, and while Stuart White’s ESS 
proposal is the least problematic labour-supply approach it too reduces the options of 
the talented when compared to the less talented. As a consequence, a talented person 
could envy a less talented person. This is unacceptable as leaves open the possibility 
that the requirements placed on the more talented do not show them equal concern. 
Of the proposals considered in this chapter, the ESS proposal is the most attractive, but 
even this leaves open the possibility that it requires too much of the talented.  
The ex post egalitarian policies, where practicable, all leave open the possibility that 
some members of society have a claim that they have not been shown equal concern. 
They have costs—or potential costs—that some individuals would not find it 
worthwhile to pay even if they did not know their relative fortune. In the next chapter I 
will consider a different approach that avoids this concern; Dworkin’s ex ante proposal.  
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  The ex ante response to bad market luck Chapter 4
 
The responses to bad market luck considered in the previous chapter were 
unsatisfactory, leaving the dilemma set out at the start of chapter three unresolved. 
The proposals considered there would appear to undermine the attractive features of 
resource egalitarianism. Namely, that it is a market-based entitlement theory which 
considers only the uncontroversial demands that people place on resources at the 
opportunity cost to others. It is therefore necessary to respond to bad market luck in a 
way that retains this advantage, that of the first person endorsement by all of the 
valuation of resources from a position of equality.  
In this chapter I will present and defend Dworkin’s response to this problem, the idea 
of purchasing insurance from a position of hypothetical equality. The idea here is to 
extend the hypothetical insurance response to disability to social and—in particular—
market luck. In the first two sections I will explain the hypothetical insurance response 
to low income (4.1), how it would work (4.2), and its advantages (4.3). In the remainder 
of the chapter I will consider some criticisms of the approach. In sections 4.4-4.5 I will 
respond to the arguments of Michael Otsuka, who argues that hypothetical insurance is 
inegalitarian as it allows morally arbitrary factors into the determination of equality. In 
section 4.6 I will explain how and why people’s preferences about distributive 
outcomes are excluded from consideration. The arguments from the previous sections 
enable me to explain and justify in section 4.7 the important difference between ex 
post and ex ante envy freeness.429 The remainder of the chapter responds to other 
criticisms of the ex ante approach, that it is inappropriate to attribute universal 
hypothetical decisions to people on a statistical average basis (4.8), and that the 
hypothetical insurance will support unacceptable utilitarian-mimicking outcomes (4.9). 
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I show that these concerns rest on misunderstandings of resource egalitarianism and 
therefore need not trouble us. 
4.1 Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance proposal  
In response to disabilities, Dworkin proposed a hypothetical insurance scheme which 
would determine an amount of compensation that would be fair between those who 
do and do not suffer the disability in question.430 The insurance has to be hypothetical 
because the sufferers did not have a chance to take out insurance against their 
disabilities. Where it is possible for people to take out insurance on equal terms, then 
there is no cause to intervene in such equal-market outcomes. Those who suffer 
misfortune having had a fair chance to insure against it have no claim to social 
compensation; they are responsible for their choice not to insure against the 
misfortune and cannot be said to envy those who did insure. For many instances of bad 
luck there is a functioning insurance market, which would leave people in the same 
situation of equality regarding risk and responsibility.  
In situations where people are in an equal position to choose their insurance, they can 
be held responsible for taking the insurance or not. Each individual involved would 
herself have chosen her level of insurance coverage according to her plans of life. This 
means that the individual can be assumed to have taken into consideration the cost of 
the insurance and what it would cover in deciding what level of insurance to purchase. 
If this individual then suffers the bad luck, she is clearly worse off than others, ex post, 
but Dworkin is untroubled by this as she was in the same position ex ante. Everyone 
faced the same decisions as to whether to insure and since they are responsible for 
their decision, and whatever should happen the initial equality would be retained. 
However, in the case of market luck, as with disability, people do not have the option 
to take out insurance for these misfortunes on equal terms. Dworkin therefore 
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proposes a similar approach to deal with a relative lack of earning talent as he did for 
disability. He suggests that we ‘may capitalise on the similarities between handicaps 
and relative lack of skill to propose that the level of compensation for the latter be 
fixed, in principle, by asking how much insurance someone would have bought, in an 
insurance sub-auction with initially equal resources, against the possibility of not 
having a particular level of some skill.’431  
In the initial 1981 presentation of equality of resources, hypothetical insurance for 
talents appears as a second-best approach to equality. However, in his more recent 
works,432 Dworkin has emphasised that hypothetical insurance actually indicates the 
egalitarian distribution. As such, rather than attempting to mimic a talent equal world 
with hypothetical insurance decisions as a guide, Dworkin later makes it clear that the 
post-hypothetical insurance distribution is the only one that treats people with equal 
concern. This is because the hypothetical insurance device can simultaneously take 
account of people’s preferences whether they are lucky or unlucky in one fell swoop.  
Take the example of health care costs, used by Dworkin to explain his position.433 Using 
the example of severe disability Dworkin distinguishes between a “rescue principle” 
and a prudential insurance approach.434 The rescue principle attempts to get those who 
suffer misfortune as close as possible to the level of those without such bad luck. This is 
therefore an ex post solution—trying to get people to the same level after suffering the 
bad luck—and it has some intuitive pull for egalitarians.435  
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It is worth noting that hypothetical insurance is necessary in cases such as unequal 
talents and disability because actual insurance is not available to all on fair terms. First 
because wealth in our society is not currently distributed fairly, and second, because 
insurance would not be available on the same terms to all due to morally arbitrary 
differences.436 This is because insurance companies have information about people that 
enables them to discriminate in ways that are unacceptable from the perspective of 
justice. Even a society beginning from an equal auction would require hypothetical 
insurance in order to solve the latter problem since the requirement is of ex ante equal 
opportunity to insure. Insurance companies would not ignore factors such as talents as 
the individuals who have this knowledge would take advantage of this disparity, leaving 
the company open to problems of moral hazard. Those who knew they were fortunate 
would not purchase the insurance, meaning that there would be few people who 
would pay in without requiring pay-out. This would mean either that companies would 
either not offer the insurance as it would not be profitable, or that customers would 
not take up the insurance as the terms would be so unfavourable (and hence 
companies would not offer it). Therefore, hypothetical insurance considerations would 
continue to be relevant even if there were no inequality in family wealth and 
generosity.  
With regard to earning ability, Dworkin rejects the notion that hypothetical insurance 
decisions should apply to the absence of specific inabilities and skills, because people 
could not form their life plans independently of their talents. Our talents are an 
important element in our decisions about what we want from life and hypothetical 
insurance decisions without that knowledge would have to be removed from what we 
are like. As Dworkin puts it, ‘if we suppose that no one has any idea what talents he 
has, we have stipulated away too much of his personality to leave any intelligible base 
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for speculation about his ambitions, even in a general or average way. The connection 
between talents and ambitions…is much closer than that between ambitions and 
handicaps.’437 He therefore has to propose an alternative approach, somewhat 
different from the hypothetical insurance for disability.  
Those insuring would generally know their own abilities, but they can be asked what 
insurance they would buy if they did not know what economic rent they are able to 
receive on these—‘what income the talents they do have can produce, or even 
whether the economic situation will be such that these talents will find any 
employment.’438 Hypothetical insurers would know the expected income structure of 
the society, but not where their talents will place them in that structure, and they will 
have to choose their level of insurance coverage. However, the insurance payments are 
paid out of actual income received from the economic rent available. Dworkin points 
out that while people overall will be worse off as a result of this scheme, since there 
would be administration costs, they would still endorse it due to their aversion to risk. 
Most people would fear that they would suffer very low income, and so would find 
such insurance appealing.439  
One criticism of hypothetical insurance for the economic value of talents is whether it 
makes practical sense. MacLeod challenges Dworkin on his claim that it would be 
possible to deny people the knowledge of the value of their talents while still allowing 
them to know their preferences and ambitions. He argues that if someone knows their 
preferences and ambitions and their society’s level of economic development they can 
be fairly sure whether or not they have valuable talents.440 The thinking here is that 
someone who likes word games and mathematical challenges will probably do fairly 
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well in a successful modern economy, while someone who likes wrestling and 
blockbuster movies may not.  
Ability and interests may correlate in some cases, but even in the examples I have 
come up with, there is no way to be sure that someone will find themselves able or not 
to satisfy the needs and desires of others in the economy based on this information: 
the geek could have severe autism which would be barrier to many careers while the 
wrestling fan may make a lot of money from wrestling or from becoming the world’s 
strongest woman. Furthermore, some people with high-brow interests may have poor 
business sense while others with low-brow interests may be very able to develop and 
practice a valuable skill. So while people might have reasons to suspect their abilities 
would be valuable, they could not be sure about this. Furthermore, to the extent that it 
is possible that knowledge of ambitions would still create an information disparity, 
using universal hypothetical choices—as I will discuss in section 4.7—resolves this 
issue.  
In section 4.3 I will recount the advantages of the ex ante approach, but before doing 
so I will explain in more detail how the hypothetical insurance works and consider 
whether it should be applied to talent or income.  
4.2 How hypothetical insurance would work  
I have explained that Dworkin rejected hypothetical insurance on specific talents, 
instead focusing on their value. I will now explain in more detail how the approach 
works, and argue that insurance should be based upon income-levels rather than 
talent-levels. Since talent-inequality is the main impetus for hypothetical insurance, 
Dworkin began by considering insurance against low-talent. That is, to base insurance 
premiums on the income that someone with that level of talent would be expected to 
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obtain. However, it is preferable to focus on income-based insurance rather than 
talent-based insurance for several reasons.441 
One advantage of the focus on actual income rather than talent levels is that there 
would be no slavery of the talented; the highly talented would not be forced to work in 
a particular profession in order to pay their high premiums.442 The second advantage is 
that it reduces the expense of determining the earning potential of each individual. The 
administrative expense of doing so would be passed on to the insured, increasing 
premiums and reducing the pay-outs. This would be particularly expensive since people 
would be tempted to ‘cheat by hiding their abilities under a bushel.’443 Furthermore, it 
might not even be possible to determine people’s earning potential accurately based 
on tests and trials. As I indicated at certain points in chapter three, the costs of the ex 
post schemes are not factored in, meaning that many if not most members of society 
would not feel the costs of ex post equality are worth paying given the choice ex ante. 
A third advantage is that an income-based approach would provide people with the 
chance to consider hypothetical insurance provisions against other forms of bad 
market luck as well as talent inequality. On this approach, even a talented person who 
made good choices but suffered from bad luck in their career and investments could 
potentially receive compensation.444 Furthermore, those who are have no valuable 
talents but who are otherwise economically lucky—for example because they have a 
lot of wealthy relatives who wish to support them—could potentially be overlooked if a 
talent-based approach were taken.445 More resources could then be channelled 
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towards those who have suffered some relevant kind of misfortune, irrespective of 
their “brute” talent level.  
Another advantage of the income-based approach is that it readily translates into a tax-
rate schedule of the sort with which we are familiar. This is because it allows a tapered 
approach, where instead of a set amount changing hands between those below and 
above the insurance threshold, the distance from the threshold will be taken into 
account.446 As such, those with earnings just below the threshold will receive less than 
those who are significantly below the threshold. The same would apply to those who 
would be paying-in to the insurance scheme rather than receiving from it; those with a 
very large income would pay more than those who earn just above the threshold.  
Tapering makes the insurance much more attractive for several reasons. Firstly, 
because people will not worry that they will be just above the pay-out threshold and 
will have to pay as much as someone with a very large income. If this was the case, it 
would limit the amount that people would be prepared to stake, reducing the amount 
available to pay out to the recipients of the fund. Secondly, it directs more resources to 
those who are significantly below the threshold and not to those who are marginally 
below. Thirdly, it would avoid the creation of a threshold effect, whereby people would 
obtain a higher net income if their gross income was slightly under the threshold 
amount than if their gross income was slightly above it. If this were the case, workers 
and employers would have a strong incentive to pay just below the threshold rather 
than the true market-rate. This would distort the labour market, subsidise employers 
who engage in the practice, and also reduce the availability of insurance funds for 
those who genuinely need them.  
With the tapered approach, people would not only have a choice over their threshold, 
but also the steepness of the rates at which they would be paying or receiving. Where 
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the rate is steeper, there will be a greater pay-out from those with the best market luck 
to those with the worst market luck. These more complicated insurance offerings 
would be much more attractive, because they would produce more resources for the 
least talented without any additional costs to those within the “statistically normal” 
range of fortune. I will consider these insurance considerations in greater detail in the 
remaining chapters of the thesis.447 Having explained the hypothetical insurance 
approach, I will now explain its appeal. 
4.3 Why hypothetical insurance?  
The ex ante approach to equality treats people with equal concern because it allows 
individuals to determine the value they place on the compensation for various forms of 
misfortune from a position of equality. On the other hand, the ex post approach does 
not respect people’s actual concerns. The ex post “rescue approach” could require 
individuals who do not suffer from the misfortune to pay-out more than they would 
have chosen to pay in insurance in order to provide the unlucky with more than they 
would have insured to receive. At the extreme, Dworkin feels that such a policy would 
lead a society to cripple itself448 by using resources to attempt ex post equality at the 
expense of the interests of its members.449  
One question for those who insist on ex post equality is to ask what scope there is for 
them to allow people to make choices that will lead to ex post inequality further down 
the line. To illustrate, if two people decide to gamble and one wins, should the 
winnings be redistributed to return to ex post equality? If supporters of the ex post 
value of equality reject this then they clearly fail to accept the requirements of anti-
perfectionism and responsibility with which I started; they clearly mark out a particular 
outcome as more important than the choices that people make. However, if they 
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accept such outcomes, on the basis that they represent choices that people can 
legitimately make and for which they can legitimately be held responsible, then ex post 
inequality is clearly trumped by responsibility and choice. Where ex post inequality is 
trumped by—or perhaps just includes—responsibility and choice in some areas, then 
surely the position to make this choice should go all the way to a position of 
hypothetical—ex ante—equality. It is a strange and unmotivated view which would 
apply liability-costs to people’s actual choices on the basis that choices should matter 
but not to do the same regarding hypothetical ones. Presumably there are some 
situations in which Adrian and Bruce—with different ambitions—should be held 
responsible for their choices and others in which they should not. If ex post equal 
outcomes are taken to be primary then it is not clear why it is acceptable to hold 
people liable for the costs of their choices at all. Supporters of ex post egalitarian 
approaches would need to explain why the resulting level of inequality should make 
such a big difference.450  
So if Adrian and Bruce have different ambitions, with the result that Adrian will have 
more resources, it seems that those who emphasise ex post inequality should deny that 
Adrian and Bruce should pay the costs of their choices. This would clearly violate the 
starting assumption of special responsibility. 
The ex ante approach rests only upon the resource-based decisions that people would 
make. The only justification for interfering with the resource entitlements that people 
have is that they would themselves have chosen to make them in the hypothetical-
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equal-insurance situation.451 The approach therefore respects the choices that people 
make (or would make given the ambitions that they have). Transfers in the name of 
equality are justified to all parties, since interferences in the freely chosen transfers 
that people make—taxation—is justified as a further choice that people would have 
made if they were equally able to insure. The ex ante approach indicates what the 
individual herself would choose to stake from a position of equality. This approach 
treats all with equal concern, as everyone makes their choice from an equal position. It 
satisfies the principles of anti-perfectionism and responsibility. People all choose for 
themselves, according to their assignment responsibility over their lives. In addition, in 
cases in which people would not have chosen to fully insure, people are liable for any 
costs of their misfortune above the level to which they would have insured.  
If our insurer is lucky, she will then have no complaint if she is asked to pay an amount 
corresponding to the premium. Similarly, if she suffers from the condition, she cannot 
complain that she should receive more than she would have insured to receive. It puts 
these difficult trade-offs into the hands of the individual. As such, equality does not 
conflict with other goods, such as utility, because it is subsumed into the procedure 
that takes into account how people will trade these goods against one another under 
equal risk.452  
I will discuss in the following chapters the implications of hypothetical insurance on 
economic and taxation policies. However, it is possible at this stage to consider the ex 
ante approach against the ex post approaches discussed in the previous chapter. The ex 
post proposals considered would not have been chosen in a position of ex ante equality 
as people would have considered them too costly should they prove to be fortunate—
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and sometimes even if they were in the unfortunate group. People could choose 
insurance coverage similar to the options proposed there. However, people certainly 
would not insure to share-out jobs according to preferences or type, as these would 
impose large costs due their detrimental effects on economic efficiency.453 People 
would not choose endowment taxation as it would limit their options if they turn out to 
be among a talented minority.  
The ex ante approach is therefore a better instantiation of the starting assumptions set 
out in section 1.1. This is because it does not rest on any potentially controversial forms 
of comparison, but only upon the actual decisions people would make, either regarding 
their real resources or their hypothetical decisions from a position of equality. Ex post 
approaches, on the other hand, have to fall back on a controversial form of 
comparison, or impose on people a vague duty to achieve a particular distributive 
outcome. In the following sections I will consider the most prominent criticisms of 
Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance solution. I will consider whether the approach 
supports outcomes that mimic utilitarianism, and, whether tax-rates should be 
personalised or universal—based on average coverage. The first line of criticism I will 
consider, however, is whether the internalisation of all considerations into the equal 
hypothetical insurance procedure violates the ideal of equality.  
4.4 Is ex ante equality egalitarian?  
Michael Otsuka provides perhaps the deepest criticism of the hypothetical insurance 
response to luck differentials.454 The thrust of Otsuka’s complaint is that ex ante 
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equality has value only to the extent that it leans on ex post equality, but that if it does 
then there is no motivation for the ex ante approach. The arguments and responses are 
complex, and I will explore them over this and the following section.  
Otsuka begins by questioning whether the role of ex ante envy-freeness is compatible 
with the ex post envy-freeness emphasised in the initial island-auction presentation of 
equality of resources. He bolsters this argument with the claim that many of the 
important and relevant risks which people face are both unavoidable and not freely 
chosen, occurring as a result of the actions of others or just at random.455 This is the 
thought, mentioned above,456 that the market is a “brute-luck-machine” that people do 
not decide to enter. Unlike the decision to gamble at fixed odds or not, the market 
society is a sort of unavoidable risk. Otsuka suggests that the existence of cases where 
“full compensation” insurance457 is either too expensive, or unreasonably expensive, 
should lead us to reconsider the insurance approach. For Otsuka, this is because the 
individual cannot avoid the risk, and yet there is no reasonable insurance available. As 
such, these are not like cases of option luck, in which people take a choice, but rather 
that the individual has no choice other than the very limited insurance on offer.458  
For Otsuka, the fact that an individual would insure at less than “full compensation” 
does not mean that they have not suffered from bad brute luck, such that they will 
envy the better luck of others. Dworkin’s position, described above, is that it is 
appropriate to apply an ex-ante envy test, which applies to the purchase of insurance 
from a position of equality (actual or hypothetical). Otsuka’s argument against the ex-
ante approach proceeds by use of the example of a horrible mental illness that affects 
people at random later in life. In a first scenario, (a), there is nothing that can be done 
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to alleviate the disease. In scenario (b) we imagine that there is developed an 
expensive treatment that has a very minor effect on the sufferers. It is then possible for 
people to purchase insurance, though no one would choose to do so. In a third 
scenario, (c), an inexpensive miracle cure is discovered, for which people would readily 
purchase insurance.459  
Otsuka argues that the ex ante procedure does not give us the resources to express 
that situation (c) is more equal than situation (b), since in both situations insurance is 
available. However, there is clearly less ex post inequality in (c) than in (b). Otsuka 
suggests that the ex post inequality is important in a way not captured by the ex ante 
approach, though it might be outweighed by other considerations in a wider calculation 
of justice.460 Otsuka, therefore, takes the more traditional view that ex post inequality 
is one consideration that must be weighed against others—such as efficiency for 
example—when determining the just outcome. For Dworkin, however, an individual 
should undertake such a calculation, considering her own values and the facts about 
the world from a suitably equal perspective. So while Otsuka thinks that ex post 
inequality can trump other issues when determining justice, ex post equality does not 
enter the resource egalitarian process.  
Andrew Williams defended the first-person resource egalitarian approach in a later 
exchange with Otsuka.461 This serves to differentiate the approaches and explain the 
motivation for the ex ante approach. I will discuss the substantive differences further in 
section 4.5. Williams draws on Parfit’s distinction between deontic and telic 
conceptions of justice in order to explain the difference between the above scenarios 
(b) and (c). The traditional understanding of these concepts is that for telic egalitarians 
equality is straightforwardly bad whereas on deontic theories, inequalities are 
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unjust.462 Deontic injustice is taken in this case to be an injustice which there is a duty 
to rectify, for example if one child steals a toy from another and you can rectify the 
situation. A telic injustice would apply to the overall outcome, but would not 
necessarily require any rectification. Deaths resulting from natural disasters might be 
considered telic inequalities, but not deontic, to the extent that the effects were 
beyond the control of the society and its institutions.463 The relevant point is that the 
existence of a telic injustice does not always imply an enforceable duty to—fully or 
partially—rectify the situation, as only deontic injustices demand action. 
Otsuka’s examples are clearly of the sort where the universe is unfair, but that does not 
mean there is a duty to rectify that situation. Indeed, since Otsuka advocates a pluralist 
approach, other values would temper the requirement to rectify inequality. The 
difference between the two positions is that Otsuka’s position would take account of 
ex post, telic, inequalities, while Dworkin’s approach ignores these. Dworkin’s concern, 
and that of this work, is to design a society which treats all its members with equal 
concern. One question, then, is whether deontic and telic inequalities are entirely 
coexistent, or whether there can be telic inequalities that do not require rectification. 
Returning to the above examples, we can readily accept that (c) is a preferable 
outcome to (b), but in deontic terms there is no difference between the two.464 
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Williams highlights that the hypothetical insurance device is a device to determine 
justice in a deontic sense; the extent to which redistribution is required from one group 
to another. On the deontic conception of justice, the difference between (b) and (c) is a 
factual one, and the duties of justice require us to take account of the facts of the case. 
When the affordable cure becomes available there is a duty to provide it, but when 
there is no such cure the expensive and ineffective treatment is not a requirement of 
justice. This leaves us open to hope for changes in these facts, and perhaps even to 
work for them (such as investing in a cure for the disease),465 but these new facts will 
alter what deontic justice requires rather than rendering one set of affairs more just 
than the other. Following Rawls, we can say that the natural distribution of luck—the 
unfairness of the universe—is neither just nor unjust in the deontic sense, and it is 
these facts to which we should respond in the name of justice.466 This explains 
Dworkin’s comment that ‘a new issue for equality arose when the cure was 
discovered.’467  
This explains the difference between the positions and explains why equality of 
resources answers Otsuka’s examples in the way that it does. Perhaps the two 
approaches would often produce the same recommendations—they would quite likely 
be similar. However, the role of the individual is different in both cases. The pluralist 
approach taken by Otsuka is able to accept the value of telic inequality, but it would 
have to weigh this against numerous other values. It would either have to take into 
account the preferences that individuals actually have, in which case it would 
presumably take a longer route in order to mimic the hypothetical insurance outcome, 
or, it would ignore the ambitions and values that people in fact have. This latter option 
is unappealing. Whatever weightings were accepted would be controversial since some 
or all people would disagree with them. Put another way, to insist on any form of 
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weighting that does not refer to subjective valuations would violate the continuity test. 
This explains Dworkin’s statement in his response to Otsuka that the imposition of 
greater ex post equality than individuals would themselves wish to have is ‘equal 
concern only in the Pickwickean sense of no concern for anyone.’468  
On the other hand, the subjective ex ante approach to justice would determine the 
proper answer based upon the choices, values, or opinions of actual individuals. In the 
hypothetical insurance case, the individual is herself asked what level of redistribution 
(insurance) she would choose, based on her own values. So to consider the mental 
health illness, the individual is asked what level of insurance coverage she would 
choose from a position of equality, given that she herself would have to pay-out if she 
did not suffer from the illness. The hypothetical insurance mechanism thereby allows 
the individual to weigh up the costs either way. The individual can then weigh-up the 
various options and consider how much she would pay-out if she is lucky and receive if 
she is unlucky. Her values are taken into account, whichever position she finds herself 
in. Like Cohen, Otsuka wishes to define equality as it is a telic value. The purpose of this 
thesis is to answer the deontic question of what taxes treat people in a just, fair, and 
equal fashion. Including the value of ex post equality in this determination does not 
treat people as equals, since not everyone would agree on how this outcome should be 
measured against other important considerations. As a result, most—if not all—
members of society would have a potential complaint that their values have not been 
taken account of by the ex-post-inclusive approach. The ex ante approach, in contrast, 
will determine redistribution in accordance with the values that people actually have. 
This hopefully explains the attractiveness of the monist egalitarian ex ante deontic 
approach over the pluralist approach which could accommodate the telic bad of ex post 
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inequality. However, this leads on to Otsuka’s further arguments, which attack the 
nature and location of equality in the ex ante approach.  
4.5 Where is the equality in the ex ante approach? 
In this section I will consider Otsuka’s further response to Williams, and the issues 
raised. It is possible to draw out several points that Otsuka makes which coalesce 
around the question of the location of equality in the ex ante approach. Otsuka’s view 
of justice is a pluralist one in which various values—including ex post equality—should 
be weighed up against one another, presumably by political philosophers, in order to 
derive a value for all-things-considered justice. His attack on ex ante equality is 
therefore that something important about equality is lost when taking this approach. I 
will consider this challenge, the further concern that Dworkin’s approach to justice is 
not constructed appropriately, and finally that ex ante equality is inconsistent.469  
Otsuka begins his response to Williams with the assertion that the intrinsic bad of 
inequality rests on a ‘relational property of some being less well-off than others.’470 He 
gives the example of survivor guilt to show that ordinary people operate with this 
notion of inequality. While people may accept that ex post inequalities are acceptable 
when they come about from people’s choices, this does not apply in the case of a 
disability that can only be partially resolved. A pluralist might explain this by arguing 
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that freedom of choice, which is one cause of ex post inequality, is something of value 
while an ex post inequality caused by a disability is not. It is possible to see immediately 
where the difference in construction lies.471 I will return to the issue of constructing a 
theory of justice shortly. I will begin by discussing this idea that ex post equality is in 
itself an important value.  
Otsuka admits that his preference for the inclusion of ex post equality in considerations 
of justice would be less ambition-sensitive, but insists that there is no problem here.472 
Otsuka considers whether the requirement of ambition sensitivity would block the 
creation of his pluralist theory, and his strategy is somewhat odd. Otsuka considers 
whether the inclusion of ex post equality is unfair to people in the same way as it was 
deemed unfair for the initial auctioneer to convert the island into a commodity that 
some people liked more than others.473 In this case the ambitions of all persons are not 
taken into account, and it is ruled out as unacceptable. However, Otsuka argues that it 
is not unfair to insist on the less ambition-sensitive pluralist approach because this 
‘does not discriminate between the preferences of some and in favour of the 
preferences of others. Everyone would ex ante prefer, and to a roughly equal degree, 
an option to insure to the levelling policy. Hence this case differs from Dworkin’s 
case…in which the auctioneer unfairly transforms a diverse variety of resources into 
nothing but plover’s eggs and claret.’474  
Otsuka’s argument can be understood in at least two ways, both of which are 
inadequate. Where he says that everyone would prefer an option to insure to the 
levelling policy, he cannot mean that the option of insuring to drop everyone to the 
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level of the severely disabled would not be on the table, since insuring to achieve ex 
post equality is always an option; no-one would choose it as it would be extremely 
unattractive choice. He therefore presumably means that everyone would prefer the 
world in which there were no misfortunes, such that no one would face the risk of 
suffering from these disadvantages. This is clearly the case—everyone would prefer 
such a world. However, the issue of justice is how to respond to worlds in which such 
misfortunes do befall people.  
Otsuka therefore perhaps means to insist that the relevant reference point is this ideal-
world-without-misfortune, whereby this provides the egalitarian baseline from which 
we can determine ambition-based differences. However, his argument seemingly 
represents a different approach to justice, in which ambition-sensitivity has a 
completely different role to play. He seems to assume that there are degrees of 
ambition-sensitivity, and that ex post equality is an option to be considered alongside 
it. That is, for Otsuka the ambitions that people have are only reference points, 
whereas with the ex ante approach they are the only legitimate manner to determine 
the appropriate response to the misfortunes that befall people in the real world. This is 
to determine a form of justice in which people’s ambitions are taken into account in 
the most appropriate fashion given the misfortunes that befall people. Otsuka’s ideal-
world baseline, alternatively, makes no reference to personal values and preferences at 
all.  
Contrast the construction of justice under both approaches. Otsuka ends his response 
to Williams by distinguishing between first- and second-order values, suggesting that 
equality is a first-order value and that justice is the second-order value that has to 
adjudicate between first-order values.475 As I have shown, the hypothetical insurance 
approach is not structured in this way. On this approach, the individual takes into 
account the values that they have from an idealised equal position—and the cost of 
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realising their plans on the plans of others. Everyone inputs their own values into the 
equal market process in order to come up with an outcome that is fair to all. While ex 
post equality is not a value, as such, in this process, it is a possible outcome. The extent 
to which it is an attractive outcome is determined by reference to the attitudes that the 
parties have to the costs they would face to their ambitions if they were unlucky or 
lucky. People could choose the extreme insurance choice, though they will not do so, 
and, for reasons that Otsuka would also include in determining justice. However, by 
including all issues in one procedure, the approach determines a just outcome whereby 
everyone involved has a say in the outcome while accounting for the costs to all. 
Otsuka’s alternative approach does not allow individuals to weigh up the different 
goods in an egalitarian and ambition sensitive manner. 
Consider the severe disability possibility (b) mentioned above, whereby the only 
treatment available has little effect and is very expensive. On the ex ante approach the 
society would not provide the treatment, and would respond to the disabled person 
that he himself would not have chosen to insure to provide the treatment from a 
hypothetically equal position. Now consider the pluralist approach, which may or may 
not provide the treatment. If the society does not provide the treatment, the answer to 
this individual’s complaint is that ex post equality was a value in the determination of 
justice, but that other values countervailed such that the treatment was not 
worthwhile. The disabled person may feel that the values of the society were 
inappropriately weighed, in which case he feels he has a legitimate grievance that the 
society has a weighting of values with which he disagrees and suffers as a result. 
Alternatively, though unlikely, he may accept society’s weighting, in which case he is in 
the same position as in the ex ante case—he accepts his complaint has been answered. 
However, if in the pluralist system the treatment is provided, then the other members 
of society will have a complaint. They will complain that resources have been spent on 
a treatment that makes little difference to the sufferer and yet makes them worse off. 
If they receive the response that ex post equality is an overriding value they have the 
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legitimate grounds to complain that society has not taken their concerns seriously. The 
ex ante approach on the other hand accounts for all the concerns people have, 
including those of the unlucky. On the pluralist approach, it seems someone will always 
have a complaint476 that the society does not show them adequate concern.  
This returns us to the concern that the hypothetical insurance approach is unable to 
place any value on ex post equality, while the more traditional pluralist approaches can. 
So where deontic equality of the ex ante variety is taken to be the right way to 
determine issues of redistribution, this means that telic equality can have no value. This 
is the concern that there is a further ideal of equality, which cannot be captured by the 
hypothetical insurance approach.477 However, I have shown that the ex ante egalitarian 
approach is constructed differently. It would be possible for people to choose 
insurance that would produce ex post equality, but where people do not choose this 
option it does not represent a lack of equal concern.  
This leads to the final criticism we can draw from Otsuka’s paper, that equality of 
resources is inconsistent. Otsuka finds no justification for inserting the equality at the 
level of ex ante hypothetical insurance envy-freeness rather than at the level of ex post 
envy-freeness. He accepts that the requirement of ambition sensitivity plays an 
important part in this, but challenges this move with the example of gambling one’s 
initial stake. Otsuka asks why individuals in the initial auction of resources shouldn’t be 
given the alternative (to 1,000 clamshells) of a 50-50 gamble for either 500 or 1,500 
clamshells with which to bid for resources.478 On the one hand, if people had the 
ambition to take this gamble, it seems that they should be allowed to do so, while on 
the other hand, it would seem to violate equality in the initial auction. If we would 
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allow hypothetical insurance in order to respect ambitions, Otsuka argues we should 
allow people to gamble their initial equal resources before undertaking the auction.  
This sets a challenge for the Dworkinian; how is the choice of line justified between 
endowment insensitivity and ambition sensitivity? Otsuka’s feeling is that the 
requirement of endowment insensitivity should lead us to value the presence of ex 
post equality. However, to the extent that ex post equality is rejected as a value, does 
this render the insistence upon ex ante equality unmotivated, and thereby 
inconsistent? Otsuka appears to believe that ex post equality must have value in order 
to motivate the island auction and hypothetical insurance as otherwise their location is 
in some sense arbitrary, a point he phrases by asking where the line should be drawn 
between ambition sensitivity and endowment insensitivity. The worry might be 
expressed that Dworkin is attempting to sit on a knife-edge between the two issues, 
and that this is an inherently unstable position. Why not, for example, insist on greater 
ambition sensitivity and focus only on actual insurance decisions?479 Or why not go 
further in the other direction, and insist on a greater amount of endowment 
insensitivity, and insist upon ex post inequality?480  
However, the reason to include hypothetical insurance in some cases and not others is 
clear. So in response to the example above, there is no reason to force people to take a 
50-50 gamble. However, the cases in which it is—unfortunately—necessary to respond 
to an external cause for inequality, ex ante is the appropriate response. This does not 
imply that gambles are more important than equality, since the ‘enforced’ gambles of 
ex ante equality are used to respond to pre-existing unavoidable situations and not 
motivated by the inherent value or advantage of gambling. The application of ex ante 
equality in some cases and not in others is explained by the existence of relevant and 
unacceptable differences in circumstance against which there was no opportunity to 
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insure. The purpose of the auction is to allow everyone to value the resources of 
society according to their own subjective concerns, rather than some external objective 
criteria. There is no inconsistency between equality and ambition-sensitivity because 
equality comes in at whatever position is necessary in order to determine equal true 
opportunity costs.  
4.6 The basis for hypothetical insurance judgments  
Some may express a concern at this point. I have argued that there is no place for the 
value of ex post equality to influence distributive outcomes, and it should be clear from 
my description that this applies to other distribution-outcome values. Some may feel 
that this excludes the perfectly legitimate views that individuals have about the correct 
distributive outcome, and that equality of resources fails to show people adequate 
concern and respect when ignoring these views. Such distributive values might be 
views about property entitlement like libertarianism.481 Or, more likely, they would be 
views about pre-institutional desert, such as that people should receive from their 
society in line with their contribution as determined by the market,482 their efforts,483 or 
as compensation for their social activities.484 A third type of view is that the distribution 
of resources in society should be organised to bring about the most desirable state of 
affairs.485  
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Equality of resources implies that we should ignore all these views about distributive 
justice, and that it does not show people a lack of concern when doing so. If everyone 
in society had the same preference for a distributive outcome, then the correct 
egalitarian distributive outcome would not matter anyway; people would donate their 
excess to create the outcome they all desire. However, in the absence of unanimity, 
implementing any distributive values would fail to show concern for all members of 
society. It should therefore be emphasised that equality of resources is premised on 
constructing an egalitarian outcome that treats all with equal concern, and that it is 
therefore appropriate to ignore the distributive preferences—such as for free-market 
outcomes—of the members of society.486  
4.7 The ex ante argument against the ex post actual-envy-free 
approach 
The previous sections make it now possible to fulfil the promise made in the previous 
chapter.487 This was to provide a fuller explanation of why the ex post actual-envy-
freeness approach endorsed by Cohen Christofidis and others is inferior to ex ante 
envy-freeness. This was the proposal that it should be possible to adjust incomes, jobs, 
and working hours such that no-one would envy any other person in their society. I 
have argued against this,488 and similar proposals,489 on the basis that they do not 
respect equal opportunity costs, but it is now possible to develop this argument.  
The ex post envy removal procedure has an apparent advantage over the ex ante 
response to envy as people will not prefer their actual position to that of any other in 
their society. People in an ex ante envy free position could complain that there is an 
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alternative under which they would not envy a particular—fortunate—person whose 
resources they currently envy. The problem with this advantage is that it fetishizes 
envy-freeness as an end in itself. It should now be clear that the advantage of envy-
freeness is that each person values the resources in society according to their own plan 
of life. The ex post actual-envy-freeness approach does not construct distributive 
justice from an equal position in which individuals themselves value resources from an 
equal position. Instead, it searches out an attractive initial outcome in which no-one 
envies anyone else. The ex ante approach takes account of the gamble and risk 
attitudes that individuals have to the possible sources of ex post inequality, while the 
latter approach ignores this.  
To see the difference, imagine the conversation between the government and a 
complaining individual in each society. In the ex ante society we can imagine Ivan, who 
has a disability and envies the overall resources of others. When complaining of his 
envy, Ivan would admit that he would not have chosen to insure to remove the actual 
envy felt between him and those others, as the gains to unfortunate Ivan would not 
outweigh the costs to fortunate Ivan. There is therefore a response to Ivan to suggest 
that he “has been treated as an equal, as he would have chosen not to insure to 
eliminate ex post envy.”  
Now consider Hector in the ex post actual-envy-free society, who is fortunate and 
would prefer to be in an ex ante society where he would pay less tax. The ex post 
government response is that he should accept this situation as he would not prefer to 
be in the position of any actual person in his society. However, Hector could be much 
worse-off than he would be in the ex ante society, in a way that he would not have 
endorsed if given the choice between the two options. Hector can point out that those 
who would have envied him in the ex ante envy-free society would have taken the risk 
that they would have had this outcome despite its actual envy.  
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The complaint against the government is different in each case. The only restrictions 
within the ex ante approach arise due to the desires of equally-placed others for the 
same resources. As a result, the restrictions come about only from the choices of 
equally placed others. The actual-envy-freeness approach adds a further restriction, 
which is that others cannot envy what you have. This further restriction violates the 
ideal of people jointly determining an outcome that treats all with equal concern. The 
two approaches therefore display respect for the individual in a different place, and 
while the ex post actual envy free approach is attractive as it will implicitly take account 
of people’s plans of life, it does not make such considerations from an egalitarian 
baseline. It begins instead from the position that ex post actual envy-freeness is simply 
valuable. In the ex post case, people’s plans of life are considered at a later stage, in 
their valuation of actual resources after they have been distributed and adjusted. In the 
ex ante approach, everyone jointly values resources in a manner that is fair to all. 
Everyone has the chance to insure to the “equal-outcome” if they wish, though in 
practice there are many areas in which no-one would do so. 
The ex ante approach respects the decisions that people make from the most suitable 
egalitarian baseline. It therefore shows equal concern to all as it provides an answer to 
Ivan that the ex post actual envy-freeness approach cannot provide to Hector on terms 
he would have to accept. Envy-freeness plays a crucial role in resource egalitarianism 
because it enables people to value resources in terms that they themselves accept, but 
it is not a value in itself that should be imposed.  
4.8 Would rates be personalised or universal?  
I mentioned above an important question regarding the hypothetical insurance 
approach, concerning the nature of the move from personal hypothetical insurance 
decisions to a tax system. The issue is whether it is necessary to produce a personalised 
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tax rate for each individual.490 Different people have different attitudes to risk under 
uncertainty and would choose different levels of hypothetical insurance coverage as a 
result. Some would be concerned to maximise their income should they turn out to be 
unfortunate—maximinimising—while others would be willing to take the risk of 
destitution for the tiny chance of being super-rich—maximising. Tax rates could be 
personalised based upon each person’s preferences and attitude to risk under 
uncertainty, and ideally, people would have personalised tax rates based upon their 
risk profiles. 
As I have described it above, however, hypothetical insurance would apply a single tax-
rate to all in society, based on the presumed average level of coverage that people 
would choose. If this universal approach is taken, some may feel their ambitions and 
values are not respected. This would appear problematic because the advantage of 
equality of resources over alternative views is its ambition-sensitivity.491 Those who 
would be willing to risk extreme poverty in order to have the chance to earn huge 
amounts would have a claim to less progressive taxation should they prove to be high 
earners.492 Additionally, those who would wish to avoid the risk of low income would 
have a claim if they would not have taken the risk in the hope of high income and 
hence purchased a very high level of low-pay compensation coverage. Those in the 
other extreme positions—paying less tax and receiving more benefits—might not 
complain that they are better-off than their hypothetical insurance decisions would 
have created, but this would only be because they were willing to benefit from 
injustice.  
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In practice, it will often be necessary to choose hypothetical insurance rates on 
people’s behalf. This is because the collection of the information required to design 
personalised taxes would be hugely problematic; if even possible, it would be overly 
expensive. One method to obtain this information would be to ask people what 
coverage they would have chosen if they did not know their current income. However, 
this would be unreliable, since people could report their hypothetical decisions 
consciously or unconsciously with knowledge of their relative fortune. An alternative to 
the reliance upon asking people would be to base coverage levels upon observations of 
the risk profile of each individual by observing their actions and choices. However, even 
this would not get around the problem, since people would potentially change their 
actions in order to improve their tax-rate. People with rare and valuable talents would 
have an incentive to take big risks in order to lower their personalised tax-rates. 
Meanwhile, those without any valuable talents would take fewer risks than they 
otherwise would in order to maximise their low-income earnings. This makes such an 
approach—even if feasible—unreliable also.493 
Even if it were deemed possible to obtain reliable and authentic information, there are 
still reasons to choose the averaged approach. Obtaining the reliable information 
required about each individual in order to make such decisions would be a hugely 
expensive undertaking. Indeed, attempting to determine actual views may be much 
more expensive than applying the average level, such that even those with the 
preferences that come out badly would be worse-off due to the administrative costs of 
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the scheme. Given that no-one would then benefit from the personalised approach, 
everyone would accept this as superior. It therefore shows greater concern to impose a 
universal approach.494  
A potentially problematic claim that Dworkin makes to further defuse worries about 
universalising is that people would only choose from a small range of policies.495 Since 
no-one’s choice would therefore deviate very much from the average it is acceptable to 
impose this average level. In response to this, Robert Van Der Veen points out that 
people have a wide range of attitudes to risk, and that imposing an average is less 
legitimate than Dworkin assumes.496 Dworkin’s narrow-range assumption is a 
potentially controversial empirical claim, and may prove not to be true. If there were a 
large deviation in the range of insurance coverage people would choose, would the 
imposition of an average be acceptable? As explained above, people would have will be 
strongly inclined to the universal approach due to the problems with a personalised 
approach.  
In response to Van Der Veen, it is important to note that there is a difference between 
the range of views regarding risk and the corresponding range of hypothetical 
insurance choice. While people have very different attitudes to risks, the sensible 
insurance options available would be in a smaller range. This is because insurers would 
take account of the moral hazards and disincentives produced by the chosen level of 
insurance.497 So those who would wish to maximise the prospects of those in the 
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lowest position—to maximinimise—would have to take account of incentive effects 
and the increased scope for—and therefore costs of—fraud.498 As a result, those with 
an extreme aversion to risk would not choose to equalise income. Therefore, the 
sensible insurance options would be of a smaller range than the range of attitudes to 
risk, making the imposition of an imputed average on all members even less troubling.  
The imposition of assumed average insurance coverage does not undermine the 
hypothetical insurance solution; it is perfectly consistent with it. People individually 
would choose the universal approach, meaning that it would pass the first-person or 
continuity test. I will now discuss another claimed problem with hypothetical 
insurance, that it would mimic utilitarianism and therefore be inegalitarian.  
4.9 Would hypothetical insurance replicate equality of welfare?  
In a series of articles in the mid-1980s, John Roemer attacked resource egalitarianism 
on the basis that it mimicked utilitarianism, which is ostensibly an inegalitarian 
doctrine.499 This line of argument was then repeated by Marc Fleurbaey.500 The 
examples given are those of Andrea and Bob, who in different examples, have different 
talents, disabilities, enzymes to convert food, endorphins, and hidden resources. 
Andrea and Bob do not know which of them is disadvantaged, but they have to make 
an insurance decision. The disadvantage not only makes them worse-off than the 
other, but also renders them less capable of converting resources into utility. The 
argument is that since equality of resources proposes hypothetical insurance to 
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compensate people for their personal resource deficiencies, and people make 
insurance decisions in order to maximise their expected utility, hypothetical insurance 
would lead people to choose coverage that would mimic the utility-maximising 
outcome. Just as utilitarianism would redistribute resources from those with lower to 
higher marginal utility, so would equality of resources.  
Roemer reaches this conclusion in the case of disability, where people would choose to 
insure to maximise the resources available to the non-disabled as they would be better 
able to convert the resources into utility. Similarly, those with superior enzymes should 
receive all the food, those who are better at producing endorphins should receive more 
resources in order to increase expected utility—by increasing total utility. Roemer 
argues that since all differences in ability to achieve utility will boil down to personal 
resources of one sort or another, we can extend the analysis to include hidden 
resources, which effectively sets up an entirely utilitarian programme, albeit for 
resource egalitarian reasons. The concern here is that if these conclusions were true, 
then resource egalitarianism would result in many of the extreme forms of inequality 
that plague utilitarianism, which would appear to contradict the egalitarian motivation 
behind the proposal. This would be because hypothetical insurance would not respect 
the distinction between persons that afflicts utilitarianism.501  
These conclusions follow on the assumption that the prudent insurance deal is the one 
that maximises expected utility, or welfare, under conditions of uncertainty. This is the 
common interpretation of insurance decisions, and Dworkin certainly—and perhaps 
unfortunately—referred to welfare considerations when he first described the 
hypothetical insurance approach.502 Roemer admits that there are other theories about 
decision making in conditions of uncertainty,503 such as prospect theory504 and regret 
                                                        
501
 Ibid.  at 92. See also footnotes 12, 97 and 180.  
502
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 96. 
503
 Roemer, 'Equality of Talent',   at 159. 
185 
 
theory,505 but argues that it is appropriate to take the dominant expected utility 
maximising approach.  
Given that Roemer assumes that insurance is purchased for the purpose of utility 
maximisation, and builds this into his mathematical assumptions, it is unsurprising that 
the outcome of his axioms mimics utilitarianism. However, there are obvious flaws in 
his approach. Scanlon provides several criticisms. His first is that Roemer’s models 
include welfarist assumptions that are alien to resource-based accounts, as they based 
on welfarist foundations; such as the axiom of pareto efficiency.506 This challenges the 
claim that resource egalitarianism really can be reduced to utilitarianism. However, it is 
noteworthy that economic theory has shifted focus over time from its utilitarian roots 
in welfare outcomes to a definition of utility which is inclusive of preferences.507 When 
including personal preferences regarding risk, an egalitarian utility-based approach will 
indeed produce the same outcome as the ex ante approach. In this case the two 
approaches have the same outcome.  
A second criticism from Scanlon is that Roemer takes all resources as resources for the 
generation of utility, which need not be case. Not everyone decides on their values and 
preferences based upon the effect these will have on his utility. Scanlon points out that 
if someone has a guilt-inducing religion which results in lower levels of utility, Roemer’s 
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approach would label this as a resource deficiency.508 This, however, is an 
inappropriate way to describe a person’s deeply held belief. Roemer’s approach 
implicitly treats every aspect of a person’s life as a means to utility. Accounting for 
people’s preferences in terms of their effect on utility is exactly the sort of 
controversial view of what counts as a good life that equality of resources is designed 
to avoid. It does so—partly, and relevantly for this challenge—in order to avoid 
perfectionism, which cannot treat people with equal concern.  
Fleurbaey challenges equality of resources utilising Roemer’s assumptions about 
hypothetical insurance. He argues that it will be unacceptable for the same reasons 
that utilitarianism is unacceptable; namely that it would have anti-egalitarian features. 
This would occur since it would be a utility-maximising insurance choice to transfer 
resources from the badly-off to already well-off “utility monsters” who will get more 
utility from the resources.509 Dworkin responds to this argument by pointing out that 
people do not currently purchase insurance in this way—people insure to avoid bad 
outcomes despite the overall utility loss.510 Furthermore, Dworkin points out that it 
does not matter whether equality of resources is extensionally equivalent to any other 
theory of justice, as it stands and falls on its own merits and not those of another 
theory with the same outcome.511 
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Fortunately, there is no need to worry about the possibility of transfers to utility 
monsters anyway. Hypothetical insurance is a means to calculate transfers from the 
envied to the enviers where they had no opportunity to choose insurance coverage 
from an equal position.512 It is therefore only available only to those who envy the 
position of another. In the problematically inegalitarian examples, the transfer would 
take place from the envier to envied, which would not be a valid hypothetical insurance 
option. So if equality of resources does mimic utilitarianism in some sense, the 
troubling outcomes that plague utilitarianism would not apply anyway.  
4.10 Conclusion  
I have explained the ex ante hypothetical insurance based response to bad market luck. 
The compensation is based upon the insurance decisions that people can be assumed 
to have made when making binding insurance decisions from a hypothetical position of 
equality. This approach allows a form of compensation that is compatible with the anti-
perfectionist form of equal concern described in the first chapter. I have shown that, 
contra Otsuka, this approach is appropriately egalitarian, though not in the same way 
that he and others perhaps take that to mean. I explained that there is no place for 
potentially controversial distributive values in the determination of equal concern, and 
that it is consistent with the values of equality of resources to apply a statistical 
average policy. Finally, I then showed that hypothetical insurance would not mimic a 
problematically utilitarian approach. I have therefore countered the most notable 
criticisms and misunderstandings of this view, and have hopefully clarified the 
advantages of the ex ante egalitarian approach to tax policy. In the remaining chapters I 
will apply this approach to determine an egalitarian tax system.   
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  Chapter 5
The holistic interpretation of hypothetical insurance 
 
Having presented hypothetical insurance as integral to distributive justice, I now turn to 
the more positive task of determining the tax system that hypothetical insurers would 
choose. In this chapter I present a holistic interpretation of hypothetical insurance that 
differs from Dworkin’s in several areas. I will explain constraints and considerations 
that hypothetical insurers will apply in such a situation. I will conclude that hypothetical 
insurers would choose an on-going513 tax and benefit system that will cover certain 
baseline costs and also transfer resources from the more economically fortunate to the 
less fortunate while taking account of the economic effects of the policies. In the 
following two chapters I will apply the findings of this chapter to the benefit system for 
the unfortunate (chapter six), and to a tax system that will tax the fortunate in order to 
provide the necessary revenue (chapter seven).  
I will begin—in section 5.1—by presenting my proposed hypothetical insurance 
approach to taxation, explaining where I agree with Dworkin. While I agree with 
Dworkin on the broad approach, I criticise two unwarranted assumptions that he 
appears to make. The first—in section 5.2—is that he wrongly assumes that insurance 
decisions imply hypothecated taxation. The second (5.3) is that Dworkin’s focus on 
hypothecated insurance decisions creates an unnecessary and unhelpful distance 
between the theory and the policies that are available. I propose instead that insurers 
should directly consider the policies available to resolve all forms of bad luck, which is a 
better fit with Dworkin’s ideal of including practical considerations in the construction 
of justice. My proposal is therefore to apply hypothetical insurance in a holistic and 
policy-focused fashion. 
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The nature of this approach will become clearer through my responses to various 
possible challenges, mostly regarding differences between Dworkin’s interpretation 
and mine. Firstly, the insurance choice between different types of policy is different 
from the initial presentation of hypothetical insurance which focused instead on 
premiums; I emphasise that qualitative issues are very important as well as quantitative 
ones. This raises a concern regarding the idea of determining the “average” policy, 
given that averaging will need to take place across types of policy as well as levels of 
premium and coverage. After explaining in section 5.4 that it is possible to overcome 
this problem, I will move on to a second—related—concern (5.5). This is that there are 
too many moving parts for people to make hypothetical insurance decisions. Insurers 
would have to take account of the effects of many policies simultaneously, 
simultaneously determining the level of coverage for multiple insurance policies. I will 
argue that it is possible to undertake such a dynamic process by bracketing some 
policies and tax expenditures and taking some issues as given while focusing on others.  
The final challenge to my hypothetical insurance approach is that it is unclear where 
the envy occurs in the process of determining egalitarian policies. I will clarify this point 
against two alternative interpretations in section 5.6.  
After answering the various possible criticisms of the approach just sketched, I will 
explain how to apply the approach. In order to do this, I take the position of the 
hypothetical insurers and explain the considerations that would guide them in their 
deliberations. This will involve more detailed discussion of the incidence of taxation 
(5.7) and the considerations that would guide hypothetical insurers (5.8). Finally, in 
section 5.9 I explain some of the ways of classifying people that will be useful when 
considering policy options. Once it is clear what hypothetical insurers would be 
deciding, and how they would deliberate, it will be possible to apply the approach.  
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5.1 Hypothetical insurance and taxation  
I will begin by setting out my interpretation of the hypothetical insurance approach to 
taxation. There are several aspects to this approach, and some will be developed in 
more detail in later sections. After sketching out the approach I will discuss the areas in 
which the approach corresponds to Dworkin’s.  
The first aspect of the approach is that insurers will be choosing an on-going tax and 
benefit system. Insurers will be interested in the whole system and its effects, and I 
therefore refer to this interpretation as holistic. As they consider the whole system, 
insurers have to consider many issues as part of a dynamic process.514 This approach 
therefore differs from Dworkin’s hypothecated approach, as I will discuss in section 5.2. 
Furthermore, it makes the hypothetical insurance procedure more complicated, though 
not problematically so—a defence I will make in section 5.5. The second aspect is that 
insurers should focus on the policies available to them and choose the best mix of 
policies to meet their insurance requirements. This differs from Dworkin’s insurance-
focused approach, whereby the hypothecated insurance decisions are primary and the 
policies have to mimic the insurance outcomes.  
A third aspect of the approach is that the revenue raised will need to be sufficient to 
meet certain baseline costs to government, as well as enabling a transfer of resources 
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from the more economically fortunate to the less fortunate.515 Raising revenues is 
limited by the fourth aspect; insurers will have to take account of the economic effects 
of the policies. The negative economic consequences of a policy can make it less 
attractive than alternatives that appear to improve the position of the less fortunate 
more directly.  
I will now describe Dworkin’s conclusions regarding taxation and redistribution, in 
order to highlight where I agree and disagree with his conclusions.516 Dworkin linked his 
hypothetical insurance approach to taxation from its first presentation, indicating that 
his hypothetical islanders would choose a ‘recognizable pattern of tax. They might 
establish a graduated income tax financing transfer payments in the amount of the 
difference between the average coverage level less the co-insurance factor and what 
an applicant can plausibly argue is the highest income he can in fact command.’517 As I 
have discussed,518 Dworkin suggests that an income-based tax would be linked to 
actual earnings rather than ability to earn, to avoid enslaving the talented, along with 
reasons of administrative cost and privacy.  
Dworkin discussed hypothetical insurance in more detail in a chapter written for 
Sovereign Virtue.519 He suggested that people would not take a “maximin” approach to 
hypothetical insurance, because of the costs of doing so to the economically lucky.520 
These are the administrative costs of the scheme, but Dworkin also highlights that 
moral hazard issues—worries that insurance opens up opportunities for people the 
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costs of which they can pass on to others—would also weigh heavily in hypothetical 
insurance decisions. People would therefore insure to cover themselves to obtain a 
poverty-line level of income, which would reduce the potential gains of—and hence 
attractiveness of—cheating the system.521 In addition, insurers would not include a 
policy that would take account of specific job preferences.522 I broadly agree with these 
points, though I will argue in section 5.3 that insurers would look to do more than 
Dworkin assumes to improve the position of low-earners. Indeed, I will discuss these 
issues in more detail in this and the following chapters.  
Dworkin discussed taxation more recently in the context of U.S. politics in his book Is 
Democracy Possible Here. In that work, the focus of his discussion of taxation is more 
negative as he argues that the reduction of taxes demanded by increasingly powerful 
libertarian and conservative lobbies, and tax-cutting president George W. Bush, would 
not be legitimate.523 Dworkin discusses what it takes for a government to be 
legitimate—for it to attempt equal concern. His argument is that cutting programmes 
for the poor members of society as a consequence of the proposed tax cuts would not 
show adequate concern for those members of society.524 His claim is that proposed 
changes to U.S. tax policy would turn a regime that is probably illegitimate in its 
treatment of the poor into one that clearly would be. Where Dworkin does discuss tax 
policy in more detail he insists again that ‘we would insist on a fairly steep progressive-
tax-rate system.’525 He then repeats his earlier insistence that income taxes would be 
preferred to consumption taxes and that there would also be an accessions-type tax 
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with multiple-year averaging.526 Accessions taxes are taxes on the recipients of gifts 
and bequests, rather than the estate of the deceased.527  
I explained the difference between justice and legitimacy above,528 and my interest in 
this work to determine the ideally just tax system. Dworkin makes a few claims about 
the just tax system—that it would involve progressive taxation of both earned income 
and unearned income from gifts and inheritance. I will discuss these policies in more 
detail—whether we can go any further than Dworkin does in specifying which form of 
tax and benefit system people would choose as part of their hypothetical insurance 
deliberations—in the following chapter. However, I will now examine the points of 
disagreement between my interpretation of hypothetical insurance and that of 
Dworkin.  
5.2 Should taxes be hypothecated? 
The first challenge to the holistic approach is that considering the overall nature of the 
tax and benefit system requires us to combine together insurance decisions that should 
be separate. This is the idea that taxes should be hypothecated529 such that the income 
from a particular tax should correspond to the expenditure on a related issue. For 
example, Dworkin considers insurance against bad market luck in the labour market 
separately from insurance for bad social-luck. Regarding the latter, Dworkin writes that 
in ‘a more nearly equal world, people would be able to insure against bad inheritance 
luck,’530 and would purchase insurance against the fear of being relatively worse off 
than others. Thus, people would want to insure ex ante against ‘occupying a low tier in 
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a class system,’531 and would therefore support highly progressive gift and inheritance 
taxation. Dworkin assumes that hypothetical insurance should proceed in this 
hypothecated manner. My approach, in contrast, is focused on the whole tax and 
benefit system and its effects, and I will show that Dworkin’s assumption is 
unwarranted. 
In some respects, Dworkin’s hypothecated approach is the obvious one; we need to 
consider different forms of fortune separately as thought experiments that will guide 
our choice between policies. However, this does not imply that taxes should be 
hypothecated such that taxes that are related to one form of good fortune should be 
used solely to relieve that form of misfortune. I contend instead that there is no need 
to determine the amount expended upon schemes directly designed to compensate 
those with poor social luck based solely on social-luck related taxes. As Clayton argues, 
there is no reason to restrict or expand the expenditure on one type or purpose of 
policy on the basis of the amount of taxes collected from the corresponding area.532  
There are several reasons to take the holistic approach and focus on the overall tax and 
benefit system rather than limiting options to direct responses. General—indirect—
policies will often have several effects which are justified by multiple reasons. For 
example, subsidised or free education may assist in mitigating social luck as well as 
ensuring authentically choosing citizens.533 It seems difficult to determine on the 
hypothecated approach how much of this spending should be attributed to the 
hypothecated source and how much to other reasons.  
Limiting government spending to direct policies may preclude more effective multiple-
overlapping-reason policies. For example, one policy may be helpful with regard to 
many justified reasons but would not be effective enough at responding to any one 
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issue alone. Considering the whole package would allow such policies while the 
hypothecated approach would not, an inefficient use of resources. Such inefficiencies 
would make the policy options less attractive, and thus provide less attractive 
hypothetical insurance options. This would result in lower taxes and less provision as a 
result of the inefficiencies caused by unnecessary hypothecation. Of course, the same 
point applies to taxation as well as government spending; taxes may also achieve 
several ends at once.  
Second, hypothecating taxes makes as little practical sense from the perspective of 
insurers as it does for governments.534 Governments rarely want to expend exactly the 
amount collected from a particular tax on that particular area of policy—some areas 
will require more resources and others will cost less than the revenue raised. 
Furthermore, in practice tax revenues will just go into a central pot, and so the 
hypothecation is merely a limitation on the ability of government to move tax revenues 
around in accordance with their most productive use. Hypothetical insurers would 
therefore not wish to be limited in their tax package options in this arbitrary manner.  
While there are advantages in considering hypothetical insurance decisions regarding 
market talent and social luck separately, this should not restrict us in finding the most 
effective overall tax system. I will therefore focus on the overall tax system guided by 
the considerations that people would make in response to the several problems against 
which they will consider insurance. It will be necessary to remember throughout that 
decision-making may relate to multiple kinds of relative brute luck, and to various 
forms of potential disadvantage.  
5.3 Policy-focus and low-earners  
The second challenge is that the policy-focus of the holistic approach is too far 
removed from the insurance-ideal. The contrast here is between Dworkin’s focus on 
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insurance policies against various forms of bad-luck and the holistic focus on policies 
that together will be attractive means to abate the consequences of bad-luck. One 
possible worry is that focusing on complicated policies obscures the important issue of 
the insurance that people would purchase. However, I will explain how the approach 
would work in the following section, thereby showing the feasibility of the holistic 
approach. Furthermore, real-life insurers choose their insurance in a similarly holistic 
fashion. 
Another possible worry is that the policies will affect those who should not be affected 
in certain ways according to the insurance scheme. For example, it might lead to 
policies that would affect two people who have no envy for the resources of the 
other.535 In response, I would highlight that the policy-focused approach by-passes the 
requirement of tailoring available policies in order to mimic the outcome of the 
insurance scheme.536 This insurance-mimicking process could just as readily affect 
people in ways that does not fit with the insurance-focused scheme. It seems more 
appropriate to take account of the insurer’s views of the policies directly rather than 
imposing a—potentially crude—mimic of the insurance-focused ideal, which may result 
in transfers between parties without the correct envy-relation.  
This point regarding mimicry indicates a further advantage of the policy-focused 
approach. If insurers focus directly on policies, then they can take account of the issues 
and costs that will the policies cause. The insurance-mimicking process, however, will 
make no reference to the costs or unfeasibility of implementing the mimic. Focusing on 
policies internalises the policy costs into the insurer’s considerations, as is done with 
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other costs such as moral hazard, meaning that insurers are making more appropriate 
decisions. By removing an unnecessary stage of mimicking the policy-focused approach 
constructs the egalitarian outcome in a much more plausible and attractive manner. 
This also fits well with the claim that the hypothetical insurance approach is not unduly 
idealising.537  
To see the advantage of the policy-focused approach, consider the response to those 
with low-market earnings. Dworkin presented hypothetical insurance as a response to 
low earning talents. However, in his writing on policies he only explicitly discusses the 
case for unemployment benefits.538 This is perhaps because of the unattractiveness of 
utilising talent-based insurance policies to increase income or of setting a threshold 
below which to increase income at anything but a very low level. However, insurers 
may find some policies designed to increase the position of the less talented quite 
attractive, and I discuss these in chapter six. The insurance-focused approach leaves 
little to be said for these policies beyond their efficacy at mimicking a talent or 
earnings-based insurance scheme. While the provision of unemployment benefits will 
improve the position of those with fewer marketable talents,539 it does not offer very 
much for the less talented who are in work. On the approach taken here, however, it is 
possible to include policies that would assist those who are in work as part of the 
hypothetical insurance approach.540  
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538 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at 335-8.  
539
 Such a policy will provide a degree of security—actual and psychological. Unemployment benefits 
will also provide workers with greater security when they need to stand up to an unreasonable or 
exploitative employer, without risking personal (and perhaps familial) desolation. It should also 
improve workers’ wage bargaining position vis-à-vis employers.  
540
 The failure to consider alternative schemes to improve the position of low earners does not 
necessarily imply that Dworkin would disagree with the broader remit of the approach I take. The 
absence of a discussion on this point may be a simple omission on Dworkin’s part, or it may indicate 
that he did not think there were any serious candidates to rival the status quo, or to improve the 
position of the worst off in a way that would be attractive to hypothetical insurers. It is quite 
possible that Dworkin would support the pre-existing minimum wage earnings subsidies and welfare 
programmes. Indeed, not only does he not condemn these, but he is generally supportive of the 
status quo against perceived threats to these from libertarians and conservatives in government. If it 
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I will briefly explain why it is necessary to look at policies beyond unemployment 
benefits.541 There has always been a disparity in market income between higher and 
lower paid workers. Furthermore, recent trends indicate growing inequality in both 
wealth and income in most countries since the early 1980s, certainly in the UK and 
US.542 As a result, the current trend appears to be towards an hourglass wage-
structure543 as some jobs become more highly paid while others disappear or become 
low-paid jobs.544 There is certainly going to be reason to consider whether policies to 
improve the lot of low-paid workers would be worthwhile hypothetical insurance 
decisions.545  
An alternative reason for Dworkin to have overlooked alternative policies for low-
earners might be that he assumed insurers would only be concerned with falling below 
an absolute level and not with their position relative to others. However, I agree with 
Clayton that there is no good reason to restrict hypothetical insurers in this way. If 
securing a reasonable relative position is attractive to insurers then they should have 
this option.546 Indeed, Dworkin is not consistent on this point. He appears to focus 
solely on relative fortune in his discussion of social fortune, while he appears to focus 
                                                                                                                                                            
is the case that Dworkin would support the approach taken here, then it is still worth considering the 
challenge from those else who may not. 
541
 I therefore agree with Alexander Brown that it is necessary to consider more policies than 
Dworkin does. Alexander Brown, 'The Slavery of the Not So Talented', Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 14/2 (2011), 185-96 at 190. Brown argues that the insurers would wish to have more 
freedom—they would be concerned about a kind of wage-slavery—and would purchase 
hypothetical insurance accordingly. Brown refers positively to the arguments of Olsaretti and Bou-
Habib, which I will consider in more detail in section 6.7 of the following chapter. 
542
 Dennis J. Ventry, 'Equity Versus Efficiency in Historical Perspective', in Joseph J. Thorndike  and 
Dennis J. Ventry (eds.), Tax Justice : The Ongoing Debate (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 
2002) at 51-2. 
543
 Edmund S. Phelps, Rewarding Work : How to Restore Participation and Self-Support to Free 
Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) at 17, Charles Duhigg and Keith 
Bradsher, 'How the U.S. Lost out on Iphone Work', New York Times, 2012. 
544
 Phelps, Rewarding Work  at 66-7. 
545
 Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership  at 182. 
546
 Clayton presents this criticism of Dworkin’s approach in parallel to his arguments against 
hypothecated taxation, discussed in the previous section; Clayton, 'Equal Inheritance: An Anti-
Perfectionist View',  at Sec. 2.3. 
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solely on absolute fortune in his discussion of talent-based market luck. There is no 
obvious reason to restrict the insurance choices along these dimensions.  
Absolute considerations will clearly motivate people in all insurance decisions. 
However, people will also be concerned with their resources relative to others due to 
the existence of positional goods. These goods matter not only for their intrinsic 
properties, but also for the position that they allow their bearer to stand in relation to 
others. The term was coined by Fred Hirsch, who uses the examples of access to 
attractive land for leisure and positions of leadership in a hierarchy.547 Those with more 
wealth will have greater access to the pleasant view, and those with greater education 
and talent will have access to the most highly-sought jobs.548 Insurers would be 
concerned about their ability to carry out whatever plans they have in life, and would 
be concerned that it would be difficult to carry out those plans if they have low-paid 
employment once they have taken care of the basic cost of living in their society.  
Hypothetical insurers would be concerned about being low-talent individuals with poor 
employment prospects and so in chapter six I will consider policies that provide more 
than merely unemployment benefits.  
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 Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976) at 27-8. 
Hirsch presents the economic inefficiencies that result from the motivations created by positional 
goods (examples include over-suburbanisation and over-education in order to gain job advantages 
over others even where there are poor marginal gains to education) Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth  
at 36-51. This work has been echoed in a more formal fashion by Robert Frank; Robert H. Frank, 'The 
Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods', The American Economic Review, 75/1 
(1985), 101-16, Robert H. Frank, 'Frames of Reference and the Quality of Life', The American 
Economic Review, 79/2 (1989), 80-85, Robert H. Frank, 'Positional Externalities', in Richard 
Zeckhauser (ed.), Strategy and Choice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 25-48, Robert H. Frank, 
'Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses', The American Economic 
Review, 95/2 (2005), 137-41. On the topic of this work, Hirsch also highlights that the gains to the 
worst-off as a result of economic growth will never entirely satisfy them as they will always be 
behind in positional goods, and so the distribution of resources will always matter as well, Hirsch, 
Social Limits to Growth  at 175. 
548
 A further example borrows from a well-known saying. Someone with one working eye in our 
society would no doubt be a slight disadvantage, but in the kingdom where everyone else is blind, 
the one-eyed man is king.  
200 
 
5.4 Qualitative issues and averaging  
I have argued for a holistic approach to hypothetical insurance, taxation, and benefits, 
as opposed to a segregated—hypothecated—approach. The whole package of taxation 
and spending is the proper focus of analysis, rather than any particular tax or benefit in 
isolation. I will compare packages of different types of policy to consider which would 
be more attractive to insurers, as well as considering the rough levels—quantity—of 
redistribution with the preferred approach. This need to compare packages of policies 
leads to another possible challenge to the approach I take; how is it possible to 
determine an average—as required in accordance with section 4.8—where qualitative 
decisions are concerned? In order to determine an average it is usually necessary to 
consider options on a scale, while qualitative considerations do not necessarily sit in 
such a scalar relationship; there may be no qualitative option in the ‘middle’ of all of 
the others.  
The challenge is either that it does not make any sense to consider packages of policies 
as hypothetical insurance decisions, or that attempts to do so would produce an 
indeterminate answer. In order to answer the first challenge I will explain a little more 
about the process. It is important to emphasise that the hypothetical insurance 
approach as I conceive it is a dynamic process. As I have indicated, and will emphasise 
again in the following section, it is necessary to bracket some aspects of the overall 
decision at any given moment in order to focus on others. Once one issue appears 
resolved, the bracketed issues can be reconsidered, with the possibility of returning to 
the primary issues later. The approach is therefore one of reaching an equilibrium,549 
the sort of undertaking that people considering insurance packages and coverage 
already make in real insurance markets.  
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 This idea has roots in observations of liquids, which led to mathematical theories in physics and 
the sciences, and was then extended to form the basis of modern economic analysis. It is also 
utilised in Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium,” Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition  at 18-9.  
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It is important to note that insurers should consider the broad institutional policies550 
prior to the precise determination of the level of coverage. It does not make sense to 
ask how much policyholders will be willing to risk from their fortunate possible selves in 
order to help their less fortunate possible selves if we do not know what sort of policies 
they will be paying into. Different policies will have different advantages and 
disadvantages, costs and so on, and insurers will take these issues into account when 
determining their preferred level of coverage. Where there are many policy packages 
available, it is therefore necessary to choose the policy package before determining the 
payments and receipts of the policy. Of course, insurers will have to consider the likely 
level of coverage that they will choose—given the likely cost of the policy package, and 
based upon the choices that others with make—with each of the packages when 
considering which packages will be most preferable. Nevertheless, they would have to 
determine between them a policy, and I will explain this process in more detail in 
answer to the second challenge.  
I have so far responded to the first challenge by highlighting that it is necessary to 
choose a policy before considering the level of coverage, but this point is not enough to 
establish that insurers should have the option to choose from a full range of packages. 
The attractiveness of the approach becomes clearer when we consider the alternative. 
This would be to insist that insurers should only make quantitative decisions based 
upon a single pre-determined policy. This policy could be the one that most closely 
mimics a typical insurance choice, or it could be the one which would provide the more 
direct response to the problem which motivates insurers. However, as with the 
hypothecated tax restriction, it would be very unattractive to the insurers themselves 
to limit their options in this way. For example, two forms of insurance may cover some 
of the same risks,551 and so there would be no need to pay the full price of both when 
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 What I have referred to above as “qualitative issues.” 
551
 For example if damage to an automobile or housing contents were covered by a household 
insurance policy the policyholder would not wish to pay for these to be covered by their automobile 
202 
 
these resources could be saved—or redirected to provide better coverage for other 
risks. So just as real insurers will select the most attractive overall package of policies of 
them, hypothetical insurers should have the full range of possible options available to 
them.  
The second challenge is that the dynamic qualitative approach will be indeterminate. 
This worry arises as there is no single scale on which an average can easily be 
determined. However, while it is more difficult to determine an average where there 
are qualitative issues, that does not mean it is impossible to obtain an acceptable 
notion of an average on the qualitative issues before working out the average coverage 
people would buy given the preferred policy package. In some cases, it may be that all 
insurers would prefer one policy package to all others. Therefore, the approach first 
requires us to look for policies that would dominate all others as insurance choices. By 
this I mean that all insurers, whatever their plan of life and attitude to risk, would 
choose a particular set of policies over all others. Such unanimity may not always occur, 
however. Where no policy would obtain full dominance over its rivals, we can ask what 
proposals are broadly attractive to all and then choose the most popular from these 
acceptable policies.  
To show how this might work, imagine that insurers would rank policy packages as 
strongly preferred, slightly preferred and undesired. We can imagine different scenarios 
regarding the strength of these preferences, and what would happen in a real 
insurance market. So we can take it that if a large number of insurers would find a 
policy undesirable, they would not agree to sign up to the policy if it were offered. A 
policy which many people strongly prefer and few find undesirable would then come 
out as the average choice. An alternative scenario would be that there are opposing 
groups, with policy L strongly preferred by one group and undesired by another group, 
                                                                                                                                                            
or additional contents insurance as well. As I understand it, insurance policies contain rules against 
claiming for the same thing under two different policies. 
203 
 
and policy M vice versa. In this case, the existence of a third policy, N, which all find 
acceptable might win the day. However, if no alternative were available then it would 
be necessary to go with the choice of the larger group.  
In general, if there is a group for whom a policy package would be undesirable, then 
that policy would not be on the table. However, it may be that some people would 
have very contrary preferences to others—such as an unusual proclivity to take risks—
such that they prefer particular policies that the majority find undesirable and reject 
the policy that the majority strongly prefers. There may be scope to exempt risk-takers 
from compulsory schemes by removing coverage from them—such as not providing 
rescue for those engaging in extreme activities,552 and requiring those who wish to ride 
motorcycles without helmets to fund their own medical care. However, where such 
profiling is unavailable, it would be necessary to overrule the exemption for the 
minority on the basis for the requirement of an average policy that is applied to all.  
5.5 Is it too complex for insurers? 
The approach described in the previous sections is a very dynamic process where many 
factors are simultaneously considered. The question for this section is whether this 
approach is too complex for hypothetical insurers. I have already indicated how it 
would be possible to deal with all of the moving parts of the approach; to treat some 
issues as fixed at any one moment and to come to a decision about any particularly 
important issue that needs to be resolved. The undertaking would, as a result, be a 
multi-stage process, with the possibility of returning to reconsider previous stages once 
other issues had been resolved. Insurers would have to consider what forms of bad luck 
they are concerned about, and then consider the extent to which packages of policies 
will respond best to those forms of misfortune.  
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 Such as climbing tall and remote mountains like Everest, or those who attempt to sail across wide 
oceans such as the Pacific. 
204 
 
Some decisions should come first as they are qualitative issues that will have a bearing 
on the more fine-tuned insurance decisions, as I discussed in the previous section. 
Another set of decisions should take place early—and can therefore be taken as fixed—
as they are uncontroversial and will yield relatively certain outcomes. One item that we 
can keep relatively fixed throughout is that it will be necessary to raise and spend 
taxation revenues for certain purposes. These must be taken account of, though this 
need not concern hypothetical insurers for the most part.553 Tax revenues are required 
in order to provide for the enforcement of basic liberties and rights,554 as well as the 
functioning of democratic government. The provision of the military, police, free and 
fair elections, and the justice and penal system is not cheap.555  
A second purpose for taxes which can be taken as fixed is the need to mitigate market 
externalities, such as pollution.556 These should be determined as per the requirements 
of equal opportunity costs.557 The third requirement has the same motivation as the 
second; to reduce externalities. However, these externalities are those resolved by the 
government providing a good that the free market will not provide. An example is the 
provision of statistical and other information to the general population where no one 
has the incentive to do so despite its usefulness to all. These public goods would 
require a slice of government revenue, which can be considered reasonably fixed for 
the purpose of hypothetical insurance deliberation.558 Of course, the effects of these 
public goods should be accounted for in the hypothetical insurance process.559 
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 Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?  at 168 n20. 
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 The spending on these background are not calculated based upon hypothetical insurance risk 
profiles, since the provision and enforcement of rights is necessary to ensure that equal opportunity 
costs are calculable at all. 
555
 This point is made at length in Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights : Why 
Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999). (However, see in particular p.15 and the 
appendix for a list of the costs of rights enforcement from the 1996 US federal budget) 
556
 These are referred to as market ‘bads’ as opposed to market goods. 
557
 I explained this in section 1.3, see particularly page 34-6.  
558
 The need for such a constitution is argued by tax constitutionalists,  
559
 We could also add a fourth additional purpose of taxation that would be reasonably fixed. This is 
that taxes may also have a role to play in the functioning of the economy, where additional taxes are 
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Another issue which hypothetical insurers could determine at an early stage occurs 
where there are multiple alternative policies to deal with some bad outcomes against 
which insurers wish to purchase insurance. For example, insurers could receive public 
goods or individualized compensation payments.560 In some cases one will be much 
more attractive than the other, while in others the insurers will be largely indifferent 
and the decision can be postponed until a later stage or left to democratic or political 
decision-making. There are cases under which hypothetical insurers would insure to 
receive a particular good that will benefit them as individuals, where the government 
could either provide the good or to hand over money or vouchers of the same value.561 
I will generally be ecumenical here about the most appropriate form of redistribution 
resulting from hypothetical insurance decisions in these cases.562 This need not be a 
compensatory payment to an individual; it can take whatever form is most suitable.563 
                                                                                                                                                            
required to cool or stimulate economic activity. This might not require any additional action given 
that taxes will to some degree automatically achieve this function, for example where benefit 
payments increase during a slump and progressive taxation will capture larger amounts during a 
boom. However, to the extent that further action is required, this can be taken as a fixed 
requirement. Any smoothing demand within the economy as a whole could be done through the use 
of a sovereign wealth fund, into which money could be channelled during good times and withdrawn 
during depressed times. This could perhaps built in to the “economic constitution,” see footnote 6. 
560
 In either of these cases there may be the possibility of means-testing the potential recipients. 
561
 Such goods could be provided either universally to everyone in the society, or on a means-tested 
basis depending on the case and what will work best in the society in question. 
562
 Insurers would have a reason to prefer to prefer the distribution of money for reasons of 
convenience to all parties and to reduce the administrative costs of the scheme. However, in some 
cases there will be a moral hazard issue with the disbursement of money, in which case insurers may 
prefer the provision of vouchers or services. As a form of targeting, or tagging, the needy and 
excluding those who seek merely to benefit materially from the public good; George A. Akerlof, 'The 
Economics Of "Tagging" As Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower 
Planning', The American Economic Review, 68/1 (1978), 8-19, Albert L. Nichols and Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, 'Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients', The American Economic 
Review, 72/2 (1982), 372-77. So, in the case of housing it may be sensible to offer money, while with 
drug treatment it may make sense to provide the treatment rather than money. Where there is no 
clear advantage either way, these decisions can be left to democratic decision making. 
563
 Some have criticised the hypothetical insurance approach on the misplaced assumption that it 
requires payments to individuals only, something I have shown to be untrue in this chapter and 
chapter one. Examples can be found in; Shelley Tremain, 'Dworkin on Disablement and Resources', 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 9/2 (1996), 343-59 at 355-6, Jerome Bickenbach, 
'Disability, Non-Talent and Distributive Justice', in Kristjana Kristiansen, Tom Shakespeare, and Simo 
Vehmas (eds.), Arguing About Disability: Philosophy Meets Disability Studies (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 105-23 at 117, Jonathan Wolff, 'Social Justice and Public Policy: A View from Political 
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I have said that it is sensible for insurers to determine the cost and form of important 
government services at an early stage in the procedure. However, some government 
services—for example those discussed earlier in this section—can be received only in 
the form of public goods rather than individual payment. Where the receipt of the 
public goods is ‘progressive,’ as the well-off will pay more in tax and the less well-off 
will often benefit more from the public goods, insurers can include this as an element 
of the hypothetical insurance compensation package.564 These goods need to be paid 
for, and—despite their necessity and benefits to all—insurers may be happy to choose 
them to be funded by taxes paid by the fortunate but not the less fortunate. 
Hypothetical insurers will know that they will be receiving some goods in kind and that 
these must be paid for by taxation, which could fall more or less on the economically 
fortunate. I will not focus on the provision of public goods in detail,565 but their 
provision in some form will be included in the chosen package of taxation.566 This is 
therefore another issue that can sometimes be fixed—and factored in—when 
considering other elements of the hypothetical insurance package. 
I do not deny that holistic hypothetical insurance decisions are complex and 
multifaceted. However, this does not undermine the approach, since it is possible to 
take many aspects of the decision as fixed when focusing on any given aspect of the 
decision. I have outlined some of those provisionally fixable aspects here, adding to the 
strategy of prioritising qualitative issues described in the previous section. Insurers 
merely need to be mindful at every stage of the process of what is being kept fixed for 
the purpose of the decision, what is already likely to be included in the package, and 
what is still open for decision. These sections should have further clarified the nature of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Philosophy', in Gary Craig, Tania Burchardt, and David Gordon (eds.), Social Justice and Public Policy 
(Bristol: Policy Press, 2008), 17-31 at 25. 
564
 This issue is discussed at length in Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice,  
at ch 4. 
565
 I may mention the provision of public goods where the case for one form of other is particularly 
strong or where it impacts upon other aspects of the hypothetical insurance decision. 
566
 I therefore follow Dworkin in focusing on the taxation rather than expenditure side, as explained 
in Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?  at 106-7. 
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the process. Before explaining the considerations that hypothetical insurers will take 
account of, I will briefly mention another challenge to the approach which should also 
help to clarify it further.  
5.6 What is envied?  
I now discuss an issue which may influence the interpretation of the hypothetical 
insurance scheme; what is it that is envied? By this I mean; which forms of envy provide 
reasons to redistribute? This may appear clear from the discussion so far—hypothetical 
insurance is for people who envy the economic resources of others which have resulted 
from their greater market or social luck.567 However, this raises the question of what 
should count as an economic resource about which people might have good or bad 
fortune. I have argued against hypothecated taxation which directly links compensation 
from one area to that of another, and this perhaps makes it more important to be clear 
about what are acceptable reasons to tax and subsidise.  
Since good and bad luck will affect incoming resources and therefore also expenditure 
by individuals, it is possible to be quite open with regard to tax and subsidy policies. 
One question is how fine-grained the envy needs to be. Must a woman wish she was a 
man in order to claim for the greater costs of children that fall on women?568 A 
question such as this would be mistaken, however; it is not necessary for someone to 
envy everything about another in order to qualify.569 The issue is whether someone has 
a potential resource deficit, and what hypothetical insurance people would on average 
purchase. This can be as fine-grained as compensation for the loss of an arm, or more 
general like the loss of particular abilities, or lack of resources in general with the most 
attractive overall package of insurance being at issue. So the question in the childcare 
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 As I described in sections 1.2 and 4.1. 
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 This example is from Justine Burley, as reported by G.A. Cohen in Cohen, 'Expensive Tastes Rides 
Again'. 
569
 It is possible that this example is designed to highlight the inability of the envy test to respond to 
social norms, an issue I discussed in section 2.8. 
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case is what level and type of compensation for children each person would choose to 
provide in a society, given the increased taxation required to pay for it.  
There is another suggested extension of this envy-freeness approach which I reject. 
Phillipe Van Parijs presents a—purportedly resource egalitarian—argument for 
unconditional basic income570 in which he suggests that those who hold jobs should 
support those without jobs since they hold a valuable and scarce resource.571 Van Parijs 
highlights that workers can earn rents from employers,572 and that since these rents 
are unavailable to the unemployed they are legitimate revenues for redistribution to 
those who have no income. The problem with this argument is that it pulls together 
several issues that can—and should—be separated. Van Parijs seems to adopt a rather 
strange version of the hypothecation approach that I argued against in section 5.2; 
since workers obtain this form of rent, non-workers should receive the proceeds.  
In addition to the challenge to hypothecation, it is possible to break the link between 
employment rents and income for all unemployed entirely, by focusing only on the 
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 Van Parijs claims unconvincingly that the argument is based upon resource egalitarian 
foundations, Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All : What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?  at 28. For 
resource egalitarian criticisms of his arguments see Andrew Williams, 'Resource Egalitarianism and 
the Limits to Basic Income', Economics and Philosophy, 15/01 (1999), 85-107, S. F. Midtgaard, 
'Ambition-Sensitivity and an Unconditional Basic Income', Analyse und Kritik, 22/2 (2000). For a good 
general criticism of the position, despite containing a misunderstanding of resource egalitarianism; 
see Brian Barry, 'Real Freedom and Basic Income', Journal of Political Philosophy, 4/3 (1996), 242-76. 
Another critic, though a nuanced one, of the unconditional nature of the basic income is Stuart 
White; see Stuart White, 'Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic 
Income', Political Studies, 45/2 (1997), 312-26, White, The Civic Minimum  at Ch 7, Stuart White, 'Fair 
Reciprocity and Basic Income', in Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams (eds.), Real Libertarianism 
Assessed (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), 136-60, Stuart White, 'What's Wrong with Workfare?', 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21/3 (2004), 271-84. 
To me it seems that Van Parijs’ conclusions that rest on an interpretation of leximin real 
freedom that is skewed in favour of leisure-lovers, see Barry, 'Real Freedom and Basic Income',   at 
262-4. I will consider basic income more indirectly as a policy response to bad market luck from a 
hypothetical insurance perspective in section 6.6. 
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 Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All : What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?  at Ch 4. 
572
 This occurs, for example, because it would be costly for employers to lose the worker and have to 
advertise the position, have a period without a worker performing the task, and possibly in 
expending resources on teaching another how to do the job. 
209 
 
involuntarily unemployed who are definitely unwillingly excluded from these rents.573 
Contra Van Parijs, it is possible to reject the idea of compensating the jobless qua 
jobless. Some of those who are jobless will desire a job and income, in which case they 
can claim compensation for misfortune. However, others who prefer not working will 
not envy those who hold jobs, and as a result would not be eligible for 
compensation.574 This does not rule out unconditional compensation for the jobless—I 
consider such a policy in section 6.6—but it does not rule it in either. Of course, the 
rents obtained by job-holders are presumably a source of revenue for redistribution 
that would be very attractive to hypothetical insurers, as I will discuss below and in 
Chapter Seven. However, this does not mean that these rents necessarily be used to 
support all those who do not work.  
5.7 Tax (and Policy) Incidence  
I have answered various challenges to my interpretation of the best hypothetical 
insurance approach to taxation and benefits. In the remainder of this chapter I will 
explain some of the more technical economic factors of which insurers would need to 
be aware. In this section I will explain the idea of tax incidence, in section 5.8 I will run 
through the economic consequences of policies that insurers would need to take into 
account, and in section 5.9 I will explain the classifications that they might utilise.  
Understanding the economic incidence of policies is of prime importance. Most people 
have some degree of understanding that the person who hands over a particular tax—
the personal with the legal obligation—is not always the person who really pays the 
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 Since Van Parijs suggests earlier in his book that state revenue should be used to maximise a 
sustainable basic income, he only considers this as a possible use for the rents when he argues that 
they are a legitimate source of revenue that do not violate his self-ownership principle; Van Parijs, 
Real Freedom for All : What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?  at Ch 2, 106-8. Van Parijs explicitly 
rejects considering subsidies designed to do anything other than increase unemployment; Van Parijs, 
Real Freedom for All : What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?  at 111. He does this despite the 
fact that employment subsidies can improve the position of the worst-off in other ways as well—as I 
will discuss in chapter six. He thereby makes his argument for basic income tenable by excluding all 
other reasonable policies, whereas all such options should of course be on the table for hypothetical 
insurers.  
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 Williams, 'Resource Egalitarianism and the Limits to Basic Income'. 
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tax. A common illustration is the ‘sin’ tax on tobacco, which is handed over by 
manufacturers and shopkeepers but effectively paid by smokers. This is because the 
cost of the taxes will be added the tax on to the final price of the cigarettes. It is the 
incidence of taxation that will concern hypothetical insurers.575  
Working out the incidence of taxes can be very complicated. In some cases, the person 
handing over tax payment will be the effective payer, while in other cases the ultimate 
consumer of the product will be the true payer. However, such clear cases will be rare 
as the cost will often be shared. To complicate matters further, taxes also affect 
behaviour. Increasing the tax on labour may encourage some people to work more in 
order to maintain their previous income. Alternatively, some may find the tax on labour 
makes the returns to their labour less worthwhile, which would lead them to increase 
their leisure instead. These are respectively known as the income and substitution 
effects.576 These effects will ripple all over the economy, as prices will change in line 
with the new decisions that people will make as workers and consumers as a result of 
the policy change. Such effects will also impact upon government revenues, and 
therefore those who benefit from government programmes. There are therefore many 
possible effects of policies which must be weighed by insurers.577  
It is very useful to consider these economic effects from the perspective of the 
individuals in the economy, and the effect that policies will have on their work 
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 Of course, it will also be of concern to those who approach justice in taxation from other 
perspectives. 
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 Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach  at 136, 40-1. 
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 The real consequences of taxation explained above will always fall on individuals. This means that 
while there are taxes on corporations, these will (potentially) affect the shareholders, workers, and 
consumers of the corporations. Hypothetical insurers would have no concern for corporations, of 
course; their concerns would be for their prospects should they prove to be a worker, consumer, 
investor, or the beneficiary of government spending funded by the tax. In the case of corporation 
taxes it is likely that these effects will largely cancel each other out once all of the prices adjust. This 
is because all corporations would be affected, and so the shift would occur only from those 
businesses (and their workers and consumers) who were more affected by the tax change towards 
those businesses (and their workers and consumers) who are less affected. Prices will then change 
accordingly; such that worker pay and profit-levels will re-calibrate across firms and industries, 
meaning that prices would probably only change slightly for most consumers in the long-run, and for 
workers and shareholders hardly at all. 
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decisions.578 Where people withdraw their labour, this will increase the costs of labour 
and therefore consumption products throughout the economy. Individuals may 
respond in one of three ways to taxes or benefits; they may withdraw their 
participation from the labour market entirely, they may reduce their working hours, or 
they may refuse—or ignore—higher paid work.579 Marginal tax rates have previously 
received most attention as they are crucial to the decisions of workers in their 
decisions over working hours and taking higher-paid work. However, economists have 
recently focused more on Participation Tax Rates (PTR) and Marginal Effective Tax 
Rates (METR).580 The importance of effective-tax-rates has been noticed with regard to 
benefit policies. These policies may produce disincentives to work at all, or to increase 
hours of work or income from work. The PTR refers to the difference that working-at-
all will make to someone’s net income, once taxes and benefits are taken into 
account.581 A high PTR will result in a disincentive to work at all. Participation tax rates 
may also apply to early-retirement decisions by the more fortunate. Hypothetical 
insurers would want these rates kept low as a rule, and certainly below 100%, since at 
this point workers are actually no better off working.  
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 Of course, the effects on people’s financial investment decisions matter as well, though the 
economics of this are much simpler to understand and model. 
579
 Economists have referred to the first decision as being taken on the extensive margin, and the 
second and third as falling on the intensive margin, Emmanuel Saez, 'Optimal Income Transfer 
Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
117/3 (2002), 1039-73. 
580
 To be clear, effective tax-rates are calculated based upon the withdrawal of benefits or subsidy as 
income increases. For definitions of METR and PTR see Mike Brewer, Emmanuel Saez, and Andrew 
Shephard, 'Means-Testing and Tax Rates on Earnings', in Stuart Adam et al. (eds.), Dimensions of Tax 
Design: The Mirrlees Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 97-9. EMTR is an acceptable 
alternative acronym to METR, as is MTR, particularly where tax-rates are the only factor, in which 
case there is no need to consider effective tax-rates separately from the actual tax-rates.  
581
 The PTR is defined mathematically as 1 minus the financial gain to work as a proportion of gross 
earnings. If the result is over 1 then of course the person is better off not working, however once the 
attractiveness of extra leisure is included, a PTR below one may still make work relatively 
unattractive for some. 
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5.8 Considerations of hypothetical insurers  
I will now explain the considerations of hypothetical insurers when making their 
decisions. These are of course my interpretation of the considerations of hypothetical 
insurers, but I feel confident that the considerations I list would match those of most—
if not all—people if they were in the hypothetical insurance situation. To begin, I 
explain the need for the chosen system to allow people to make and form plans, and 
also describe Adam Smith’s principles of taxation, which may limit policies. I then 
discuss the strong reasons that insurers would have to prefer progressive taxation, 
though I also note the countervailing reasons for limiting progressivity. Next, I explain 
the attractiveness of focusing taxation on unearned windfall income, though again 
offer reasons to limit this form of taxation.  
Insurers will want to support their unfortunate selves, but will be concerned about bad 
consequences of potential policies. Insurers will not want to find themselves overly 
restricted as a result of the policies. Whatever life plans the insurers will have, they will 
want a degree of certainty,582 and therefore would avoid policies that would make it 
difficult to form and carry out plans.583 This will occur where policies impose heavy 
costs on some groups, make it difficult for people to anticipate future liabilities, or 
where policies interfere with people’s ability to purchase and own the items of 
property they require. I will assume that this consideration will override any others, 
though this will leave most of the options on the table. We can add two more of Adam 
Smith’s principles of taxation; stability and convenience.584 Taxpayers would desire 
taxes that were stable over time, as would be the case if hypothetical insurance choices 
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 This is one of Adam Smith’s principles of taxation, see footnote 584 below. 
583
 By this, I mean that insurers will (ex ante) want to ensure that their real (ex post) selves can form 
and carry out plans. 
584
 Smith has four principles of taxation, Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations  at 498-501 These are usually listed as equity, certainty, convenience, and efficiency. 
Equity, however, is superseded by hypothetical insurance decision-making in this analysis. I 
discussed the utilisation of equity within the public economics literature in footnote 5. 
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were installed permanently. Insurers would also want to ensure that the tax package 
was not inconvenient to them; that is, not unduly onerous on their time and efforts. 
Hypothetical insurance policies compensate those who suffer misfortune at the 
expense of those who do not suffer the misfortune. As Dworkin showed from his initial 
presentation of equality of resources, this leads insurers to prefer smoothly585 
progressive taxation.586 Progressive taxes will provide most effectively for the less 
fortunate as they will secure larger revenue without impacting upon the less 
fortunate.587 Following the traditional—binary—insurance approach of setting a level 
below which people receive a set amount and above which people will pay out a set 
amount is not an attractive option. The difference between those immediately above 
and below the threshold is tiny, but the effect on changing between the two would be 
large. This would encourage insurers to choose a very high pay-out threshold, which 
reduces the amount of tax revenue while increasing the number of people who share 
the proceeds despite being less needy. It would also have significant economic effects 
as those near the insurance line would alter their behaviour in order to fall below 
rather than above. The sensible option is therefore to have a group of people in the 
middle who neither pay in nor receive, with progressively more assistance provided to 
the worst-off and progressively more contribution from those who are best-off. Thus, 
smooth progression is the most sensible insurance bet.588  
There are further reasons to prefer progressive taxation. The first is the concern 
insurers would have regarding their economic position relative to others. I have 
mentioned some reasons for this concern—in section 5.3—regarding relative access to 
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 That is, without any sudden changes—jolts—in the rates as tax-base increases or decreases.  
586
 See above, page 191. A further justification for progressive taxation comes from the requirement 
to deal with externalities such as pollution and climate change, that taxes or charges to deter such 
activity will be both unfair and ineffective unless they are done in a progressive fashion; footnote 86, 
Casal, 'Progressive Environmental Taxation: A Defence'.  
587
 At least, not directly impacting on the less fortunate, as taxes will affect the economy in various 
ways as I outline below. 
588
 Aside from the general assumption that a progressive structure is required, I will bracket 
consideration of the precise tax-rate structure until sections 7.7-7.8. 
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positional goods. This concern for access to positional goods is paralleled by a desire to 
ensure that political power is not dominated by the wealthy. Progressive taxation may 
help in this aim, along with restrictions on the ability of the wealthy to buy political 
power. Second, insurers would be worried that they would suffer from a lack of relative 
opportunity due to their family background. Progressive taxation and redistribution 
would help in this regard, along with the provision of public goods such as education 
and training for those from poor families. A final additional reason to prefer 
progressive taxation and redistribution for relative reasons as well as absolute ones is 
that insurers would fear the shameful stigma of appearing in public in a position of 
relative poverty.589  
I have provided many reasons which would lead hypothetical insurers to prefer 
progressive taxation, but other factors may weigh against this. Insurers would also be 
concerned with the general effects of the tax system. They would want a system that 
would encourage economic stability, efficiency, and—if possible—growth. Policies or 
rate-levels that threatened to damage the economy would be a bad choice for 
hypothetical insurers. The progressivity of taxes would therefore be limited in 
accordance with the marginal economic considerations described in section 5.7; that 
marginal-effective and participatory tax-rates (METR and PTR) should not be too high, 
and should certainly not go above 100%.  
Returning to the theme of taxation designed to capture the returns to the fortunate, 
some kinds of fortune will be of particular interest to hypothetical insurers. What might 
be called ‘unearned income’ will stand out as a prime target for taxation. The first 
instance of this is income received in the form of gifts and bequests. However, the 
attractiveness of taxes on gifted income will be tempered by people’s desire to leave 
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 This thought is given a very prominent place by Rawlsians and “democratic egalitarians” (see 
footnote 302). These thinkers emphasise the importance of people relating to one another as 
equals, which motivates the desire for a property-owning democracy (see footnote 112 and 
surrounding text).  
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themselves some scope to give and receive property.590 The second type of unearned 
income the taxation of which will appeal to hypothetical insurers is what I have called 
locational fortune, which can be described as windfall economic rent.591 This occurs 
where the owners of a particular type of property benefit from a broadly unforeseen 
change in the economy that greatly increases the value of their property.592 Of course, 
while the benefits are random, someone with a large portfolio of property and 
investments is much more likely to benefit than someone with very little to their name, 
and so taxing such windfalls should also transfer from those with greater market talent 
and good social fortune to those with less.593 Even in cases where economic rents are 
not totally unanticipated—the owner was a more perceptive investor than others in 
society—it will still be attractive to tax this income at a high rate. This is because there 
some investors will be in a position to invest due to some previous form of good 
fortune, as well having the ability to anticipate better than others. Furthermore, since 
the fortune is a windfall, taxing it will have little effect on economic decision-making 
and therefore economic efficiency. Of course, that it is desirable to tax unearned 
income does not imply that it will always be practically straightforward to distinguish 
unearned income. However, where it is possible to tax unearned income at a higher 
rate without serious consequences hypothetical insurers would choose to do so.  
To summarize, insurers will avoid policies that make their real lives unduly difficult, 
interfere with their ability to form and carry out their plans, and cause economic 
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 I will discuss the tax-base options in more detail in sections 7.1-7.6. For discussion of hypothetical 
insurance and bequests see section 7.1, Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?  at 117-8, Clayton, 
'Equal Inheritance: An Anti-Perfectionist View'. 
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 See above, page 110.  
592
 A good example is the discovery of gold or oil below some previously low-value farm land. Since 
there is a random distribution of good fortune, insurers would want to increase their chance of 
sharing in the good fortune. 
593
 This relates to the idea of accumulated advantage described above, page 114. 
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hardship. However, within these constraints, insurers will desire progressive policies,594 
particularly with regard taxation focused upon unearned income.  
5.9 Useful classifications  
I will end by briefly explaining how hypothetical insurers may classify their co-insurers. I 
will highlight three-stage classifications along three different continuums that are 
relevant to insurance decisions.595 With regard to luck they could distinguish; the 
fortunate, those with average fortune, and the unfortunate. Often people will fall 
somewhere on a continuum as regards their luck, and the insurers will seek to 
determine the levels below which they will be particularly concerned to insure to 
receive additional resources, and the levels above which—and cases in which—they are 
happy to risk paying out more. The lines they draw between classes will presumably 
alter depending on the particular issue against which they are considering insurance. 
Happily, I do not think there would be very wide variation in people’s perceptions of 
fortune and misfortune regarding taxation.  
In order to have some idea of the insurance choices that will be attractive to society as 
a whole, which will affect the policies available and their costs, it is useful to group 
people according to their attitudes and preferences. For instance, we might consider 
the insurance bet that would be made by those who are risk-averse, risk-neutral, and 
particularly risk-taking. The averaging requirement will mean the average level of risk-
aversion in society is needed, but this social average will also impact on the decisions of 
insurers. The different preferences people have regarding work and leisure will also be 
very important to insurers. There will be those who are leisure-lovers, those with a 
desire for a balance between work—and the corresponding income—and leisure, and 
those who are work-lovers. People may fall into the work-lover category because they 
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 That is, policies which tax people more in accordance with their economic fortune and provide 
them with more in accordance with their lack of fortune. I provided the definition of progressive 
taxation in footnote 14. 
595
 It is, of course, possible to make the classes more fine-grained if this is useful. The approach here 
is merely a useful heuristic to indicate the relevant considerations. 
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are consumption-lovers, gift-lovers, wealth-lovers, because they have a protestant-
style work-ethic or because they simply enjoy their work more than anything else.596 In 
many cases, the majority of people will have preferences between those extremes, 
which I will refer to as statistically normal. Those in the extreme positions will have to 
accept the offer that is best for those in the large middle group. People may not have 
the same position on this spectrum throughout their lives, though some no doubt will.  
Of course, as the position taken here is anti-perfectionist there is no room to commend 
or condemn any of these positions. However, insurers will be interested in the effects 
of policies and will therefore be particularly interested, for economic incentive reasons, 
in leisure-lovers.597 The preferences of this group render them particularly relevant 
because they will have a very strong inclination to respond to taxes and benefit policies 
that would enable them to work less or not at all. However, it will be necessary to 
consider whether those within the extreme groups will tip the balance towards an 
insurance package that would be more acceptable to them while still being acceptable 
to the others. This might occur where the other packages are very unattractive to a 
group with the extreme preferences.  
5.10 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain how to consider issues of taxation from 
the perspective of hypothetical insurers. I will use this analysis to find the most 
attractive policy for the less fortunate in the following chapter. In the final chapter—
chapter seven—I will consider the type of taxation that people would choose to pay for 
the costs of government and for the benefit policies set out in chapter six.  
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 The terms leisure-lovers and consumption-lovers appear in Martin Feldstein, 'On the Theory of 
Tax Reform', Journal of Public Economics, 6/1 (1976), 77-104 at 82. The term “protestant work-ethic” 
comes from Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
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 These may consist of non-needy bohemians, who have a strong preference for a lifestyle that 
produces nothing for which others are willing to pay. The term comes from Richard J. Arneson, 'Is 
Work Special? Justice and the Distribution of Employment', The American Political Science Review, 
84/4 (1990), 1127-47 at 1134. The relative size of this group has been used to attempt to explain the 
different welfare systems in Europe and the U.S.A., Roland Hodler, 'Leisure and Redistribution', 
European Journal of Political Economy, 24/2 (2008), 354-63. 
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In order to prepare for the detailed analysis of policies, I have explained what I take to 
be the correct way to approach hypothetical insurance. I presented a holistic policy-
focused approach to hypothetical insurance decision making, whereby all of the 
hypothetical insurance decisions are considered simultaneously and impact upon one 
another. I expounded Dworkin’s writing on taxation, endorsing some of his conclusions 
while criticising his hypothecating assumption and his failure to directly consider 
policies. I then considered several possible challenges to my approach, showing them 
to be unproblematic. In sections 5.7-5.9 I listed various points that insurers need to 
consider when thinking about taxation. I will consider alternative types of tax and 
benefit packages to see which is most attractive, given the need to raise taxes for 
redistribution as well as for other crucial government functions. 
The most immediate transfer from this chapter to the following two will be the list of 
considerations which will be used to judge the policies available to the insurers. These 
are—in order of priority—that they should enable people to form and carry out plans, 
that they should not cause economic or personal hardship, and they should be as 
progressive as possible—particularly with regard to unearned income. Meanwhile, 
we—on behalf of the insurers—need to be mindful of the economic incidence and 
effects of the policies.  
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  Chapter 6
Hypothetical Insurance and the Economically Unfortunate 
 
Governments have attempted many policies designed to improve the position of those 
who suffer from the misfortune of unemployment or low-pay. While people have some 
responsibility for their employment situation, luck plays a role. As I discussed in the 
previous three chapters, people have different talents, and those who lack the talents 
that create products valued in their society will face fewer options, less access to 
resources, and a greater likelihood of involuntary unemployment. Furthermore, some 
people will simply find themselves in “the wrong place at the wrong time,” and lose 
their job or business as a result of unforeseen changes in their market.  
I have so far defended resource egalitarianism as the best approach to distributive 
justice, and argued in the previous chapter for a holistic interpretation of this. As I 
indicated there, while all the policies must be combined together in the construction of 
a just overall policy mix, it is necessary to treat some issues as fixed and to focus on the 
qualitative issues prior to the determination of one’s quantitative rates and levels. In 
this chapter I will determine the most attractive policy response to bad market luck for 
those considering insurance policies from a hypothetically equal position;598 the first 
such undertaking. I will argue that a negative-rated hourly-averaging tax system with a 
guaranteed work programme and the provision of income for those with caring 
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 Private insurance is available for involuntary unemployment, though the terms are generally 
quite poor since there is a self-selection moral hazard; people with very secure employment and 
highly valuable talents will not purchase the insurance while those in less secure employment and 
without highly sought talents will. For this reason, the existence of such insurance does not remove 
the need for hypothetical insurance policies. 
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responsibilities and for those who undertake education would be the most attractive 
set of policies.599  
I will begin the chapter by itemising in section 6.1 the relevant considerations for 
hypothetical insurers. Bad market luck poses two worries for insurers. The first is that 
they should find themselves involuntarily unemployed, and the second is that they 
should find themselves in a low paid job with no prospect of better work. Insurers will 
want to select the policy that provides them with security but with consideration of the 
cost to the fortunate in taxation and to all members of society through its effects on 
prices and unemployment levels throughout the economy.  
Unfortunately, there is insufficient room to compare all possible policies to one 
another, and so I will present what I consider to be the most attractive policy and then 
compare this to the prominent alternatives.600 I argue that the most attractive policy 
would include a negative hourly-average tax, which subsidises the income for each 
additional hour worked by those with a low lifetime average income. Since the negative 
hourly-average tax proposal is original to this work, I will dedicate a section—6.2—to 
explaining how this tax would be calculated. After explaining this form of tax 
calculation, I will then explain—in section 6.3—why insurers would prefer such a 
method of subsidising low-earnings. In section 6.4 I explain how insurers would wish to 
protect themselves from unemployment. They would ensure that they would have 
access to income despite caring responsibilities and through guaranteed work 
programmes, education and training. This policy mix would provide something for 
those who have low earnings (negative hourly taxation) and those who are 
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 Here assuming that it would be possible to raise the necessary tax to pay for it, an issue I will 
discuss in more detail in the following chapter. 
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 There are other potential policies that I will not discuss for reasons of space. These are the idea of 
job sharing (limiting the amount of time that an individual can spend on each job they hold), the 
provision of large numbers of public sector jobs, and direct subsidies for items like housing and food 
that will be useful for those with bad market luck. I will not consider these and other proposals as 
they are generally very expensive and they are not targeted policies to help the low-paid and 
unemployed. 
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unemployed (a guaranteed work and training programme). Insurers would choose such 
a policy because it would provide these advantages without having economic 
consequences as undesirable as the rival policies.  
Having set out what I take to be the most attractive policies, I will then discuss rival 
policies that deal with each of the two issues in turn, beginning with unemployment. 
The issue for unemployment payments concerns what conditions should be placed on 
recipients of compensation. The preferred policy places many conditions on the receipt 
of additional income though it would allow people to obtain income from education 
and training.  
I will consider why insurers might choose to have greater or fewer restrictions than I 
have proposed, and show these arguments to be wanting. One alternative—discussed 
in 6.5—would be to set stricter conditions on the receipt of additional income by 
excluding training and education. I show that the benefits of strictness would not 
outweigh the reasons to include education and training. The opposite extreme is to set 
no conditions on unemployment payments at all, thereby providing an unconditional 
basic income. I argue—in 6.6—that this option is unattractive to insurers, however, as 
it enables leisure-lovers to reduce their hours of work at great potential cost to the 
scheme as well as the economy and consumers. Finally, in section 6.7 I consider levels 
of conditionality between the unconditional position and the one I propose. I will 
respond to the arguments of authors who think that hypothetical insurers would 
choose to place fewer conditions on claimants. 
Having discussed unemployment policy alternatives, I will then then consider 
alternative policies to improve the position of those with low-earnings. The first 
alternative—discussed in in section 6.8—is the imposition of a minimum wage as a 
means to improve the hourly wages of the low-paid. I argue that this policy has too 
many deleterious side-effects due to its tendency to raise unemployment and the price 
of goods. I will then consider alternative forms of employment subsidies to my 
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negative-hourly-averaging proposal. I argue these would be less attractive to insurers. 
These are firstly the limited subsidies of the sort currently provided in many countries 
(6.9), and, second, the more comprehensive wage subsidy proposed by Edmund Phelps 
(6.10). After dismissing these alternatives, I will finally consider—in section 6.11—two 
possible arguments against the preferred policies. These are that the policies suffer 
from the problems with earnings subsidies presented by Anne Alstott, and that the 
policy is unfair to leisure-lovers.  
The focus of this chapter is on policy responses to bad market luck from a hypothetical 
insurance perspective. Of course, this is not the only reason to raise taxes or the only 
purpose of tax expenditure. I outlined other baseline requirements,601 and will take 
those provisions as a given throughout. I will also bracket other forms of bad luck which 
could be separately considered and acted upon. These include social luck, disability, 
medical needs, and support for needy children and carers. I agree with Dworkin that 
these issues should be dealt with through hypothetical insurance decisions.602 
However, since these needs can usually be more easily and accurately identified than 
can bad market luck I will generally bracket them off as already decided on the basis of 
more straightforward hypothetical insurance decisions. One way to express this point is 
that social luck, disability, medical needs, and the guardianship of children or 
incapacitated adults can readily be targeted separately, or tagged.603 Therefore, for the 
purposes of this chapter I will treat the requirements for the above problems as fixed 
costs while focusing on market luck.604  
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 See pages 36-7 and 203-4.  
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 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue  at Chs 8 and 9. 
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 Akerlof, 'The Economics Of "Tagging" As Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, 
and Manpower Planning', Nichols and Zeckhauser, 'Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on 
Recipients'. Akerlof considers the extent to which welfare programmes can be designed to perform 
tagging in the same manner as other programmes, an issue to which I will return throughout this 
chapter. 
604
 Nevertheless, the attractiveness of hourly-averaging is such that it is actually a very useful tool for 
dealing with other issues as well, a point I highlight at times in passing. 
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6.1 Relevant considerations for hypothetical insurers 
I explained the considerations of hypothetical insurers in chapter five, and these will 
apply here. Nonetheless, I will briefly explain the considerations that are particularly 
pertinent to benefit policies. Bad market luck arises from the possession of fewer 
marketable skills than others possess. It can also arise where someone is simply in the 
wrong place at the wrong time—such as living in a region that is in decline while others 
are booming. Bad market luck can result in a low income compared to others, or 
alternatively involuntarily unemployment. The former is a problem because a low 
income will leave individuals less able to carry out their plans, as well as reducing 
access to important positional goods. Involuntary unemployment has the same effects, 
but in a more severe form, as well as potentially harming mental well-being605—for 
example, due to loss of self-esteem and self-confidence.606  
Insurers will want policies that reduce—and ideally remove—the harms associated with 
low pay or unemployment. However, they would of course be mindful of the cost of 
policies. The most obvious cost is the scheme’s direct cost. This is the administrative 
cost of the policy, where administrative costs will reduce the effectiveness of the policy 
by directing funds away from the intended beneficiaries. As well as the direct effects, 
however, policies will have indirect costs.  
Any policy that improves the position of those with bad market luck will have wide-
ranging effects upon the economy. Insurers will be concerned about such effects on the 
wider economy. Each policy will have its own side-effects, but insurers are affected as 
beneficiaries of the economy, as consumers, and as taxpayers. The first issue is that of 
the broad economic effects, and is the most complex. This refers to concerns about the 
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 Richard Layard, Happiness : Lessons from a New Science (New York: Penguin Press, 2005) at 67. 
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 For some panel-data based evidence on the effects of unemployment see; Liliana Winkelmann 
and Rainer Winkelmann, 'Why Are the Unemployed So Unhappy? Evidence from Panel Data', 
Economica, 65/257 (1998), 1-15, Peter Warr, Paul Jackson, and Michael Banks, 'Unemployment and 
Mental Health: Some British Studies', Journal of Social Issues, 44/4 (1988), 47-68, Andrew Clark, 
Yannis Georgellis, and Peter Sanfey, 'Scarring: The Psychological Impact of Past Unemployment', 
Economica, 68/270 (2001), 221-41.  
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effectiveness of the economy at meeting the needs and wants of consumers. Policies 
that would harm economic efficiency and growth would be unattractive to hypothetical 
insurers, as they will do one or more of the following; increase unemployment, lower 
pay or profits, or raise prices. Increased unemployment would be a concern to insurers, 
as it may affect them personally. In addition, increased unemployment would increase 
the direct costs of the policies. If the policies damaged economic growth, they could 
reduce the returns to investments and therefore result in lower profits. Reduced 
economic growth also harms investment-levels, which would lead to lower pay as there 
would be a larger proportion of workers competing for available jobs and driving down 
wages.  
The second issue is that policies could increase prices for consumers. This occurs where 
it becomes less attractive for people to produce what consumers want, either through 
encouraging people to perform less work and take more leisure or by encouraging 
firms to shift to more expensive technology (in place of workers). Price increases would 
make it harder for people to carry out their plans. The second worry relates to the 
third, which is the cost to taxpayers.  
The analogous concern between increased prices and the effects on taxpayers arises 
because, as well as affecting the decisions of those with bad market luck, the policies 
may also alter the decisions of those who are not unfortunate. Policies may induce 
other workers to reduce their work hours or effort, reducing tax revenues. Of particular 
importance are the Marginal Effective Tax-Rates (METR) and the Participation Tax-
Rates (PTR) that the policies have.607 High marginal rates on working more will 
discourage productive work by those with low earnings, which will increase the tax-
revenue cost of the programmes and also have unwelcome economic effects. These 
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 I explained these in the previous chapter, in section 5.7. In some cases, people may feel they are 
better off not participating in the workforce at all and maximising their leisure. While this has similar 
consequences to high METR’s—it increases costs—it should be distinguished as a separate type of 
response.  
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broader economic effects are a fourth consequence. It is therefore preferable to avoid 
high marginal and participation tax-rates if possible.  
The second and third indirect costs described above—increasing prices and increasing 
taxation—have a distributional element. Insurers will generally prefer policies which 
have costs that fall primarily upon their economically fortunate potential selves rather 
than on the less fortunate. This is because policies whose costs—in unemployment, 
increased prices, or tax—fall on the less fortunate will be somewhat self-defeating, 
since some (or all) of the benefits of the policy will be lost to its intended beneficiaries. 
Such losses make policy options with such effects less attractive.  
6.2 Hourly-averaging through hour-credits 
The policy that I propose would be most attractive to hypothetical insurers is an hourly-
averaging scheme to benefit those with bad market luck. I will not discuss whether it 
should be used for the calculation of tax on the more fortunate until the following 
chapter.608 Before explaining the preferred policies for the less fortunate in full, it is 
necessary in this section to explain this new form of hourly-averaging tax calculation. I 
will begin by explaining the long-standing idea of time-based tax averaging, before 
explaining the hourly variant of this idea. I will briefly explain hour-credits and what 
they do for their recipients. Unfortunately, there is no room to discuss the practicalities 
of the proposal,609 and I will assume that the administrative costs of the system would 
be comparable to its rivals.  
Tax is usually calculated on an annual basis,610 or on each individual transaction of a 
particular type.611 However, a third option is to calculate taxation on a period longer 
than a year by utilising an average from a longer calculation period. The idea of 
                                                        
608
 I will show its superiority in this regard in sections 7.7 and 7.8. 
609
 These will be discussed in more detail in Bamford, Rethinking Tax. 
610
 Such as income or corporation tax, or—less commonly—a wealth or endowment tax.  
611
 Such as stamp duty, import and export excise, estate taxes, sales taxes and VAT. 
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averaging income for tax purposes has a long heritage.612 Multiple-year averaging has 
been introduced on several occasions around the world,613 but a more principled 
lifetime averaging approach has been discussed since its advocacy in the 1930s and 40s 
by U.S. economist William Vickrey.614 Vickrey’s calculation involves cumulative 
averaging. This means that someone who had been taxed for five years would have her 
total income over that period applied to a five-year tax-rate table, and there would be 
similar cumulative tables for people who had been taxed for four years, six years, and 
so on. Our taxpayer would apply her cumulative taxable income to the relevant (five 
year) tax-rate table to determine how much tax she should have paid up until this point 
in her life. In order to calculate her current tax liability she would deduct her past 
payments from this new total and pay the tax authority the difference.  
It is straightforward enough to replace this cumulative approach with a true averaging 
proposal which would divide total lifetime income (with past income adjusted for 
inflation) by the time period in order to calculate an average annual income. A single 
average tax-rate schedule could then be applied to all. In order to calculate her tax 
liability, our five-year taxpayer would split this gross annual average into an annual tax 
average. She would then multiply this tax average by the number of years—five—to 
                                                        
612
 There is no reason why averaging could not be applied to other types of tax calculation, such as a 
consumption tax. I will discuss the tax-base in the following chapter. 
613
 For example in Wisconsin and Australia in the 1920s and 30s, and as part of US federal income tax 
from the 1960s to 80s. See William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation (with a New 
Introduction) (Clifton N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1972) at 105-6, William Vickrey, Public Economics: 
Selected Papers by William Vickrey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 169-72. The US 
federal system changes were introduced in the Internal Revenue Code §§ 1301-1305 (1964), and 
discussed in Richard Schmalbeck, 'Income Averaging after Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in 
Horizontal Equity', Duke Law Journal, 3 (1984), 509-80. Moving averages are problematic because 
the averaging period contains different income each time yet income from a particular period 
appears in several separate averaging calculations. The moving average calculation, however, does 
not account for all of these past tax payments based partially on the same income, with arbitrary 
and unfair results. Moving averages can result in high taxes when people have a lower income and 
are less able to pay. Furthermore, it can reduce taxes for some people with high overall income. In 
addition to moving averages like this one, averaging has been allowed for particular professions, 
including authors and inventors in the UK (thanks to Andy Reeve for pointing this out to me). 
614
 Vickrey’s initial article is reprinted in Vickrey, Public Economics: Selected Papers by William 
Vickrey  at ch 5. In 1947 he published a book length exposition of the proposal for cumulative 
averaging, later reissued as Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation.  
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see the amount of tax she should now have paid in total. She would then deduct her 
past tax payments from this new total in order to calculate her current liability. All past 
payments would need to be adjusted for inflation, which would be done automatically 
by the tax authority.  
That explains time-based averaging proposals, but I propose a variation that does not 
utilise time passed, but rather hours credited. The idea here is that people would be 
credited with an hour-credit for each hour of work they perform for a registered 
employer,615 and that these hour-credits would form the basis of the averaging 
calculation. Employers would inform the tax authority of the number of hours that each 
worker has been paid for working in the specified period.616 These hour-credits would 
take the place of years or months in time-based averaging calculations, with each 
person’s total lifetime income divisible instead by his total number of hour-credits to 
determine an average hourly gross value. The government would set an hourly-average 
tax schedule, which would determine the amount of tax that each person should pay 
on this gross average. The gross average is then split into a net and tax portion in 
accordance with the relevant tax-rate. This average hourly tax amount is then re-
multiplied by the number of hour-credits. This total then indicates the amount of tax 
that the individual should have paid to the government and the net amount that she 
should have received up until that point. This calculation can be done as often as 
desired—for example once a week or month—each time as if it were to be the last 
payment on the person’s account. Some may find it easier to understand the system if 
it is expressed in equations, and so I have included these as an appendix.  
                                                        
615
 Employers would need to be registered for anti-fraud compliance reasons. Conferring hour-
credits will reduce tax revenues, as well as effecting greater transfers to the recipients through 
lower tax-rates. Therefore fraud of this kind would be doubly expensive to the government and the 
rest of society. 
616
 Clearly there would need to be strong anti-fraud measures in order to ensure that employers and 
employees do not collude to overstate the amount of hours worked. These would include cross-
referencing employment advertisements, job offers and contracts and the enforcement of serious 
penalties for firms and managers who are found guilty of hour-credit fraud.  
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I will now return to the example individuals from Chapter Three, and use these to 
illustrate the calculation.617 Bertrand and Angela could earn more than others—let us 
say up to £25 an hour. Derrick and Cassandra had fewer options, and can only earn £6. 
Bertrand and Derrick are leisure-lovers, and desire only the income necessary to 
survive while pursuing their other interests, which we will assume to be £6,000 a year. 
Cassandra and Angela will desire to work full-time and earn whatever they can from 
that. Let us assume that these numbers have held constant for their entire working 
lives, and that they have received no outside income. The tax on a £6 gross average is 
zero, while the tax on £25 is sixty percent. This allows us to create the following table 
for each month.  
Table 6.1: Monthly figures 
The system works by treating each point in time as if it will be the last payment by (and 
to) the taxpayer.618 It is possible to calculate the amount of tax that the individual 
should have paid and net income received up to the present. These totals are then 
used to calculate current liabilities. To illustrate this, imagine the individuals above 
have reached their 100th month of work, represented in table 6-2. The net income due 
to the individual at the latest point is easily calculated by subtracting past total net 
receipts from 99 months (*) from the current amounts due after 100 (**).619 Since in 
                                                        
617
 Page 120-2. 
618
 Though there may be scope to allow deferred tax payments for those who have a sudden 
decrease in net income.  
619
 The calculation could just as well be undertaken on the basis of tax paid in the past in order to 
calculate tax due in the latest period. This is because gross income equals net income plus tax.  
 Gross Income Hour Credits Hourly 
Average 
Tax 
Rate 
Net hourly Net 
Income 
Angela 4000 160 25 60% 10 1600 
Bertrand 1250 50 25 60% 10 500 
Cassandra 960 160 6 0% 6 960 
Derrick  504 84 6 0% 6 504 
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the simplified example the individuals have had a consistent average hourly income 
level their net income does not change, and it is the same in the 100th month as it was 
in their first.  
 Previous 
Gross 
total 
Prev. 
H/C 
total  
Prev. 
Net 
total * 
New 
Gross 
total 
New 
H/C 
total 
New Net 
total ** 
New 
Net 
Income  
Angela 396,000 15840 158,400 400,000 16000 160,000 1600 
Bertrand 123,750 4950 49,500 125,000 5000 50,000 500 
Cassandra 95,040 15840 95,040 96,000 16000 96,000 960 
Derrick  49,896 8316 49,896 50,400 8400 50,400 504 
Table 6.2: One hundredth month calculation 
In the artificial examples above, the tax rate does not change. Imagine now two further 
individuals, Humphrey and Irene. Both of these individuals lack earning talents but they 
inherit large amounts of money.620 Humphrey inherits at 18 years old, while Irene 
inherits at sixty. Irene’s situation is the same as that of Cassandra until she inherits. At 
this point, she has 80,000 hour credits, and has earned £480,000 in total gross.621 Upon 
inheriting a million pounds, her hourly average rises from £6 to £18.50, which we will 
say corresponds to a tax-rate of thirty-five percent. Irene will have to pay £350,000 in 
tax on her windfall. Humphrey, however, receives his windfall when he has no hour-
credits. He therefore receives none of it up-front,622 though the gross income will 
increase his net income throughout his life with each additional hour-credit he obtains. 
After his first month at work, he earns 160 hour-credits, an hourly average of £6256. 
We will say that this has a 99% tax-rate, meaning that he receives £62.56 an hour net, 
£1009.60 for the month of work. Each additional month will bring him more hour-
                                                        
620
 I here assume that all kinds of income should be included in the one comprehensive calculation, 
anticipating the discussion of the tax-base in the following chapter. 
621
 And the same amount of net income, given her zero per-cent tax-rate at this point. 
622
 This is because, when re-multiplying whatever the net-hourly-income is by zero hour-credits the 
result will always be zero.  
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credits, which will drop his gross hourly average. This drop will in turn reduce his tax-
rate, which will mean that he will receive a greater proportion of his inheritance as 
time goes on. When Humphrey and Irene reach sixty, their tax situation will be the 
same.623 
In order to drive home the crucial role of hour-credits in this system consider how they 
affect their recipients. There are two ways of looking at the effect an additional hour-
credit will have on its recipient. The first is that the hour-credit will have a value of x 
pounds to them, corresponding to their net hourly income. Angela would receive 
roughly £10 if she were given an additional credit. The other way to look at hour-
credits is that they will reduce the tax-rate that the individual faces—compared to a 
situation where they did not obtain that credit. So, when someone receives an hour-
credit without their usual level of income her tax rate will reduce as a result. This 
occurs because the total is now divided by more hour-credits, meaning a reduced gross 
average, which will correspond to a lower tax-rate. This is what happens in the case of 
Humphrey.  
6.3 The preferred policy for low-pay 
Having explained hourly averaging I can now explicate what I argue would be the most 
attractive policy against bad market luck for hypothetical insurers. The first part of the 
policy to discuss is the element intended to improve the position of those who work 
but have low pay. This relates to the hourly averaging proposal, and is—put simply—
that those with a low hourly average income should have a negative tax-rate. This 
negative rate would top up the income of the low-paid from state funds for each hour 
credit that they receive. So if we assume the desirable minimum net income is £5 an 
hour, those with an average of £0.01 would have a negative fifty-thousand percent tax 
                                                        
623
 Of course, Humphrey may have spent some or all of his inheritance before Irene received hers. 
However their lifetime net receipts and tax payments would be the same at this point. 
231 
 
rate in order to obtain £5 for each hour.624 Someone with an average gross income of 
£3 an hour might have a negative 83.333% tax rate. This would increase their net 
lifetime average to £5.50, meaning that the state will have paid them £2.50 extra for 
every hour they work. The tax rate would reach zero, let us say, for those with a £6 
average. This proposal is, therefore, a new form of earnings subsidy. I will discuss 
alternative earnings and wage subsidy policies in sections 6.9-6.10.  
The hourly-averaging subsidy is attractive to insurers because it would improve the 
position of those who work in low-paid employment, as an hour of work for them will 
be worth more than it would otherwise. This is shown by the negative tax rates in 
Figure 6-1. The subsidy provides the low-paid with more resources or leisure to carry 
out their plans. The graphs below indicate how the tax-rate would apply to those with 
low lifetime hourly income. As figure 6-2 indicates, net income should always rise with 
gross income in order to maintain the incentive for people to perform more 
economically productive labour, while ensuring that those with a very low average 
would be elevated to a higher hourly income.  
                                                        
624
 Hourly-averaging would therefore remove the need for a minimum wage, an alternative policy I 
will consider in section 6.8. However, I would propose that with hourly-averaging there should be a 
selective minimum wage in place which would vary according to employer or job-type. For some jobs 
the minimum gross wage could be £0.01 an hour, but for others it would need to be set at the zero-
tax-rate level. The idea is that hour-credits should only be available to those who have sufficient 
economic demand for their activity.  
Two categories of job are immediate candidates for higher minimum-gross-wage levels. The 
first category is jobs which are also leisure activities, such as professional footballer, artist, and 
political philosophy academic—based on the testimony of a professor who admitted that he would 
do his job for free. Put technically in terms of equalizing differences—see page 115—the attributes 
of these leisure-activity jobs are positive in themselves, and so it is necessary to ensure that those 
undertaking these jobs are doing so as a result of a demand for their activities rather than a desire 
on their part to practice them. A second relevant category arises since people will be keen to 
support their preferred political ideology or religion in whatever way they can; if they could work 
full-time to support their cause with taxpayer subsidy many would be inclined to do so. As a result, 
religious and political organizations would be required to pay their workers more than profit-seeking 
firms in order to stop people taking advantage of the subsidies to do work that they would do for 
free. This selective minimum wage serves to ensure economic efficiency and to reduce the scope for 
fraud and misuse of hourly subsidies. 
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Lifetime hourly averaging would also improve the income of those who have a high 
lifetime income, but who experience a significant drop in income. Imagine, for 
example, that Fred’s income dropped from £6-an-hour to £2-an-hour. While his gross 
average would not immediately drop into the subsidy region, his lifetime tax-rate 
would drop with each hour worked. This drop would release even more of his past 
gross earnings, since this reduced average will correspond to a reduced tax-rate, and 
this new tax-rate will be applied to his historical income as well. Effectively, those who 
suffer a large drop in their average gross income will receive some of their past higher-
tax-rate payments back. As a result, those with a low present income who are not 
receiving overall negative tax-rates could still receive tax rebates as a result of their 
now reduced income.625 This is attractive to insurers as it will smooth-out their income, 
meaning that they will not face any extreme changes in circumstances. 
The main advantage of hourly averaging, however, is that it will take account of good 
fortune in a manner that insurers will find more attractive than the rival policies. As I 
emphasised in section 3.1, the more fortunate can utilise their fortune to increase their 
leisure-income-job-satisfaction composite. Hourly-averaging is far better at 
                                                        
625
 This case emphasises that although lifetime totals are used in the calculation, it is the lifetime 
average that does the work. The lifetime net income and tax totals are therefore dynamic. It 
therefore avoids the lifetime inequality versus present inequality worries highlighted in Dennis 
McKerlie, 'Equality and Time', Ethics, 99/3 (1989), 475-91. I discuss this issue further in section 7.7. 
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determining those who are less fortunate than the rival policies. It taxes part-timers 
with a high hourly income but not those who work long hours at a lower income, thus 
focusing much more help on the less fortunate. As well as improving the financial 
situation of low-earners, hourly averaging should also give them better scope to find 
work that is more attractive, or to negotiate higher pay for unappealing work. 
Furthermore, the less fortunate can choose to work less as a result of their hourly 
subsidy.626  
The hourly-averaging approach also combines two features that are attractive to 
insurers; it has limited moral hazard and causes less economic damage than its rivals. 
The approach creates less of a moral hazard when compared to subsidies provided on a 
non-hourly basis. This is because leisure-lovers—whether economically fortunate or 
not—will withdraw their labour by reducing their hours and making use of the subsidy. 
This is a hazard for the insurers as it would increase the costs of the policy, as well as 
increasing costs to consumers by reducing the amount of labour undertaken in the 
economy. Some of the alternative policies can avoid the moral hazard problem, though 
they then face the second problem of damaging the economy. Hourly-averaging should 
not cause any additional unemployment and indeed should help to reduce 
unemployment.627 It would not cause price rises when subsidising low-earners. Indeed, 
the policy should even reduce prices by encouraging more workers into employment 
and thus lowering wages. This benefit should then be passed on to consumers in lower 
prices.628 However, lowered wages would raise the cost of the policy, requiring more 
taxes to pay for the scheme. Furthermore, the subsidy will be focused on those with 
consistently low hourly earnings. I will discuss alternative policies to increase the 
                                                        
626 The policy has many of the advantages of the ESS policy described in section 3.10, but without 
endowment-focus which insurers would find unattractive for reasons I will outline in section 7.1. 
627
 The feature of earning subsidies has long been touted. 
628
 This effect would not be universal, since even low-talent workers would have a better bargaining 
position. Low-paid jobs that are undesirable would therefore require higher pay, with these costs 
passed on to consumers. The costs of this advantage to the less talented workers would therefore 
be shared rather indiscriminately among consumers. 
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earnings of low-earners in sections 6.8-6.10, which will further show the superiority of 
hourly-averaging.  
I emphasise that the subsidy is applied on a lifetime-average basis, and not on the basis 
of each hour worked with a low hourly-gross-income. Some of the proposals 
considered below, such as the minimum wage and wage subsidy, work in the latter 
way. Again, the advantage of lifetime-averaging over those proposals is generally that it 
is more sensitive to the overall fortune of the worker in question, enabling more 
focused subsidies and keeping costs down.629 There are also administrative reasons and 
incentive reasons for lifetime hourly-averaging, and—in addition—I will show 
attractiveness of the approach taxing the more fortunate in the following chapter.630 It 
will make sense to have the same system in place for subsidising low earners and taxing 
high earners if it is attractive in both areas.631 
6.4 The preferred policy for unemployment 
The other problem which will concern hypothetical insurers is that of involuntary 
unemployment. The traditional question is the extent to which conditions should be 
placed on those who receive unemployment assistance, and I will discuss rival views in 
sections 6.5 to 6.7. Dworkin argues that hypothetical insurers would choose what he 
calls a mandatory-interventionist policy.632 This would require the scheme organisers to 
provide training for new skills where it will benefit the claimant and/or the community, 
and also provide jobs where no work is available. I broadly agree with Dworkin on this 
point, though I will add more detail to his conclusions. I will also show how the 
                                                        
629
 These advantages of averaging for the worst-off are considered in Lilly Batchelder, 'Taxing the 
Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered', Harvard Journal on Legislation, 40/2 (2003), 395-439. 
Batchelder argues that the US averaging should have been applied to calculations of benefits for the 
worst-off rather than focused on providing tax-breaks for the best-off.  
630
 Sections 7.7-7.8. I also emphasise in sections 7.3-7.6 that it is attractive to combine all forms of 
fortune into the same lifetime tax calculation by adopting a comprehensive tax-base which would 
include gifts and therefore account for both social and market good fortune. 
631
 That is to say that if the approach were as attractive as its rivals at income subsidy, but more 
attractive than its rivals with regard to taxation, then the administrative advantage of having a single 
system for both ends would tip the balance towards the proposal.  
632
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 336-8. 
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response to unemployment can be interwoven with the hour-credit approach to low 
wages. 
Given that I have suggested a negative hourly-average tax proposal would be the most 
attractive response to low-pay, it is sensible for the unemployment policy to be 
compatible with that. I therefore propose that the involuntarily unemployed should 
have access to hour-credits, but only if they meet the requirements of a guaranteed 
work programme. This policy would involve a jobcentre633 in each locality which would 
provide job search assistance, training, and also local community work.634 The 
advantage of this policy is again that it would reduce the moral hazard to the scheme 
from leisure-lovers. This is because leisure-lovers would not have the option of utilising 
this scheme to gain leisure instead of performing work on the market.635  
As well as reducing moral hazard, the provision of guaranteed jobs in the community 
would provide some useful employment to those who would otherwise find 
themselves unoccupied. The existence of this backup work would be a boon to workers 
who can only find insecure jobs.636 In addition, with less conditional schemes, those 
with bad employment luck may find it difficult to distinguish themselves from leisure-
lovers who are happy to take advantage of unemployment benefits. Insurers would 
fear that this misapprehension on the part of employers may hurt their prospects of 
                                                        
633
 To borrow the term currently used in the UK. 
634
 This would then include work in the community, either manual work improving the local 
environment, or service work at local schools, hospitals, care-centres and so on. The job providers 
would have to work with the local community, local government and NGO’s to obtain proposals for 
schemes, and to ensure that these schemes were functioning appropriately. 
635
 Unless perhaps they can find work that is more leisurely on the scheme than they can on the 
market. In this case, the difference should not be sufficient to encourage a large number of leisure-
lovers to join the scheme. Furthermore, to the extent that leisure-lovers might join the scheme for 
this reason, at least those paying for the scheme would benefit more from the community-minded 
work performed by the leisure-lovers than if the alternative whereby leisure-lovers receive an 
income without performing any work. 
636
 There appears to be a trend towards more short term and temporary work, very likely driven by 
globalisation. The neologism ‘precariat’ (from precarious proletariat) was coined by Guy Standing to 
describe workers in the 21
st
 century, who are much less likely to have the prospect of a job-for-life 
that characterised employment in the mid-20
th
 century.  
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finding further work. Finally, and relatedly, a guaranteed job programme should reduce 
the stigma of unemployment claims by providing socially useful work.637  
I have said so far that insurers would choose to have access to hour-credits for work or 
workfare-type activity. In addition, it is worth noting that insurers would also consider 
the advantages of combining the hour-credit system with other benefits. For example, 
it would be advisable to provide those with disabilities that render them less able to 
take part in the economy with compensatory hour-credits along with any aids and care 
assistance that their particular disability requires. I also suggest that low earners with 
children or who care for disabled adults should receive hour-credits for performing this 
task.638  
Furthermore, I suggest the provision of hour-credits to those who undertake training or 
learning that will improve their employment prospects.639 This is because a more 
educated society is a public good,640 but also because otherwise the hour-credit system 
                                                        
637
 It is necessary to fight any such stigma because of one downside of the interventionist policies, 
namely that they add additional barriers to claimants. The fear for conditional benefits is that some 
worthy individuals might fail to receive them, whether due to bureaucratic complexity or due to the 
associated stigma. 
638
 This should perhaps be extended to all carers, irrespective of wealth or income. Alternatively, 
there could be different quantities of additional hour-credits provided depending on the average 
gross hourly income of the carer. Child benefit in the UK has traditionally been a universal benefit for 
all parents and it may make sense to continue this tradition for reasons of administrative simplicity, 
and to avoid creating additional incentives for parents to earn less. Subsidising carers is attractive 
both because hypothetical insurers would wish to insure themselves against having to provide care 
for needy relatives, and because the responsibility for doing so would otherwise fall on the rest of 
society. For a discussion of the problems inherent in defining work for the purposes of workfare, see 
Noah Zatz, 'What Welfare Requires from Work', UCLA Law Review, 54 (2006), 373-464. For 
arguments for the inclusion of caring in the definition of work see Zatz, 'What Welfare Requires from 
Work', at 456-62, Noah Zatz, 'Supporting Workers by Accounting for Care', Harvard Law & Policy 
Review, 5/1 (2011), 45-68. 
639
 I would propose a maximum amount of hour-credits that people could get from these additional 
hour-credit schemes should be less than the maximum for those in paid employment, for example 
32 hours a week instead of 42. This would limit the overall expenditure on these schemes to the tax 
system, and would provide an additional incentive for workers to find more economically productive 
work. I mean productive here in the sense that consumers or taxpayers are willing to pay for the 
goods or services produced. 
640
 Subsidising education by sharing the costs with the educated would provide the public goods of a 
more deliberative and productive society. However, the provision of subsidy is only justified on the 
basis that the chosen benefit system (hourly-subsidy) would make education much less attractive 
when compared to work, rather than on the basis of resource envy. For more on this see footnote 
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would produce a strong incentive not to undertake adult education and retraining at 
great potential cost to economic productivity. Insurers would agree to this policy as a 
form of education subsidy that will be compatible with the hour-credit scheme, since 
without this policy people would have a strong disincentive to spend time in education 
rather than work. Insurers would fear that such a disincentive would, in the long-run, 
lead to a less educated and less productive economy. The presence of fees for 
education and the requirement that students meet course requirements should 
provide adequate disincentives to leisure-lovers from using education as a means to 
paid leisure.641 
When combined with the guaranteed work programme, the negative hourly-averaging 
tax is good for less-talented workers.642 It provides security from unemployment and 
improves take-home hourly pay,643 while maintaining the economic incentive to work. 
For this reason, amongst others, the policy just described would be the most attractive 
for hypothetical insurers. In order to bolster this claim, I will present rival policies in the 
remainder of this chapter. The advantages of the preferred policies will therefore 
                                                                                                                                                            
648. The inclusion of education, training and care work is also supported in Elizabeth Anderson, 
'Welfare, Work Requirements, and Dependant-Care', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21/3 (2004), 
243-56 at 255.  
641
 Insurers may also be tempted to allow hour-credit fines for those who do not use their education 
or training within a given period—say ten years from the end of their education. This would 
discourage leisure-lovers, but would also make education and training much more of a risk and 
hence less attractive. 
642
 It would need to be combined with a guaranteed work programme or conditional unemployment 
scheme, since earnings subsidies alone would not provide enough incentive to ensure that all 
workers would be able to find work at any given point in time. This ability to combine the two 
policies negates the argument of Alstott that basic income is superior to earnings subsidies on the 
basis that they do more for the involuntarily unemployed; Anne L. Alstott, 'Work Vs. Freedom: A 
Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies', The Yale Law Journal, 108/5 (1999), 967-1058 at 1022-
3, Anne L. Alstott, 'Why the Eitc Doesn't Make Work Pay', Law & Contemporary Problems, 73 (2010), 
285-314 at 308 Alstott’s broad argument is that minimum wage or earnings subsidies can either help 
improve employment prospects or the economic position of low-earners but not both, Alstott, 'Work 
Vs. Freedom',  at 1041. My response is that combining these policies with unemployment benefits or 
guaranteed work programmes would largely resolve both problems. 
643
 The hour-credit scheme would be more generous than the other proposed schemes for the 
involuntarily unemployed. This is because past earnings will still count in the average, and hour-
credits are more valuable for those who have a higher average. Those whose average is dropping 
through the receipt of additional hour-credits therefore effectively receive some of their previous 
tax payments back again. 
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become clearer through comparison with inferior alternatives. I will begin with 
alternative approaches to unemployment insurance, which involves considering the 
imposition of more conditions (section 6.5) or fewer conditions (6.6 and 6.7) on 
unemployment assistance. In sections 6.8-6.10 I will consider alternative proposals to 
improve the position of low earners; the imposition of a minimum wage and alternative 
forms of earnings subsidies.  
6.5 More conditions on unemployment benefits 
The first alternative I will present is the idea that there should be more conditions on 
unemployment payments. This can be dealt with very briefly as my proposal is among 
those with the most stringent conditions. The system could be made more stringent by 
introducing a cumulative time-limit on claimants, or by disallowing the provision of 
additional hour-credits that I proposed in the previous section. 
The proposal to place a cumulative time-limit on unemployment claims is described by 
Dworkin as a severe policy.644 Dworkin suggests could this limit could be set to two 
years, after which the individual would never again be eligible for unemployment 
assistance. This proposal would be the least onerous on the fortunate, since the 
scheme would be much cheaper due to the limit on expenditure per claimant. In 
addition, the less fortunate would have a strong incentive to find work quickly and to 
hold on to it once obtained. This should reduce gross wages and therefore prices. 
However, as a result of this, it would leave less-skilled workers in a more precarious 
position; they would have a considerably weakened bargaining position with regard to 
their employers, and much less security to stand up against workplace bullying and 
abuse. Furthermore, some of the most disadvantaged workers will find it very difficult 
to find work—they will always be last to be picked due to their relative lack of ability. 
The chances of exceeding the time-limit would be much greater for such disadvantaged 
workers. 
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 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 336. 
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Dworkin argues that the severe policy would not provide enough security for insurers, 
and I agree with him. Indeed, while there are some benefits for those who find 
themselves economically fortunate, these benefits are limited. For example, the 
guaranteed work policy should reduce the moral hazard issues caused by leisure-lovers, 
and so the main advantage is in the cost savings in pay-outs to genuine claimants. As a 
result, the policy is a bad insurance bet—a very slight gain for the fortunate is weighed 
against a severely worsened position for the unfortunate.  
The other way to apply more conditions on unemployment benefit would be to restrict 
the activities for which people could receive additional hour-credits.645 Some of these 
additional hour-credits are justified by other types of reasons, not necessarily related 
to bad market luck—such as those designed to mimic hypothetical insurance decisions 
regarding disability and medical needs. The additional hour-credits in question, 
therefore, are those for carers and students. Not providing extra hour-credits to carers 
and students would greatly reduce the expense of the system on the premiums for the 
more fortunate. I am therefore less sure of this point than some of the others. 
However, if I am right that insurers would consider hourly-averaging to be the most 
attractive policy, then they will wish to include the additional credits.  
One reason is that those with disabled loved ones will often lose out in the job market 
as a result of their caring responsibilities, and the provision of hour-credits for caring 
would compensate them for their reduced career and work opportunities. 
Furthermore, insurers would fear being in need of care, and would therefore support 
credits for caring as they would wish to have the support of their family members 
without facing additional financial hardship as a result. This applies to children as well, 
since insurers would be concerned to avoid growing up in an impoverished 
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 Discussed above, page 235-7. 
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environment, and would wish to have a policy in place to ensure that low-earning 
parents can provide well for their children.646  
As I have indicated, there are also public good arguments for providing additional 
credits. In the case of education, the public good is a more educated public society and 
workforce. Insurers would want to ensure that the incentive for people to undertake 
education is retained, since the taxation required for the hourly-subsidy scheme would 
reduce the returns that people could expect to obtain from educational investments.647 
Regarding caring, where the government would have to provide care for the needy—as 
a result of hypothetical insurance choices regarding care—in the absence of family 
assistance the provision of hour-credits would be a ready substitute for this alternative 
cost. Of course, the hour-credit policy would no doubt be much more expensive as 
many families otherwise would simply bear the cost themselves rather than leave their 
loved ones to the care of an institution. However, to the extent that this is the case, it is 
also an argument for the hour-credit approach, since it is clear that many carers are 
keen to look after their loved ones even where they are disadvantaged by the cost of 
the caring responsibilities they accept. This is presumably because all parties in these 
cases think it is preferable where possible to care within the family. Given this fact, 
insurers would plausibly wish to purchase carer-cover to avoid burdening the lives of 
their loved ones.648  
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 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 338-9. The argument for extending additional hour-credits to those 
higher up the tax scale would be that otherwise people with children will have an incentive to lower 
their income in order to qualify for the benefit, see footnote 640. It is harder to tell at this abstract 
level what the best policy would be in this case, as it would depend on many empirical factors. 
647
 I emphasise here that the argument is based on returning to roughly the baseline levels of 
education that would occur in an economy without hour-credits, though it might not be that the 
people and form of education would be the same. This argument is therefore that there is a case to 
ensure that the public good of tertiary education is not overly damaged by the introduction of hour-
credits. I am not arguing that there should be additional expenditure on education as it is a public 
good, for reasons explained in the following footnote. 
648
 It is important to note that the argument here proceeds on the basis of the hypothetical 
insurance decisions of the less fortunate, rather than on the basis that all public goods should 
receive subsidy. The latter argument is problematic from a resource egalitarian perspective, as it is 
not always acceptable for to charge individuals for public goods even if they benefit from them on 
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6.6  Unconditional Income  
I will now consider whether my proposal has too many conditions on unemployment 
benefits, and will begin—in this section—by contrasting it to the strongest alternative 
policy; unconditional income.649 Unconditional income650 has a long—though 
discontinuous—heritage and a wide variety of supporters.651 It has been supported 
under many names, such as basic capital,652 demogrant,653 stakeholder grant,654 and a 
negative income tax.655 These proposals are all effectively the same mathematically,656 
                                                                                                                                                            
resource egalitarian grounds, see Casal and Williams, 'Equality of Resources and Procreative Justice',  
at 156-9. However, as Casal and Williams point out, where it is not possible to hold people 
accountable for the costs of their choices—specifically those of procreation—and yet innocent 
others would be harmed by the imposition of such costs, it may be necessary to acquiesce in one 
form of injustice in order to prevent a larger one. One policy that may be helpful in this regard would 
be to provide parents with soft low-interest loans rather than payments to ensure that their children 
do not suffer poverty, thus making it clear that they should have borne the cost themselves—even if 
they never actually pay back the loan. 
649
 For a selection of writings in support of basic income from Thomas Spence in 1797 to Juliet Rhys-
Williams in 1943 see John Cunliffe and Guido Erreygers, The Origins of Universal Grants: An 
Anthology of Historical Writings on Basic Capital and Basic Income (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) at Part 2. 
650
 Since I am assuming a single-state world in this work, the idea that the income should be 
universal to all the human race or just citizens of the country in question does not arise. However, in 
a multi-state world, citizenship or some form of official status would presumably be a condition on 
the otherwise unconditional income.  
651
 Cunliffe and Erreygers, The Origins of Universal Grants: An Anthology of Historical Writings on 
Basic Capital and Basic Income at xiii. 
652
 See the chapters reprinted in Ibid.  at Part 1. 
653
 I.e. a grant to all members of the demos (Greek word for ‘population’). 
654
 Bruce A. Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1999) at Ch 1. Alstott claims a Dworkinian heritage for her position, Alstott, 'Work Vs. 
Freedom', at 982-3. However, she takes the position that Dworkin describes as a starting-gate 
theory, and dismisses Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 87-8. I discussed this in chapter 1, page 30-1.  
655
 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) at 191-2. 
656
 The mathematical equivalence of the schemes is shown in John Creedy and Richard Disney, Social 
Insurance in Transition : An Economic Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) at 147-8. However, it 
should be noted that the decision to include basic income as taxable or not would make a difference 
on this point.  
An attempt to highlight the differences between the two approaches is made in Davide 
Tondani, 'Universal Basic Income and Negative Income Tax: Two Different Ways of Thinking 
Redistribution', Journal of Socio-Economics, 38/2 (2009), 246-55. However, the differences 
highlighted—that the two schemes would appear differently on the government budget (p248) and 
that the negative income is more focused on benefitting the lowest earners (p248-9)—are derived 
using overly strict assumptions. Tondiani goes on to discuss the different motivations of supporters 
of the two schemes (p250-4), which is irrelevant here. Of course, the different motivation for 
supporters of the scheme may lead them to prefer different rates and levels within the approach—
for example to have a maximally high sustainable basic income or a sufficient minimum guaranteed 
income to avoid extreme poverty through a negative income tax. 
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since the taxes paid by higher earners would outweigh any grant, making them net 
contributors to the scheme despite their ‘grant.’ Some have argued that a basic income 
is a requirement of justice, though I am unconvinced of this and will treat this as an 
open question in this work.657 I do accept the possibility of independent reasons to 
provide a one-off grant for adults beginning life or as a regular payment, for example to 
mimic the arrival of a new citizen into society in line with the imaginary island auction 
situation.658 However, I will bracket such reasons for unconditional income here as I am 
considering responses to bad market luck. I will therefore focus on the more pragmatic 
claims; those that would be considered by hypothetical insurers as a response to bad 
luck in employment.  
The basic income policy can benefit both the unemployed and those who are employed 
with low wages. This is because the basic income is paid to anyone who has low 
earnings in the specified period, either to top it up to a pre-ordained minimum (Figure 
6-3), or to a minimum level plus a small tapered amount in order to ensure that there 
remains an incentive for people to earn more while in the subsidy region (Figure 6-
4).659 The latter—tapered—approach is generally favourable as it provides incentives to 
people to earn even small amounts,660 although there are still very high effective 
marginal rates on additional hour of work within the region of the subsidy.  
                                                        
657
 The most prominent argument for a basic income is presented in Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All : 
What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? For more on Van Parijs’ position see section 5.6.  
658
 See page 28-9, Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society at Ch 2, Rakowski, Equal Justice  at 
150-5. Further reasons might be to ensure a reasonable opportunity for all or as a means to share 
out a natural resource dividend. 
659
 For a series of graphs that illustrate different proposals see Philippe Van Parijs, 'Basic Income: A 
Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-First Century', in Bruce A. Ackerman et al. (eds.), 
Redesigning Distribution : Basic Income and Stakeholder Grants as Alternative Cornerstones for a 
More Egalitarian Capitalism (London: Verso, 2006) at 27-34 (appendix). 
660
 Put another way, without the tapering, the METR is 100% for incomes below the basic income 
level. 
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The eternal question for supporters of the basic income is the level at which the basic 
income—B in the graphs—is set. The higher the basic income, the more it provides for 
the involuntarily unemployed, and the more it subsidises the income of low-earners. As 
well as the material benefits to those who find themselves under-employed or 
involuntarily unemployed, a high basic income would give workers greater security and 
bargaining power in the employment market. If an employer offers them bad terms 
they can walk away from the offer safe in the knowledge that they will receive a decent 
income.  
However, the higher the level of basic income is set, the greater the cost to taxpayer 
funds. Furthermore, the higher the level of basic income is set, the more people will be 
inclined to stop working.661 Leisure-lovers will take the opportunity to live a life of 
leisure, irrespective of their level of talent. Indeed, as the level rises, more and more 
low-talent workers who are not leisure-lovers but who value leisure will feel that they 
are better off with the basic income and large amounts of leisure rather than a slightly 
larger gross income and much less leisure. This drop in workforce participation will 
vastly increase the cost of the policy. In addition to the greater costs to taxpayers, the 
lesser amount of work done in the society will be likely to reduce the quantity of goods 
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and services produced, which will push up prices for all. This in turn will make the basic 
income less valuable to those with bad luck than it was when initially set.  
Armed with an understanding of the basic income proposal, it is now possible to 
consider whether hypothetical insurers would prefer this scheme.662 The basic income 
could be set at a relatively high or a relatively low level, where either is less attractive 
to hypothetical insurers than the guaranteed work and negative hourly tax policy I set 
out above. I will first discuss a low-level basic income, set so as to stave off starvation 
and death for those who find themselves without any income.  
A low-level basic income would be considered preferable to a laissez-faire system as it 
would provide some security and subsidy. However, it would have a very limited effect 
on the lives of low-earners, who would still live in poverty. It would certainly not 
provide enough income to ensure that the unemployed would be able to access all or 
most of the positional goods in the society.663 It therefore offers little security to 
hypothetical insurers.  
Setting a higher basic income that would get low-earners out of poverty, however, 
creates a dilemma. The higher the level, the greater the assistance it offers to the 
economically unfortunate, but the greater the number of leisure-lovers that will take 
advantage of the scheme. Indeed, in terms of feasibility, I doubt it would be possible to 
provide a sustainable basic income at a level that would provide a subsidy for hard-
working low earners.664 As such, even the high basic income would not be set 
particularly high, and would provide no assistance to those who are in work. This 
                                                        
662
 Dworkin at one point suggested the possibility that a negative income tax scheme could be the 
most appropriate; Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) at 208. 
663
 A low level basic income—since it is set at a low level—would not assist to those who work full-
time in low-paid jobs. This means that it would not provide any benefit to less talented individuals 
who have a preference for consumption or saving and can obtain work. As such, it would be only be 
of use as an alternative to the guaranteed work scheme for the involuntarily unemployed. 
664
 However, if it were possible, this high-level basic income would be even more expensive in terms 
of taxes and prices on the fortunate and those who are not leisure-lovers, compared to a lower-level 
basic income. 
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means that the basic income would not be anything like as generous to the 
involuntarily unemployed as the guaranteed work programme could be.  
Van Parijs asserts that the basic income proposal is, in general, the most effective form 
of redistribution due to its low administrative costs and simplicity.665 However, I am 
sceptical of this claim, and Van Parijs does not offer any figures. While basic income 
would be inexpensive to administer it is reasonable to assume it would be very 
expensive in increased pay-outs to leisure-lovers, and in increased prices as a result of 
the reduced amount of work. Van Parijs would therefore need to provide evidence that 
these well-founded fears are in fact incorrect.666 
For insurers with statistically normal and work-loving preferences, an unconditional 
income policy would be extremely unattractive. Setting the income level low will be of 
little help to the unfortunate, while setting it high will greatly increase the costs to the 
more fortunate—and those with average fortune.667 Leisure-loving hypothetical 
insurers, however, would have a very strong preference for a basic income at as high a 
level as possible.668 However, given that the leisure-lovers would be a minority and 
everyone else would have a very strong preference for placing conditions on 
unemployment payments, they would not agree to contract with the leisure-lovers on 
this policy.  
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 Van Parijs, 'Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-First Century',  at 17-8. 
666
 Van Parijs does not provide any evidence to contradict the common sense conclusions regarding 
the cost of basic income versus other programmes. The increased costs of administering the 
alternative programmes would have to amount to more than the lost services, goods and taxes from 
those who would choose a life of leisure as a result of the policy.  
667
 The dilemma is shown in welfarist terms in Robin Boadway et al., 'Optimal Redistribution with 
Heterogeneous Preferences for Leisure', Journal of Public Economic Theory, 4/4 (2002), 475-98 at 
495-6, Philippe Choné and Guy Laroque, 'Optimal Incentives for Labor Force Participation', Journal of 
Public Economics, 89/2–3 (2005), 395-425 at 398.  
668
 If the leisure-lover were highly talented they could work part-time just as they could in a laissez-
faire environment, but if they were less talented they would have the resources to have maximal 
leisure. The taxes and increased prices that would result from the policy would fall much more 
heavily on those with normal or work-loving preferences, and so they would face very little risk 
when supporting extensive redistribution using a basic income policy. 
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In conclusion, while the basic income proposal would be very attractive to leisure-
lovers, those with normal and work-loving preferences would much prefer the 
guaranteed work proposal. They will therefore refuse to agree with leisure-lovers on 
such a policy, and insist instead upon conditions on unemployment assistance. I will 
next consider whether insurers would be tempted to take an approach with more 
conditions than an unconditional basic income but less than the guaranteed work 
programme. 
6.7 Less conditional unemployment policies 
I will now consider policies that are closer to the one I endorsed in section 6.4, though 
with fewer conditions. Some authors have suggested that hypothetical insurers would 
choose to place fewer conditions on the unemployed than Dworkin suggests, and I will 
consider their arguments. It is not clear whether they would support an unconditional 
basic income or whether they would allow additional exemptions from workfare 
activities. However, since I have shown that the basic income approach is unattractive 
to insurers, I will assume that the option is to reduce the work requirements imposed 
upon those receiving payments. Of course, I have already proposed to reduce the work 
requirements for those who enrol on approved education courses and who have caring 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, some authors appear to think that insurers would go 
further than this and I will now consider their arguments.  
Bou-Habib and Olsaretti argue that conditional programmes would be unattractive to 
insurers, since it would require them to take whatever job is found, meaning that they 
would not have freedom of occupational choice.669 Their argument is presumably that 
Dworkin does not give enough weight to the advantages to less talented workers of an 
unconditional basic income. The advantages are that it enables citizens to refuse offers 
of work until an attractive job and career becomes available, as well as offering them 
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 Paul Bou-Habib and Serena Olsaretti, 'Liberal Egalitarianism and Workfare', Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 21/3 (2004), 257-70 at 263.  
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the time and resources to develop their skills in their preferred profession. The work 
requirement implied in the guaranteed work programme would mean that the 
unemployed would have to take whatever jobs were found for them, which would 
reduce the time they have available to pursue their preferred career.  
I accept that people would be willing to risk a slightly higher premium in order to avoid 
the possibility of being unable to find their preferred type of employment. Indeed, 
these considerations were relevant in the inclusion of education and training as activity 
worthy of hour-credits despite the extra expense. This provision would enable people 
to retrain with some public subsidy if they desire a new career.670 Furthermore, I 
suggested that those on workfare programmes should have an occasional hour-credit-
worthy day at their local jobcentre where they could receive advice, improve their 
résumé and apply for jobs. In addition, the workfare programme would be very 
generous for each hour-credit—given that it would be supported by the negative 
hourly tax—and that workers would face a limit of unpaid hour-credits amounting to 
less than a usual full-time week.671 As a result, those on the workfare scheme would 
have a reasonably large amount of time available to pursue other employment, and 
indeed would be assumed to be doing so.672 
The proposal I support therefore offers something to insurers who would be worried 
about the work requirements. Perhaps this would answer the concerns set out by Bou-
Habib and Olsaretti. However, if they felt insurers would want to go further than this 
                                                        
670
 I would also propose that people could ask the tax authorities to store ‘potential hour-credits’ 
where they spend time on a hobby that they hope to turn into a career. If they were to later become 
successful in this career, they could then call upon these stored credits. Unfortunately there is no 
space to discuss this possibility further in this work, but this could also provide insurers with some 
consolation that those who do follow a particular dream and make it come true may receive some 
compensation later on. 
671
 I would suggest a limit of 30 or 32 hour-credits a week for those obtaining them without pay, 
where those being paid would have a limit of something like 42 to 45. 
672
 Those on the workfare scheme would not have complete control over the hours they can work, of 
course. They would be offered projects with set hours, and would have to undertake them in order 
to obtain the credits. Where possible, though, the skills and preferences of the workers would be 
considered when assigning them to projects. 
248 
 
then I disagree. If those in receipt of the unemployment payment were able to self-
certify as holding out for their ideal career then the cost of the scheme—directly and 
indirectly through lost work—would balloon. Not only would unscrupulous leisure-
lovers assert that they were waiting for their ideal job, but many people would simply 
take advantage of the chance to work for their ideal career no matter how unlikely 
their chance of success. Offering to subsidise people to pursue their ideal career would 
be hugely expensive and insurers would balk at the extra expense for a policy that 
would provide little in the way of benefit. After all, many of the claimants would not 
manage to obtain their preferred career if everyone had the same increased 
opportunity to work at it; there would still be only a limited number of economically 
viable jobs available.673  
Bou-Habib and Olsaretti also consider whether there are problems with the use of 
actual preferences in hypothetical insurance decisions. Their first argument674 is that 
actual insurance preferences might be based on mistaken statistics, though I take it as 
acceptable to assume that hypothetical insurers are armed with all the relevant 
statistics. Their second argument675 appears to consider people’s preferences to be 
inauthentic due to social attitudes, an issue that is anyway resolved by the application 
of the principle of authenticity.676 The example given is of a society in which there is a 
strong protestant work ethic, though some people are ‘well-adjusted.’ The social norms 
result in the choice of a conditional policy, though the well-adjusted would prefer to be 
able to reject jobs they find undesirable. However, Bou-Habib and Olsaretti fail to 
realise that the hypothetical insurance outcome will usually be the opposite of the 
values of the society—for example as they would be chosen democratically. This is 
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 Another relevant point is that the negative hourly tax and guaranteed work programme would 
push the economy as a whole away from less popular jobs and create more of those jobs that 
people prefer.  
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 Bou-Habib and Olsaretti, 'Liberal Egalitarianism and Workfare',   at 262. 
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 Ibid.  at 263. 
676
 Described in footnote 69. 
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because a society in which there was a majority of leisure-lovers, the policy that 
favours leisure-lovers would be even more costly, and hence less sustainable.677  
I have argued that the arguments above for fewer conditions on unemployment 
insurance would not convince hypothetical insurers. Reducing the conditions in the 
described way would greatly increase the cost of the scheme without offering much in 
return. I say this because the preferred policy would allow low-earners greater leisure 
to pursue a preferred career by subsidising hourly income. Furthermore, allowing hour-
credits for tertiary education would enable people to undertake training that would 
open opportunities for them. The preferred policy therefore provides opportunities 
while keeping costs at a reasonable level.  
6.8 Minimum Wage  
I have considered whether alternative responses to unemployment would be more 
attractive to hypothetical insurers than my proposal. I will now consider policies that 
have been implemented or proposed as a response to low-pay, and whether 
hypothetical insurers would find them attractive. I will present two broad approaches 
designed to improve the position of low-earners; a minimum wage and alternative 
forms of employment subsidy. I will argue in this section that insurers would prefer 
employment subsidies to the minimum wage. In sections 6.9 and 6.10 I will explain that 
the negative-hourly-income-tax on low-earnings described above would be more 
attractive than other subsidy policies.  
The minimum wage is the most common policy to improve the position of low-earners. 
It regulates employment transactions, forbidding any labour contracts that pay less 
than a set amount per-hour.678 It comes in the form of a regulation, but Shaviro points 
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 The same effect occurs where there is a strong work-ethic, or majority work-lovers, since a basic 
income would then pay out to few leisure-lovers. 
678
 In the UK it was set at £6.08 for over 21 year olds from the 1st October 2011. The U.S. federal 
rate was set at $7.25 on July 24 2009, though several states also enforce higher rates—for example 
Vermont at $8.46.  
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out that it can equally accurately be viewed as a form of tax and subsidy.679 That is, a 
tax on employers who would have paid below the minimum wage, which must be paid 
directly to their—otherwise below minimum wage—employees. Of course, this policy 
requires the setting of a single threshold, and the choice of this threshold is very 
important. The insurers would have to take account of the likely effects of the policy, 
which I will now discuss.  
The effects of the minimum wage are empirically difficult to determine, and there is 
disagreement on this point. I will generally follow the predictions of mainstream 
economic theory,680 though these have faced strong challenges.681 Even accepting the 
mainstream approach, it is very difficult to assess the effects of the policy, since it will 
depend upon the elasticities of supply and demand for each type of product and 
labour. To illustrate the possible effects I will describe four ideal-type responses to the 
introduction of a minimum wage on a firm that previously paid below-minimum wages 
to a large number of its staff.  
The first response is that the workers receive an increase in pay at the expense of the 
profits of the company. This situation would be ideal for the policy, as the benefits 
would go to the otherwise low-paid workers and consumers would be unaffected. 
However, this effect will only occur where the company was previously able to set the 
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 Daniel Shaviro, 'The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy', 
The University of Chicago Law Review, 64/2 (1997), 405-81 at 407, 11-9. 
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 George J. Stigler, 'The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation', The American Economic Review, 
36/3 (1946), 358-65. 
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 For some evidence that the mainstream theory is wrong see David E. Card and Alan B. Krueger, 
Myth and Measurement : The New Economics of the Minimum Wage (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1995) at chs 2-4. However, for a good criticism of their empirical research see the 
comment by Hamermesh in Charles Brown et al., 'Comments by Reviewers', Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 48/4 (1995), 828-49 at 835-8. Card and Krueger refer to the existence of 
monopsony in labour markets to explain the disagreement with textbook economic expectations, 
Card and Krueger, Myth and Measurement  at 269-83. In this they follow Richard Allen Lester, 
Economics of Labor (New York: Macmillan, 1964) at 280-1, 510-8 Another explanation is that firms 
are not usually as productive as they should be, and a minimum wage will shock them into greater 
productivity. However, this effect is only likely to be short-term, since the effects will be felt upon 
the introduction of the policy but not later on. I will focus on the expected long-term effects 
according to economic theory, which I do not think Card et. al. have adequately dismissed.  
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price of goods at a high level and earn super-profits. This would only be possible where 
companies have monopoly or cartel power over pricing, or where there are limits on 
entry to rival firms. Most industries, however, are competitive, and so there will be no 
windfall to redirect towards employees.682 This leads to a second idealised response, 
one which is also of benefit to workers. Here, the increased labour costs are passed on 
in the price of the company’s products. However, this price increase is likely to make 
any given member of society worse off, with no regard for the fortune of those who are 
affected. This means that the worst-off will be affected, meaning that some of the 
advantage they receive in higher wages will be lost when they pay higher prices. 
The third ideal-type response is for the company to use more or better technology in 
order to improve productivity and reduce its labour force. This will enable producers to 
provide the same product or service as before for a lower labour cost, though a higher 
technology cost. Production will be more expensive than the non-minimum-wage 
regime, and the increased costs will be passed on to consumers. However, the 
technology will be chosen as it is cheaper than the employees, and so the price rise will 
be less than in the second response. Companies who are unable to pass on the 
additional costs to their consumers or improve their productivity will simply go out of 
business. The fourth possibility is therefore that some products and services will no 
longer be viable where there is a minimum wage.683 Consumers will have no access to 
such products, and production and consumption will shift elsewhere. The third and 
fourth responses will increase unemployment. This is because they will increase the 
proportion of spending in the economy on industries with greater use of technology 
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 In those firms that are not subject to competition, or who gain from rent windfalls of this kind, 
other actors will have had a strong incentive to attempt to get a piece of the pie. This will include the 
government and workers. Workers will have had a strong incentive to organise into a trade union in 
order to obtain some of the surplus anyway. Ideally, though, in industries with a tendency towards 
monopoly—such as large infrastructure—the government should regulate prices or offer franchises 
to run the infrastructure in order to avoid monopoly pricing. 
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 As I have indicated, alternative theoretical ideal-type responses to a minimum wage are 
considered in Card and Krueger, Myth and Measurement  at Ch 11. I remain unconvinced that these 
alternative effects would last into the long term.  
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rather than labour. They will also make consumers worse off, as they may find their 
preferred products become more expensive or even unavailable.  
The above examples are ideal-types. The first and last responses are unlikely to occur, 
and it is unlikely that a firm would respond with only one of the second and third 
responses. The introduction of a minimum wage is therefore most likely to cause a 
mixture of increased unemployment and increased prices to consumers.684  
Having described the possible responses that firms will take to the introduction or 
increase of the minimum wage, I will now consider the effects on low-earners. Some 
individuals would have earned just below the minimum wage, and they directly benefit 
from the policy as their wages will be increased accordingly. Furthermore, those slightly 
higher up the wage structure will find themselves in a better bargaining position as 
they can threaten to leave for other jobs that now pay a higher rate than otherwise – 
i.e. the minimum wage.685 So some low-paid workers will be better off; they earn an 
increased hourly wage.686 However, some low-paid workers may find themselves worse 
off. They may lose their jobs upon the introduction of, or increase in, the minimum 
wage and then find themselves unemployable thereafter. A dilemma then appears; set 
the minimum higher and increase wages but also involuntary unemployment, or, set 
the minimum lower and increase wages less but avoid causing as much unemployment. 
Insurers would be very concerned about the downsides of whatever minimum wage 
level they chose.687 
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 For some evidence of increases in prices as a result of minimum wage changes, see Ibid.  at 51-6, 
390, Jonathan Wadsworth, 'Did the National Minimum Wage Affect Uk Prices?', Fiscal Studies, 31/1 
(2010), 81-120 at 106-7. For considerations regarding who pays for the price rise, see Wadsworth, 
'Did the National Minimum Wage Affect Uk Prices?',   at 92. 
685
 Of course, if the minimum wage policy increases unemployment, then this bargaining position is 
simultaneously undermined due to the reduction in available alternative jobs. 
686
 Which they could use to increase their consumption, or to work less and increase their leisure. 
687
 For a selection of writing criticising the minimum wage along these lines see Stigler, 'The 
Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation', Phelps, Rewarding Work  at 146-7, Shaviro, 'The 
Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy',   at 433-4, T. M. 
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There may be some economic benefits to the minimum wage, for example if some 
people are tempted to seek work at the minimum level who would not have worked at 
the sub-minimum price.688 However, this advantage would apply just as much to other 
earnings subsidy schemes such as the one I have proposed. Indeed, earnings subsidy 
schemes such as the negative hourly tax should be much better than the minimum 
wage with regard to labour participation.689 Another possible advantage would occur if 
some of the workers made better-off were to reduce their hours, since this may open 
opportunities for others. This would reduce slightly the worry about unemployment, 
though I doubt the effect would be very helpful given the likely scale of increased 
unemployment.  
As I have said, it is difficult to be sure what the economic effects of the minimum wage 
would be, but it seems very likely that if it is effective in raising wages, then it will also 
increase prices. The increased prices are equally as likely to apply to those with good 
and bad market luck. Since the costs of the minimum wage come more through higher 
prices than increased public revenue, this does give it one relative advantage over 
more expensive alternatives. It is effectively a tax on consumers and so does not 
require as much of an increase in tax revenues, where these revenues would also have 
potential economic effects on productivity and prices. 
The reduced tax cost may tip the balance towards the minimum wage where it is 
difficult or impossible to raise the required tax revenues. In this sense, the choice here 
                                                                                                                                                            
Wilkinson, 'The Ethics and Economics of the Minimum Wage', Economics and Philosophy, 20/02 
(2004), 351-74 at 359-60. 
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 More technically, it lowers PTR rates. 
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 Brewer, Saez, and Shephard, 'Means-Testing and Tax Rates on Earnings',  at 118, Saez, 'Optimal 
Income Transfer Programs'. As a result of this increased participation, and the inability of 
governments to determine earning ability, negative income taxes of the kind implied by earnings 
subsidies can even be optimal on a utility-focused optimal taxation analysis (described in footnote 
4); see Saez, 'Optimal Income Transfer Programs',   at 1054, Choné and Laroque, 'Optimal Incentives 
for Labor Force Participation',   at 409-11, Philippe Choné and Guy Laroque, 'Negative Marginal Tax 
Rates and Heterogeneity', American Economic Review, 100/5 (2010), 2532-47, Paul Beaudry, Charles 
Blackorby, and Dezsö Szalay, 'Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs', 
The American Economic Review, 99/1 (2009), 216-42 at 239. 
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depends upon the findings of the following chapter on the scope for taxing the 
fortunate. However, it is well to remember that the increased unemployment that is 
likely to follow from the introduction of a minimum wage will require tax revenue. The 
additional unemployed would be a further drain on the unemployment schemes. The 
prospect of providing generous unemployment compensation would be reduced, since 
there would be a greater number of claimants. As well as the direct and indirect costs, 
insurers would also fear that they will be more likely to suffer the effects of long-term 
unemployment.  
A further problem with the minimum wage is that it is not very well targeted at the 
economically unlucky.690 Some of the beneficiaries will be those who are temporarily in 
low-paid work but who will earn a large amount over their lifetimes. After all, it applies 
to the worker’s contract, though that worker may also have the benefit of a very 
wealthy family or have a very high wage at another point in life. The negative hourly 
lifetime average tax, on the other hand, will focus benefits on those who have a 
consistently low average. This will further reduce the cost of the scheme when 
compared to the increased living costs for low-earners caused by the minimum wage.  
The headline is that the minimum wage is likely to be ineffective—or possibly even 
harmful—to the economically less fortunate.691 Some will find it harder to get work as a 
result of the policy, with potential costs to their mental well-being as well as the direct 
cost to taxpayers. Furthermore, both the fortunate and less fortunate will face higher 
prices as a result of the policy. Insurers would therefore only prefer the minimum wage 
to the negative hourly tax policy if it were very difficult to raise the required revenue, 
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 Stigler, 'The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation',   at 362-5. 
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 Some further problems arise as a result of international considerations that I am abstracting from 
in this work. The first is that in a global economy, a minimum wage may reduce international export 
competitiveness with corresponding effects on trade balance and economic performance. Second, 
some firms and workers may conspire to evade the minimum wage, particularly illegal immigrants—
who are in a worse bargaining position due to their lack of rights. The use of illegal labour of this 
kind will increase unemployment for the worst-off, while not improving the wages of anyone. 
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an issue I will discuss in the following chapter, and which we can assume to be possible 
at this stage.  
6.9 Limited earnings subsidies  
I will now consider alternative earnings subsidy policies to the one I presented in 
section 6.2.692 Limited earnings subsidies have been introduced in several countries, 
and I will describe these below. What the policy aims to do in general is to direct 
government-funded subsidy to those who are working but who have a low income.693 
These subsidies can either be paid directly to employers employing low-earners—with 
the assumption that it will be passed on to the workers—or through the tax system in 
the form of a ‘tax credit.’ In this section I will discuss the current wage subsidies in the 
UK and USA. In section 6.10 I will describe Phelps’ more comprehensive wage-subsidy 
proposal. I will argue that these two policies would be less attractive to insurers than 
the negative hourly-averaging approach. 
Many countries currently have limited earnings subsidy schemes, calculated on the 
basis of earnings. These involve “tax-credits”, and I refer to them as limited as they 
have numerous restrictions, taking account of family composition, and possibly 
requiring a certain amount of hours worked. However, unlike the negative-hourly-
averaging proposal these are not directly calculated on an hourly basis. I will explain 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) from the USA and the Working Tax Credit (WTC) in 
the UK as examples of limited schemes. These schemes are administered by their 
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 It is of course possible to have both a minimum wage and earnings subsidy in place at once, as is 
currently the case in many countries including the UK and USA. Indeed, I proposed a minimum wage 
for some types of job in footnote 624. However, since any minimum wage for the vast majority of 
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of hourly subsidies. 
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 These are related to, though distinct from, hiring subsidies. Hiring subsidies are designed to 
combat unemployment by providing payments to firms who increase their employment of low-wage 
workers. This is therefore a temporary incentive, which does not do much to improve the income of 
low-earners, see Alstott, 'Work Vs. Freedom',   at 1029-38. 
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respective tax authorities.694 They are primarily intended to incentivise work given the 
parallel attempts to combat poverty among families by providing benefits. As a result, 
these policies were previously focused on those with children and dependent adults. 
This requirement was later relaxed potentially to include all 25 to 65 year olds in both 
countries. This relaxing accompanied the creation of additional Child Tax Credits, 
though the split credits are still administratively integrated.  
The qualifying conditions are extensive and thresholds regularly change,695 and so I will 
discuss the policies in broad terms. The WTC requires claimants to work a certain 
number of hours per-week,696 in addition to the earning requirements. The EITC, by 
contrast, takes no account of hours worked and is calculated based upon the amount 
of income that the claimant has received from sources that indicate that they have 
worked for it.697 The effect of the tax credits is to top up the income of those who 
qualify for them, at a rate based on income. Both the WTC and EITC have a plateau 
level and then a phase-out stage (or tapered reduction) of the subsidy in order to 
reduce threshold effects.698 In addition, the EITC has a phase-in stage, so that people 
have an incentive to earn more money up to that point in order to gain a larger 
subsidy.  
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 HMRC in the UK and the IRS in the USA. The current UK coalition government plans to roll the 
Working Tax Credit into its new “Universal Credit,” which will be administered entirely by the 
department of work and pensions. The description of these schemes is taken from the HMRC and 
IRS websites, and refers to the rules in Spring 2012 unless otherwise indicated. For a description of 
the history and nature of the EITC see V. Joseph Hotz and John Karl Scholz, 'The Earned Income Tax 
Credit', in Robert a Moffitt (ed.), Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), 141-97 at 143-55. 
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 As I mentioned the previous footnote, the current UK government plans to subsume the credits 
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 In 2012 this was 16 hours for single parents, 24 hours for couples with children, and 30 hours for 
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for couples and those with disabilities.  
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 That is: wages, salaries, tips; Union strike benefits; certain disability benefits received before 
minimum retirement age; and/or Net earnings from self-employment. 
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 Put differently, excessive METR or PTR rates as a result of subsidy changes will make it much less 
attractive for workers to work any additional hours once they reach the threshold point. 
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I will begin by considering advantages for the limited subsidy schemes. The main 
advantage seems to be that it does not require the tax authority to take account of the 
number of hours worked by each claimant. This advantage applies with regard to the 
EITC, though less so with the WTC which does have hour requirements. Nevertheless, 
since people have to claim the tax credits the onus is upon them to prove their hours 
worked, albeit through a signed confirmation by their employer. This may also be 
subject to fraud, but it would appear that the authorities would have a much smaller 
number of claimants to assess than the universal hour-credit approach. With a lifetime 
hourly averaging approach it is necessary to record the income and hour-credits for all 
citizens, even those with high earnings, in case they might have a reduced average in 
the future. The hour-credit scheme can therefore be expected to be much more 
expensive to administer than the limited subsidies. Other than this, however, the 
limited schemes seem to offer no further advantages to insurers—apart from its likely 
preferability to leisure-lovers. Nevertheless, insurers would need the hour-credit 
approach to have many advantages over the limited scheme in order to overcome 
losses to the scheme through this extra expense. 
The first disadvantage of the limited subsidies is that they produce threshold effects. A 
problem for both the basic income and minimum wage approaches is that it is 
necessary to set a single threshold, where there are reasons to make it higher (to 
provide more to the unfortunate) along with strong reasons to make it lower (to 
reduce costs and economic disincentives). The analogous issue for earnings subsidies is 
where to set the break-even point at which workers receive no subsidy, and how strong 
to make the subsidy below that point. However, because the subsidy is tapered, the 
decision is much less fraught than it is for the previous policies. Despite this lack of a 
single-threshold-setting dilemma, however, the limited earnings subsidies that are 
currently in force produce unwanted economic incentives because of the way in which 
they are calculated.  
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Negative-hourly-averaging subsidises on an hourly-basis, based upon the hourly-
average-rate for the worker. However, the EITC bases its calculation on the income that 
people receive from earned sources. This gives higher-paid workers who have an 
interest in greater leisure an incentive to work part-time instead of full-time in order to 
qualify for the subsidy.699 This transfer to part-time high-earners increases the cost of 
the scheme to taxpayers, while also reducing the amount of taxes, goods and services 
provided by those workers. This problem is not shared by hourly-averaging, where the 
subsidy depends upon the number of hours worked and is applied to those with a low 
average.700 
The WTC avoids this problem, to a degree, by imposing a work requirement of a certain 
number of hours per-week.701 This will stop the most extreme losses—for example 
from high earning self-employed workers working reduced hours. However, the WTC 
introduces an alternative threshold effect. Workers will have an incentive to work the 
required number of hours, but less incentive to work more hours than this. This again 
incentivises certain behaviour that employers and employees may not have otherwise 
have chosen, with any additional costs likely to be passed on to consumers. 
Furthermore, some people may struggle to find a job with exactly the number of hours 
required in order to qualify for the subsidy.702 So while the addition of an hour-
requirement has virtuous elements, it also adds another threshold effect. As I 
mentioned above, the hour-requirement also reduces the administrative advantage of 
limited subsidies over hourly averaging.  
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 More technically, by potentially subsidising high paid part-time work, it creates very high METR 
rates for full-time employment for such workers. 
700
 Alstott points out an additional worry about the EITC, which is that people have an incentive to 
claim that they have received more income than they have, as it will increase their subsidy. Her 
concern is that tax authorities administering the payments have experience in uncovering 
underreporting of income (in order to reduce tax bills) but not of over-reporting, Anne L. Alstott, 
'The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform', Harvard Law 
Review, 108/3 (1995), 533-92 at 586. 
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 The amount of hours required is varied according to relationship and family status. 
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 Particularly during economic downturns and in economically depressed regions 
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The limited subsidy policies have the further disadvantage that they can fail to provide 
subsidies to those with bad market luck. I have mentioned that it will not directly help 
those who still cannot find work despite the subsidy, or not enough hours to meet any 
hour requirements. In addition, since it focuses on overall earnings in each period it 
may exclude those who have low hourly earnings but who work very long hours in 
order to provide themselves a reasonable income. Some such individuals may decide to 
reduce their hours in order to qualify for the scheme and the greater leisure time it 
might allow them. However, others might have a strong preference for work and these 
low-earners will not be helped by the limited scheme. To include those who work long 
hours at low wages, it would be necessary to raise the pay-out threshold. This would 
then enlarge both the cost of the scheme and—more importantly—the problematic 
economic disincentives described above. The hour-credit scheme avoids these 
problems by calculating the subsidy on an hourly-basis.  
One final concern that insurers would have regarding earnings subsidies is how 
effective their administration would be, and the limited subsidies currently in operation 
have administrative problems. It is necessary for claimants to apply for the benefit, and 
to renew it periodically,703 which is bureaucratically difficult. Furthermore, people have 
to know about the policy and that they may be eligible to benefit from it. As a result of 
these barriers, many people who are worthy recipients miss out on the subsidy. An 
additional worry is that the barriers may well have the perverse result that while some 
of the unfortunate might miss out, those who are less unfortunate yet eligible are more 
able to make use of this scheme. The administration of the scheme is therefore 
expensive yet still fails to help many intended recipients.  
Insurers would strongly prefer hourly-averaging, given that it would be less likely that 
they would fail to obtain assistance if they were less fortunate. Insurers would also 
prefer hourly-averaging on economic grounds, as it does not have any of the economic 
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disincentive problems and threshold effects that I have highlighted for the limited 
subsidy schemes. 
6.10 Phelps’ wage-subsidy proposal 
Economist Edmund Phelps has proposed a more comprehensive wage subsidy scheme, 
which is therefore closer to my own proposal than the limited subsidies.704 Phelps sees 
the cause of many social problems as arising from the reduction in pay for—and loss 
of—low-paid work in US cities.705 This, according to Phelps, has resulted in the decline 
of urban areas, poverty, irresponsible parenting and criminality in the inner cities.706 
Phelps argues that the pre-existing policies of welfare payments, unemployment 
benefits and the minimum wage promote welfare dependency and do not help these 
communities.707 Phelps sees the solution as being the return to relatively high incomes 
for low-paid labour, so that the traditional breadwinning-male family will return. Phelps 
therefore presents an economically-informed conservative argument for wage 
subsidies, an argument which is not compatible with the starting assumptions set out in 
section 1.1. However, his proposed policy is worth considering as an alternative to the 
hour-credit approach.  
Phelps proposes that companies should be paid money from the government for 
employing low-waged workers. Firms would get a $3-an-hour subsidy for a $4-an-hour 
employee, with the subsidy gradually being reduced until it is phased out at around 
$12-an-hour.708 According to economic theory, firms would then have a much greater 
incentive to employ low-paid workers than they currently do, and they would have to 
pass on the subsidy to the employees in wages. The minimum wage level for the 
lowest-earners could then be substantially dropped, as the government would make up 
the shortfall. Phelps “guesstimates” that the policy would cost a hefty $125bn in 1997, 
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roughly 1.75% of US GDP.709 Phelps restricts his subsidy to those employed in full-time 
work of 35 hours a week or more.710 This is because Phelps’ focus is on the 
conservative aim of economic self-sufficiency through work,711 though I will consider 
whether this feature would be attractive to insurers.  
I will now highlight the differences between the Phelps plan and the hour-credit 
scheme to gauge whether it offers any advantages. One difference between the 
schemes is that the Phelps plan pays employers who will then pass on the subsidy to 
their workers, while the hour-credit plan will directly enlarge the pay packet of the 
worker. The argument in favour of the former is presumably that it is cheaper and 
easier administratively, an issue I will discuss later in this section. However, there is a 
downside to wage subsidies. This comes from the worry that firms who employ low-
earners will obtain a windfall if they can avoid passing on the wage subsidy to their 
workers in higher pay.712 Economic theory may predict that prices will recalibrate, but 
this process does not always happen as smoothly in reality as it does in theory, and 
firms might take advantage of this. In the short term the employers might get a 
windfall until the new prices sort themselves out. While any windfall would only be 
temporary, it is a downside of the Phelps scheme that any temporary windfalls that do 
occur would go to company shareholders rather than low-earners. Insurers would 
therefore have a preference—ceteris paribus—for earnings subsidies paid through the 
tax system rather than wage subsidies paid to employers. 
A second difference is that the Phelps plan supports the wages of low-paid workers. 
These low-paid workers may be high-paid workers at another point in time, or have a 
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share in larger family wealth. These factors can be taken account of by a lifetime-
hourly-averaging scheme but not by a wage subsidy scheme. In this way, the Phelps 
plan is less targeted at the unlucky, meaning that more resources are spent on those 
who are less likely to be in a position that insurers would be particularly concerned to 
improve. Insurers would prefer a more targeted scheme that would channel more 
resources towards their less fortunate possible selves.713 
The third clear difference between the schemes is that Phelps would restrict his subsidy 
to those working in full-time employment. This produces a large incentive for workers 
to take full-time work even if they would prefer to work fewer hours.714 Phelps’ 
arguments here rest on his paternalistic and conservative assumptions, which do not 
apply to the hypothetical insurance approach taken here. Insurers would not want to 
restrict low-hourly-wage subsidies to those who work full-time, since part-time workers 
are at least as likely to be less fortunate. Hypothetical insurers would wish to ensure 
that they receive help even if they prefer to work part-time.715 Some people with bad 
market luck may also have disabilities or caring responsibilities that would make it 
difficult or impossible for them to work full-time. Phelps focuses on making low-paid 
work more attractive for inner city men, enabling a return to the nuclear family and 
reducing social problems. However, insurers will be concerned that they will have 
caring responsibilities or some other misfortune that would make full-time work 
unmanageable.  
Both the Phelps and hourly-averaging schemes require firms to inform the authorities 
of the number of hours worked or contracted for each of their employees. This is an 
additional cost for both schemes, and in both cases opens an additional avenue for 
fraud. Firms may attempt to collude with employees to overstate the number of hours 
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they have worked in order to gain additional payments.716 It would be just as necessary 
to have systems in place to make such fraud difficult and costly under both schemes.717 
The only possible advantage for the Phelps plan in this regard it that it would only be 
necessary for the authorities to investigate those who claim to employ low-paid 
workers at any particular point in time. Hourly-averaging, however, would require the 
potential assessment of the hour-credits of all workers.  
The one advantage of Phelps’ proposal is its lower administrative costs. However, this 
would not outweigh the other issues for insurers. It is a less targeted scheme, as 
indicated in the second difference between schemes. Phelps’ scheme will also fail to 
support many less-fortunate people, and the subsidies for people who are fortunate 
overall will increase the cost of the scheme. Breaking this link between low-pay and 
overall fortune further limits the advantage gained in paying out via employers rather 
than the tax system; the tax authorities would have to liaise very intimately and 
expensively with employers to create personalised payments.  
6.11 Negative hourly taxation and leisure-lovers 
I will now briefly consider two challenges to the proposal I have favoured. The first is 
the set of criticisms of income subsidies by Alstott. While income subsidies are 
intended to improve the position of low earners, this policy of course has other effects. 
I will first explain the effects of earnings subsidies on prices in order to consider 
Alstott’s arguments that earnings subsidies create untargeted windfalls and cause 
displacement.718 The second criticism is the worry that the policy is unfair to leisure-
lovers. 
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Earnings subsidies are likely to raise some prices and lower others compared to a 
laissez-faire system. Where low-paid work is relatively more attractive workers have 
greater choice and power. As a result, it will be harder to convince workers to perform 
unattractive work. This will then increase costs for the products and services that 
require unattractive work. As with the minimum wage, we can assume that these costs 
will affect fortunate and less fortunate members of society equally—though work-
lovers will be more affected than leisure-lovers.719 For relatively more attractive low-
paid work, conversely, more workers will prefer this now-subsidised work to the better-
paid-but-less-enjoyable work that they would do otherwise. Increased demand for 
these jobs will reduce pay, and therefore some of the income subsidy will be passed on 
to consumers in the form of lower prices. These interferences with the market seem to 
me to be minor compared to the gains to low earners, and I take it that hypothetical 
insurers would feel the same. However, I will now defend the proposal against some 
further arguments against earnings subsidies.  
Another challenge based on this scenario is that earnings subsidies produce a windfall 
for those who are not really of concern to insurers, which we can refer to as 
“leakage.”720 Some high-ability people may have a strong preference for a particular 
kind of work, such that they will do this work as long as it provides for their basic 
needs. Earnings subsidies might therefore provide a windfall for these workers at 
taxpayer expense. Of course, resource-egalitarians would not have a problem in 
principle with any additional welfare obtained by these already fortunate individuals.721 
Nevertheless, such cases would be included in the costs of the scheme, but provide no 
help to those with bad market luck. If there were a large group of fortunate workers 
who are happy and motivated in low-paid jobs, then this expense might be difficult to 
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justify, though I imagine that the numbers affected would be small.722 Furthermore, 
this windfall effect also occurs with the minimum wage, which is the only real 
alternative to doing nothing at all.723 
A further argument against earnings subsidies presented by Alstott is that it will 
displace one set of workers for another, with little overall net gain.724 This is due to an 
inverse effect of that described above regarding the minimum wage. Minimum wages 
cause firms to spend more money on technology, generally operated by higher-paid 
workers, increasing unemployment for low-skilled workers. Wage subsidies would push 
firms the other way, making it more attractive to employ lots of workers to do work 
that could be done by fewer, more productive, workers. Alstott worries that wage 
subsidies would create more menial jobs, reducing the opportunities for employers to 
create and sustain more advanced roles that workers would prefer. However, the 
insurers would have to take account of the full effects, and this issue seems trivial 
compared to the problems with the alternatives of a minimum wage or doing nothing 
at all. The quality of the work is included in the price to the extent that workers have 
some power over jobs, and the earnings subsidy scheme combined with a guaranteed 
work programme would provide workers with a very good bargaining position. Firms 
who find it easier to hire may increase their workforce at the expense of technology, 
but that will serve to focus technological solutions in society on to those jobs that 
workers find less desirable. This seems like a fairly unproblematic result to me, and I do 
not think insurers would have much concern here.  
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I will now consider the second challenge to the hour-credit scheme: that it is unfair to 
leisure-lovers. Leisure-lovers will have very different policy preferences other people. 
They will tend to prefer basic income as this will give them the chance for a large 
amount of leisure whether they are economically fortunate—and work part-time—or 
are less fortunate and live off the basic income. It is this very preference of leisure-
lovers, however, that leads those with even a slight concern about their ability to 
purchase items for consumption beyond the basics to prefer any reasonable alternative 
to an unconditional basic income. Therefore, this preference of leisure-lovers will not 
outweigh the preferences of others. This raises two issues: first, whether leisure-lovers 
should be included in the scheme at all. As I argued in section 5.6, leisure-lovers do not 
envy their employed neighbours, and so have no hypothetical insurance claim against 
them. However, leisure-lovers appear in the hypothetical insurance scheme since less 
fortunate leisure-lovers will envy more-fortunate leisure-lovers.725  
The second issue is whether it is possible to reach any agreement at all from a 
hypothetical insurance perspective given the very different preferences of the insurers. 
Certainly, the prospect of agreement is complicated, but not impossible. The idea of 
the average policy is more difficult to specify where there are discrete policies on offer. 
However, as I described in the previous chapter,726 one policy choice may be more 
attractive than the others, and I have argued that negative-hourly-averaging with a 
guaranteed work policy is that policy. All would agree that all the policies considered in 
this chapter are superior to laissez-faire. Since the vast majority of people would have 
normal or work-loving preferences, the modal, mean and median average would all 
indicate a preference for the hourly-subsidy and guaranteed work policy. The presence 
of a substantial minority of leisure-lovers—and leisure-likers who would take the 
opportunity to enjoy leisure if they could also have a reasonable income—makes 
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unconditional income a less attractive option.727 This is because it would always be 
more expensive to improve the position of the less fortunate with this policy. Since 
leisure-lovers would choose my suggested policy over laissez-faire—in order to be able 
to afford more leisure should they turn out to be unfortunate—the leisure-lovers 
would agree to the scheme and therefore the average policy.728 I will extend this 
discussion of this issue when discussing leisure-lovers and tax policy in section 7.9.  
6.12 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have presented several policies designed to improve the position of the 
less economically fortunate members of society, and considered which hypothetical 
insurers would choose. Economic misfortune could result in low-wage work, 
involuntary unemployment, or interspersed periods of both. The general problem for 
hypothetical insurers is that attempts to improve the position of the unfortunate will 
usually have detrimental effects on the economy, and that the more that is done for 
low-earners the greater the costs. I have isolated a group—leisure-lovers—as 
particularly relevant to this calculation and explained with each policy how this group 
would react to the policy.  
To assist those who find themselves unable to get work, I proposed a guaranteed work 
programme, in which people can obtain an income if they undertake the work and 
training requirements set by their local jobcentre. I also proposed that those who 
undertake accredited courses should obtain subsidy through hour-credits, as should 
those who have onerous caring responsibilities that affect their ability to work full-
time. I have defended this policy from arguments that it either imposes too many or 
too few conditions on claimants. Imposing more conditions would make the least 
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fortunate much worse off with little gain to the more fortunate, a very bad insurance 
decision. Imposing weaker conditions would enable leisure-lovers to take advantage of 
the scheme, which would be very expensive, both in terms of direct costs and indirect 
economic costs affecting all members of society. 
In order to improve the position of those who have low-paid work, I proposed 
negative-hourly-averaging. I have shown that the hour-credit policy is attractive to 
insurers as it provides incentives to work. There is an incentive to engage in work, and 
while low-incomes are subsidised there is still an incentive for those in work to work 
longer.729 This is because hour-credits will always have a minimum value for their 
recipient. Negative-hourly-averaging is clearly superior to limited subsidies, as there are 
fewer restrictions and the hour-rates can be much more generous without producing 
the serious unwanted economic effects of limited subsidies. The advantage of negative-
hourly-averaging over Phelps’ proposal is that it raises the income of part-time low-
earners, and any short-term windfalls would go to low-earners rather than company 
shareholders. 
Indeed, while negative-hourly-averaging is the policy that is least likely to exclude the 
low-paid, it is also the most targeted at the less economically fortunate. Many point 
out that the minimum wage and earnings subsidies can benefit those from wealthy 
families, and those who will go on to earn large amounts later in life.730 Using lifetime 
averaging, those who benefit from a wealthy family731 or who previously had high 
earnings will not be eligible for the subsidy. Furthermore, those who receive the 
subsidy early in life but later in life become high-earner will have to pay a greater 
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amount of tax later in life as a result, decreasing the overall cost of the subsidy.732 By 
taking account of the most information, it will be possible to reduce leakage as much as 
is possible without knowledge of the true nature of the economic misfortunes that 
people have suffered or not.733  
Despite being the most expensive to taxpayers and potentially leading to some price 
increases, negative-hourly-averaging would provide by far the most comprehensive 
coverage without costing very much more than the alternatives. It should also have the 
least detrimental effect on the economy. It is therefore the most sensible insurance 
choice for hypothetical insurers, assuming that it can be funded. The collection of tax 
revenue is the focus of the next chapter.  
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 This is because the subsidy paid to them will always count as net income they have already 
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 A further advantage of hourly-averaging is that, as I have indicated in footnote 638, it is readily 
compatible with other forms of redistribution, for example for education, disability and carers. 
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  Chapter 7
Calculating Egalitarian Taxation 
In this chapter I will consider which taxation policies would be most attractive to 
hypothetical insurers. In the bulk of this chapter I will discuss the crucial matter of the 
tax-base. This refers to the basis on which to calculate an individual’s tax; so for 
example, a wage income tax-base would tax workers on the size of their pay packet. 
The first proposals I will consider—in sections 7.1 and 7.2—are to calculate taxation 
based on endowment, on wealth and interpersonal wealth transfers. None of these is 
attractive, nor would they be able to provide sufficient revenues to pay for the policies 
of the previous chapter. I therefore consider (7.3) a broad-based mix of several forms 
of taxation, such as we have at present. I argue that a comprehensive tax-base would 
be a more attractive choice for the insurers, and consider the options. I reject both the 
traditional ideal-types of tax base, accretion-income (7.4) and consumption taxation 
(7.5). I propose instead—in section 7.6—a hybrid approach I refer to as the acquired-
income tax-base.  
Towards the end of the chapter I complete my analysis of taxation from a hypothetical 
insurance perspective by considering the calculation of tax-rates. I advocate lifetime 
averaging—in section 7.7—and the use of hour-credits—in section 7.8—as a means to 
achieve greater progressivity and revenue gathering without compromising economic 
efficiency. In section 7.8 I also explain the limits on tax-rates and provide graphs of the 
progressive tax-rates that insurers would find attractive as a means to tax the 
fortunate. I end by rebutting some final challenges to my preferred policies in sections 
7.9 and 7.10.  
7.1 Endowment and wealth taxation  
I will begin by briefly discussing two tax-bases which will be unattractive to 
hypothetical insurers, endowment and wealth-based taxation. I rejected endowment 
taxation in section 3.9 as a direct response to bad market luck and talent inequality. 
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Nevertheless, the approach reappears on the agenda because it may still be the most 
attractive option available to hypothetical insurers. One attractive feature of 
endowment is that it could be taxed progressively and still be efficient. However, 
insurers would worry that they would be effectively forced to work in their most 
remunerative occupation whether or not they desire to. Or, where they would not be 
forced, those who turned out to have special talents would still have to pay a high price 
in work-choice or leisure-time in order to pay off their larger tax bills. The insurers 
would be happy to have taxation that taxed the more highly endowed at a higher rate if 
they utilise their endowment, as most forms of progressive taxation would. However, 
they would not choose to calculate taxes on the basis of endowment alone.  
A second base to consider is that of wealth.734 This would work by taxing the amount of 
wealth that a person holds at a given period in time, say, once a year.735 So those with 
more wealth could be charged more in tax, which would be progressive. This appears 
attractive because those with good fortune will often have greater access to wealth. 
The wealthy can invest their wealth to make further gains,736 and a wealth tax would 
interrupt this process without having too much effect on those with little market-luck 
who will earn and own little.  
Nevertheless, wealth is an unattractive tax-base. Firstly, it focuses on savers and 
ignores spenders. This means that someone with huge earnings who immediately 
spends what they earn will never pay any tax while someone with low earnings who is 
saving-up for something will pay tax. Saving levels could be independent of market 
luck, even though there will be a general tendency for the lucky to be more wealthy. In 
addition, given that the tax will not raise revenues from some of the fortunate—those 
who spend a lot—it is difficult to raise substantial tax revenues. This would be 
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exacerbated as a wealth tax would encourage spending and discourage saving, 
requiring ever higher tax-rates on an ever diminishing pool of savers. Furthermore, the 
disincentive to save may have detrimental economic consequences—for example the 
ownership of businesses would be unstable as those with highly valuable businesses 
would have to pay large taxes. This instability would result in inefficient business 
management. Business-owners may also render their businesses less efficient in order 
to reduce their wealth-tax liability or the enforced sale of their business.  
Hypothetical insurers would worry that their plans may require them to save up for 
something, where a wealth tax would make such a plan much harder irrespective of 
their social class or natural talents.737 A related problem is that it would interfere with 
the ability that people have to carry out plans that involve the transmission of wealth 
from one period into the next. This is because they may be forced to liquidate their 
assets in order to pay their tax bill.738 As an example, consider someone who enjoys 
tinkering with electronics and builds herself a robot. Other people think of profitable 
ways to employ this robot and its value shoots up accordingly. Similarly, imagine an art-
lover who buys a painting that she thinks would go particularly nicely in her house. The 
artist later becomes famous and dies and her old works become priceless. The robot-
owner and art-owner would have to pay tax on the increase in value of their items and 
would therefore have to sell the items that they consider an important part of their 
lives.  
The wealth tax is therefore unattractive as a sole tax, but would it be attractive as part 
of a multiple-tax package? I will consider broad-base taxation shortly, but I would think 
that hypothetical insurers would prefer not to include wealth taxes even in a broad-
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based system unless it was at a very low-rate.739 The purpose of this would be to build 
some progressivity into an otherwise regressive taxation system, where it is not 
possible to tax profits. This would work by taxing a very small proportion of wealth, 
which would correspond to the annual profit that someone would expect to earn from 
investing their wealth.740 However, the revenues from such a wealth-tax would be 
negligible.  
In conclusion, a wealth tax is not a very attractive option on its own. It may be 
considered necessary as part of a mix of taxes if it were deemed necessary to fill gaps in 
the other tax-bases, though only at very low-rates. Such a tax would be included in a 
broad-base, which I will consider shortly. Prior to the broad-base, however, I will 
consider taxes on inheritances and gifts.  
7.2 Wealth transfer taxes: Estate and Accession taxation  
The next tax-base for consideration is that of what is sometimes called a “death tax.” 
This is the tax on the value of the estate of those who have died, and so is properly 
called the estate tax. This tax-base is attractive as it is efficient for government and 
taxpayers; it falls at a time at which assets are assessed and valued for the purpose of 
inheritance. Furthermore, the deceased can be said to no longer need their assets to 
carry out their plans, though this would be controversial.741 Finally, since such transfers 
are a windfall to their recipients, and the wealth of family and loved ones is a matter of 
fortune, it would be an attractive form of tax for hypothetical insurers.742 However, the 
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estate tax has been described as a voluntary tax since it is very easy to avoid this tax;743 
for example, one could use one’s wealth to purchase an annuity744 and then give away 
the remaining wealth before death. The tax would therefore not provide much revenue 
to support the unlucky.745  
An alternative to estate taxation is to tax recipients on their cumulated lifetime gifts 
and bequests from others. This is called an accessions tax,746 and it would probably 
raise more revenue than an estate tax, since people could not gift resources in advance 
of death in order to avoid the tax.747 The accessions tax is perhaps harder to administer 
than estate taxation, since gifts take place irregularly over the course of the life of 
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individuals. Insurers may therefore have concerns that accessions taxes would be less 
convenient for them, though the additional progressivity in determining and taxing 
windfall fortune would no doubt sway them towards an accessions tax over estate 
taxation.748 Indeed, the strongest case for accessions taxation over estate taxation is 
that accessions taxes focus on the recipient while estate taxes focus on the donor. I 
assume that hypothetical insurers would prefer to tax recipients of gifted income in 
accordance with their level of fortune, rather than the fortune and preferences of 
donors.749  
Despite its likely ability to raise more revenue than an estate tax, an accession tax 
would still fail to provide enough taxation to support the redistributive programmes 
described in the previous chapter. After all, most people spend most of their resources 
on themselves rather than giving it to others, something that would be exacerbated if 
only this activity were taxed. Accessions taxes might be used—of course—as part of a 
broad based tax, which I will consider shortly. Furthermore, accession income would be 
included in a comprehensive income approach, which I will also consider.  
However, some have suggested that there should be no taxation on gifts and bequests 
of these forms.750 Such arguments are generally made by those who propose a 
comprehensive consumption tax, and I will consider the case for consumption taxes 
that exclude wealth transfers when I discuss this.751 However, it is worth considering 
now one argument against wealth transfer taxes found in the work of consumption tax 
supporters. This is that such taxation would have detrimental economic consequences 
because some people work longer and harder, and save more, in order to benefit their 
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loved ones. The higher the tax on interpersonal wealth transfers, the argument goes, 
the less people will work and save.752 Working and saving are beneficial to the general 
running of the economy, and so reducing the incentive to do these things would be bad 
for everyone.753  
One response to this is to point out that taxes have income effects, and so those who 
desire to benefit their loved ones by a chosen amount will have to work and save more. 
However, this is unlikely; people will generally desire to benefit their loved ones, but 
also desire other things as well. They may for example respond to this taxation by 
working as much as before, but spending more on themselves. Nevertheless, I doubt 
that the effect on work and saving would be that great, since people will still wish to 
benefit their loved ones. Hypothetical insurers will be happy to share the proceeds of 
the windfalls caused by such feelings, since they might be in the less fortunate majority 
of people who will not benefit from generous and wealthy loved ones. They would 
worry about the effect such transfers would have on their opportunities and access to 
positional goods. Furthermore, to the extent that people would give less away in 
proportion to the degree of wealth-transfer taxation, they might nevertheless work as 
much but spend more on themselves. Insurers would worry that highly talented people 
would have less incentive to work if it was harder for them to benefit loved ones, but it 
seems that enough talented people would work for other incentives that the effect of 
wealth-transfer taxation would not be so great as to overwhelm the reasons to tax such 
windfall transfers. 
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Regarding the worry that wealth-transfer taxes reduce savings for investment, it is 
worth emphasising that people save for other reasons than to gift money—for example 
to shift money across their life-cycle754—which would provide some investment funds. 
Nonetheless, if such taxation were considered to have a damaging effect on savings, 
the government could divert tax revenues to the creation of a sovereign wealth fund 
which would provide investment.755 This solution would be much more attractive to 
insurers, who would be concerned about their relative position while still desiring 
economic investment.  
In conclusion, wealth-transfer tax-bases alone would be unattractive to insurers 
because they cannot raise large amounts of revenue. However, it would appear that 
they—or a substitute for them—will have an important role to play, given that the 
arguments against them would not convince hypothetical insurers. I will now consider 
tax packages that will have the ability to raise the sorts of revenue that would be 
desired by hypothetical insurers.  
7.3 Broad-based taxation 
The broad tax-base is the one with which we are familiar. This a tax system in which 
there are lots of different types of taxes on lots of different things, usually at fairly low 
rates. In the UK at present there is a wage tax, corporation tax, VAT, capital gains tax, 
estate tax, National Insurance, and so on. This is the approach taken by pretty much all 
countries around the world, for clear practical reasons. It is a very effective way of 
raising revenue without too much administrative expense. Nor does the tax interfere 
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hugely with people’s decisions. It also has limited ill-effects on the economy, producing 
little in the way of economic distortion as long as the rates remain low.756  
However, the low tax-rates that accompany the broad-based tax are problematic for 
hypothetical insurers. It is not possible to introduce a high degree of progressivity into 
the system for several reasons. Since it contains elements of consumption, wealth, and 
income taxes, increasing the tax rates will have extreme effects on some people, as 
well as on economic behaviour generally, and hypothetical insurers would worry that 
they would suffer from these effects. Secondly, it is often possible for high earners to 
organise their affairs through clever accounting in order to minimise their tax exposure 
under a broad-based system. Typical examples are the shifting of personal income to 
business or capital-gain income through the creation of a business or payment in 
shares, the receipt of perks,757 or by postponing income until retirement.758  
Hypothetical insurers would also worry that the broad-based taxes will fall 
disproportionately heavily on them should they turn out not to be among the 
fortunate. As there are many types of taxation, almost everyone will get caught in the 
web, and usually over and over again. Thus, while high-earners can often find ways to 
reduce their tax bills, low and middle earners will find that they have little recourse to 
such activities and that they will contribute greatly to the public revenue. While this 
does mean that there are plenty of resources available to government, the general 
approach does not tax the highly fortunate at higher rates than the less fortunate.  
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This lack of focus on the more economically fortunate is exacerbated because the 
multiple taxes, even if somewhat progressive, are calculated independently of one 
another. As a result, someone who is fortunate in one area—say in their family 
background—will pay as much tax as others who are fortunate in that area. However, 
another person may be fortunate in lots of ways, also being highly talented and skilled. 
While this person may pay more in other taxes, this will be limited due to the limited 
progressivity of each separate tax. Hypothetical insurers would be reluctant to set tax-
rates on the separate bases sufficiently progressively to tax the multiply-fortunate 
person at a high rate. Such rates would fall then very heavily on those who are 
fortunate in only one area and not others, meaning that it will not fall as effectively 
upon the most fortunate. It would also interfere with the running of the economy as it 
would create incentives of different kinds for different people to change their 
behaviour. 
In conclusion, the broad tax-base is good at raising tax revenue, but only up to a certain 
point, which might not provide very much to fund the programmes described in the 
previous chapter. Attempts to raise more revenue than this will usually hit the majority 
of earners more and the economically lucky less, along with producing detrimental 
effects on the economy. Insurers would then face an unattractive choice between 
raising more revenue for redistribution at the expense of those who are not particularly 
lucky, or not to do so. If there were no alternative, insurers would prefer a broad based 
tax system that would tax gifted income and wage income at a progressive rate, and in 
which sales and VAT-style taxes played a minimal role.759  
Due to the limitations of the broad-based approach, I will consider the idea of 
comprehensive personal taxation; taxes that attribute gains to the person. These are 
more attractive than broad-based taxes to the extent that they can more accurately 
                                                        
759
 Since these fall on low earners particular hard, given that the taxes are proportional, and that low 
earners generally have no choice but to spend a large proportion of their income on necessaries. 
280 
 
differentiate the more fortunate from the less fortunate and apportion tax accordingly. 
Furthermore, being comprehensive, they should not cause the sorts of accountant-led-
shifting and economic behaviour distortions that the broad-based tax encourages.  
7.4 Comprehensive income tax  
I will now discuss attempts to focus taxation more comprehensively on each person. 
The original proposal of this kind was the comprehensive income tax, also known as the 
Schanz-Haig-Simons (S-H-S) approach after three prominent proponents.760 The tax is 
also known as the accretion tax, as it taxes the accretion in wealth during the period. To 
calculate someone’s income for a year, we would add the money he has spent to the 
increase in his wealth in the period.761 The thinking is that the person will either use 
their income on personal expenditure or it will increase their overall wealth. This has 
been taken to be an ideal tax-base because it accurately reflects the use of, and 
increase in, economic power that the taxpayer has obtained during the year. It tracks 
the gain during the period. There is no way for a taxpayer to shift resources in order to 
avoid the tax,762 and so it has the potential to be very progressive without interfering 
too much with economic incentives. This means that it will effectively indicate the 
fortunate and less fortunate and enables transfers to take place from one to the other.  
Unfortunately, the accretion approach is not very practical. It—technically—requires 
the government to know exactly what each person spends each year, and exactly what 
their wealth was worth then and now. The government would need to value everything 
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 Robert M. Haig, 'The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects', in Richard A. Musgrave 
and Carl S. Shoup (eds.), Readings in the Economics of Taxation (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, for the 
American Economic Association, 1959), Simons, Personal Income Taxation : The Definition of Income 
as a Problem of Fiscal Policy  at 49. The approach is traced back to Schanz by Richard Goode, 'The 
Economic Definition of Income', in Joseph A. Pechman (ed.), Comprehensive Income Taxation 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1977), 1-30 at 7-8. His reference is to Georg Von Schanz, 'Der 
Einkommensbegriff Und Die Einkommensteuergesetze', Finanzarchiv, 13 (1896), 1–87. For a 
(slightly) more recent discussion of the ideal see Joseph A. Pechman (Ed.), Comprehensive Income 
Taxation (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1977). 
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 This ‘increase’ could of course be negative if people divest their savings or investments to fund 
consumption. 
762
 Apart from destroying resources, which would be a self-defeating strategy to reduce one’s tax 
bill. 
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every year, an operation that would be expensive and impractical.763 Hypothetical 
insurers would have another serious concern. Taxing accretion in the value of property 
will effectively install a wealth tax on gains in so-called paper-value.764 Insurers would 
therefore fear that they might not have the liquid resources to pay tax on increases in 
their wealth, which would result in their having to prematurely sell items they own.765 
This might make it more difficult for them to make and enact their plans. So, assume 
that someone has built a cottage on some land that is later found to contain a lot of 
gold. The owner would be forced to sell their cottage to pay their tax bill on the gold 
they initially knew nothing about. It therefore shares problems with the wealth tax. 
This also affects our business owner, robot builder and art lover,766 each of whom 
would find it hard to live out their life according to their choices, a risk that insurers 
would not wish to take.  
For these reasons, consumption taxation is now a more popular choice for advocates of 
comprehensive personal taxation.767 I will therefore consider this tax-base next.  
7.5 Consumption tax 
An alternative comprehensive approach is therefore to ignore the wealth side entirely 
and focus only on the market value of each person’s consumption.768 So if I earn 
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 Andrews, 'A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax',   at 1141-3. Indeed, a 
proponent of the approach appears to support a realization-based approach rather than an 
accretion-based one, Simons, Personal Income Taxation : The Definition of Income as a Problem of 
Fiscal Policy  at 212. 
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 Indeed, the accretion approach is referred to as a wealth tax in Jeff Strnad, 'Periodicity and 
Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation', The Yale Law Journal, 99/8 (1990), 1817-911 at 
1832. 
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 Andrews, 'A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax',   at 1143. 
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 Described in section 7.1. 
767
 Some propose that the broad-base tax system should more closely resemble the consumption 
tax-base; J. E. Meade and IFS, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation : Report of a Committee 
[Set up by] the Institute for Fiscal Studies [and] Chaired by J.E. Meade (London: Allen and Unwin [for] 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1978), J.A. And King Kay, M.A., The British Tax System (London: Open 
University Press, 1990). Others argue for a complete move to consumption taxation, Edward J. 
McCaffery, Fair Not Flat: How to Make the Tax System Better and Simpler (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2002), Laurence Seidman, The Usa Tax: A Progressive Consumption Tax (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). 
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£100,000 in a year but save £50,000 and spend £50,000 then I would pay tax on the 
£50,000, the same as someone who earned £10,000 and spent £50,000. There are two 
approaches to the collection of consumption taxes. I will call the first point-of-sale as it 
requires retailers to collect the tax when items are bought by consumers, as with sales 
taxes and VAT-type taxes.769 The alternative approach is a cash-flow based tax system, 
which accounts for income from all sources but allows investors to deduct their 
investments from their taxable income. When the investments are cashed in, they 
count as taxable income at that later stage. The cash-flow approach is therefore 
somewhat like a deferred comprehensive income tax. I will consider each version of 
consumption taxation in turn before discussing the general problems with consumption 
taxation.  
A progressive point-of-sale tax system would be very unattractive. If people were 
required to report their spending at the end of each year it would be very labour 
intensive to check all receipts and to ensure that taxpayers have not failed to report all 
spending. For this reason, as well as one of convenience to taxpayers and general 
administrative feasibility, it would be better to withhold tax revenues at source. This 
would involve retailers charging an additional tax on each item they sell. This is 
straightforward where there is a proportionate tax rate, assuming retailers comply with 
the tax, but is much more difficult where progressive taxation is required. This would 
require retailers to know the tax-rate of each customer and add the correct amount of 
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 Support for consumption taxation has been traced back to Hobbes, Leviathan  at 386, Dudley 
Jackson, 'Thomas Hobbes' Theory of Taxation', Political Studies, 21/2 (1973), 175-82 at 180. 
However, whether Hobbes really meant what we now consider consumption taxation is 
controversial. We can be more certain that such prominent thinkers as J.S. Mill and John Rawls have 
endorsed consumption taxes; Mill, Principles of Political Economy: Books Iv and V  at 164 (Book V, Ch 
2, S4), Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition  at 246. The modern debates about consumption 
taxation were sparked by Nicholas Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955). More 
recent advocates have included Meade and IFS, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, Kay, 
The British Tax System, Seidman, The Usa Tax: A Progressive Consumption Tax, McCaffery, Fair Not 
Flat. 
769
 VAT is paid on each transfer. However, businesses who have purchased goods can claim VAT back 
on their expenses. The idea is that the businesses in the product chain each pays VAT only on their 
gains, though the final non-productive consumer of the product cannot claim anything back. 
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taxation accordingly. It might be possible with modern IT technology to develop a 
system by which to do this, though it would make purchase calculations much more 
difficult for consumers. This is because consumers would have to add their personal tax 
rate on to the advertised pre-tax cost of each item they are considering, making it 
inconvenient for taxpayers. Furthermore, it suffers from the general disadvantages of 
consumption taxation I will discuss after the alternative—cash-flow—approach.  
The cash-flow approach would measure the income that people receive from wages, 
investments, gifts and other gains, and tax the recipients on this income minus the 
amount that they invest in recognised investment vehicles.770 This approach would 
therefore ensure that high-earners could not recharacterize their income in order to 
avoid progressive rates, and also ensure that people who were lucky in multiple areas 
were taxed accordingly. However, the tax is only applied when people divest their 
investment, meaning that they can retain control over their gross income until they 
spend it. This is an important difference to which I will return when criticising the 
consumption approach. Before doing so, however it is worth considering its 
advantages.  
One obvious advantage of the consumption tax-base for insurers is that it would not 
interfere with the plans of our cottage owner, art lover and robot builder. It does not 
mimic wealth taxes in the way that the accretion-income approach does.771 The 
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 Andrews, 'A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax', Michael J. Graetz, 
'Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax', Harvard Law Review, 92/8 (1979), 1575-661. One 
practical issue is whether the tax-base is tax-inclusive or tax-exclusive, where it is often assumed 
that consumption taxes would be of the latter sort. Tax-exclusive calculations would effectively 
allow taxpayers to pay taxes out of their savings without it affecting their tax-liability, meaning that 
much more progressive rates would be required in order to achieve the same effective progressivity, 
Graetz, 'Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax',   at 1482-3. As such, in order to achieve the 
same progressivity as a tax-inclusive 98% rate, a tax-exclusive consumption tax would have to apply 
a rate of 4,900%.  
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 Supporters of luck egalitarianism and equality of resources will also find consumption taxes 
attractive as people can choose to save at the market rate without any interference from taxation; 
Rakowski, 'Transferring Wealth Liberally'. The market rate of returns to investment, after all, reflects 
the desires of others. However, it should be emphasised that the idea of equal opportunity costs 
includes the decisions of hypothetical insurers, and as such the tax-free returns to investment has no 
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consumption tax-base obtains this advantage by excluding wealth entirely from 
taxation, but I will argue that it goes too far in the other direction as it ignores returns 
to wealth. Another advantage claimed for consumption taxation is that it encourages 
saving and investment, an issue I discussed and dismissed in section 7.2. 
A question arises regarding the treatment of wealth transfers from one person to 
another—gifts and bequests—under a consumption tax-base. Most assume that 
consumption taxation would exclude such transfers from the tax-base as long as the 
recipient immediately invests the wealth upon receipt. I discussed this issue when 
discussing the desirability of taxes of wealth-transfer income, arguing that exempting 
gifts would not be attractive to hypothetical insurers. As an alternative, it would be 
possible to include such transfers in taxation by labelling them as a form of 
consumption by the donor.772 However, this would create a perverse hybrid-style tax 
which would take the worst from all proposals; particularly since the tax would fall on 
the donor rather than the recipient.773 This compromise would perhaps be attractive if 
it were not possible to find an attractive income-based approach, which I will consider 
in the following section. I will therefore focus here on the traditional wealth-transfer-
exclusive consumption tax.  
I will now consider the significant difference between consumption taxation and its 
rivals; its treatment of savings and investments.774 Consumption taxes would exempt 
                                                                                                                                                            
special moral status. In addition, arguments based on the equal position of savers and spenders 
depend upon the interpretation of the importance of market-rates, where it is unclear how to 
measure equal positions inter-personally and inter-temporally. Furthermore, the existence of infra-
marginal returns undermines the argument entirely anyway, see Barbara H. Fried, 'Fairness and the 
Consumption Tax', Stanford Law Review, 44/5 (1992), 961-1017 at 982-5, Deborah H. Schenk, 'Saving 
the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax', Tax Law Review, 53 (2000), 423-76 at 460. So while hypothetical 
insurers would want to ensure that they had the chance to save for the future without penalty if 
they desire to do so, they would not be concerned that people can get the same returns that they 
would under a laissez-faire system. This is because those with greater social and market luck will be 
in a better position to save in the first place, and are likely to make better use of their savings. 
772
 This is a further reason to prefer accessions-type to estate-type taxation. 
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 I argued that this was unattractive above, 274-5. 
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 Alvin C. Warren, Jr., 'Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax', 
Harvard Law Review, 88/5 (1975), 931-46 at 938-41. 
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savings from taxation until they are spent, which defers the tax—assuming the 
consumption tax rates are much more progressive than the income tax.775 However, 
those savings can be invested to obtain additional returns. The consumption tax-base 
has no way to differentiate the returns to savings of this kind from other forms of 
income that the less fortunate will have to work for. Essentially, the more fortunate can 
invest their good fortune and use it to receive more resources,776 but attempts to tax 
this will also fall upon some of the less fortunate.777 Two factors exacerbate this. The 
first is that investors can achieve infra-marginal returns—returns above that which 
would induce them to save.778 Hypothetical insurers would have a strong reason to 
want to tax gains from investments given that some of the gain will be a bonus to the 
saver. The second factor is that the more able and socially connected are likely to have 
greater success with their investments.  
Hypothetical insurers would prefer tax revenues to come from investment returns than 
other sources—consumption—which affect the less fortunate as well. The leisure-
loving fortunate779 would be able to convert their investment returns into leisure 
without incurring any additional taxation by spending the average amount. If the 
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 To be clear at this point, even though will I discuss these issues below, there are two reasons why 
consumption taxes need to have more progressive rates than those of income taxes in order to 
achieve the same outcome. The first is that the untaxed investments will in turn have gains which 
accrue to the owner. The second is that the calculation is presumably (though not necessarily) tax-
exclusive. That is to say that people can used untaxed investment revenue to pay their tax bills, 
which would not be possible under an income tax.  
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 Some have argued that the marginal return to risk-free investment is very low—around 0.5%. As 
a result of this, the fact that people can alter the risk-profile of their investments, and the fact that 
the government allows deductions from lost investments there is actually very little difference 
between consumption and income taxation Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, 'Is the Debate 
between an Income Tax and  a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?', Tax Law 
Review, 47/2 (1992), 377-406, William M. Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard, 'Distributional Implications 
of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax', Tax Policy and the Economy, 11 (1997), 1-47. If the 
difference between the tax-bases were that small, then the case for either tax-base over the other 
would be mitigated. However, I would suggest that hypothetical insurers would want to limit the 
extent to which governments subsidised investment losses in the up-front matter that is assumed in 
these calculations. Furthermore, Gentry and Hubbard compare flat-rate taxes, which are much more 
likely to be similar in nature between bases while the question here is how to introduce progressive 
taxation without undesirable side-effects on individuals and the functioning of the economy.  
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 Namely, those with a strong preference for work and consumption. 
778
 Fried, 'Fairness and the Consumption Tax',   at 982-5. 
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 As well as some of those closer to the statistically normal preferences. 
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consumption tax-base is to generate as much revenue as rival tax-bases it would have 
to tax at much higher rates. It would then tax those who are hard-working-but-less-
socially-and-market-lucky to a greater extent, in order to make up for the lower 
revenues from the more fortunate.780 In addition, the avoidance of work by the leisure-
loving fortunate would decrease the amount of work done in society, probably 
increasing prices and affecting the economy. 
A further worry regarding consumption taxes is their dynastic element.781 The gold 
owner will not have to pay any tax upon the find, but nor will their heirs if they inherit 
the gold. The wealth—if unspent—can therefore pass untouched from generation to 
generation, conferring advantages on each. One worry insurers may have is that the 
dynasts will have the better opportunities as a result of their greater—untaxed—
leisure. So for example, the dynasts would be able to improve their human capital—
developing new skills, doing unpaid internships—while others have to do productive 
work.782 As I emphasised in section 3.1, leisure is one form of advantage and 
consumption taxes may not tax this form of advantage. However, combining a 
consumption tax with the hourly-averaging system would mitigate this difference.783 
Another worry with regard to business-ownership dynasties is that they will be less 
efficient, as people will obtain great economic power without necessarily having any 
economic or investment skills. 
The consumption tax is more attractive than the accretion-base. It will interfere less 
with people’s ability to make and carry out plans. However, insurers would worry that 
progressive consumption taxation is inconvenient to taxpayers, and that it is less 
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 To add to the case against the alleged progressivity of consumption tax, see the following paper, 
which shows that inequality would be greater over time with a consumption tax that raised as much 
revenue as an income-based equivalent; Nigar Hashimzade and Gareth D. Myles, 'Inequality and the 
Choice of the Personal Tax Base', in Peter J. Lambert (ed.), Research on Economic Inequality, Volume 
15: Equity (Amsterdam: Elsevier JAI, 2007), 73 - 97. 
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 A further, minor, consideration might be that the wealthy dynasts would not spend their 
resources in the hope that they may find a way for their descendants to avoid taxation in the future.  
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 Our old friend “accumulated advantage” again, see page 116. 
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 I described this in section 6.2, and will discuss averaging again in sections 7.7-7.8. 
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progressive than income taxes. It will either raise less revenue for the programmes 
described in chapter six, or raise the same amount of revenue but tax less-fortunate 
consumption-lovers more heavily. I will therefore consider the possibility of a hybrid 
comprehensive tax.  
7.6 A refined comprehensive income tax-base: Acquired-income 
The comprehensive tax-bases considered in the previous two sections are ideal types 
or models and fortunately we are not faced with a choice between two problematic 
options. After all, ideals are irrelevant aside from their features. I will therefore 
propose a hybrid comprehensive tax-base which takes different elements from the 
consumption and income ideals.784 I will begin by reviewing the advantages of each 
extreme approach, after which I will provide a general outline of the hybrid acquired-
income base that will be most attractive to hypothetical insurers. I will finally run 
through some further cases to clarify whether they should be included or ignored for 
the purposes of taxation, or to clarify when it will be the most attractive time to apply 
taxation in the case.  
The advantage of comprehensive income is that it captures more revenue and sooner, 
and from the more attractive sources. However, undertaking an annual valuation 
exercise would be unattractive as it would be onerous on governments and taxpayers. 
Furthermore, as people would have their gains taxed before realising them it would 
become harder for people to carry out their plans without interference from taxation. 
The consumption tax-base does not suffer from this problem, since it taxes assets upon 
consumption.785 However, this feature is the one that undermines progressivity. We 
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 Some have suggested that the current system is a hybrid between the consumption and income 
ideals, Andrews, 'A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax',   at 1117, 20, Edward J. 
McCaffery, 'Tax Policy under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax', Texas Law Review, 70 (1992), 1145-
218. However, while this may be a more appropriate label in the US than other countries, I think 
they mean that the broad-based approach taken has both consumption-type and accretion-type 
elements. 
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can see that the timing issue is crucial. Both extremes appear problematic, and so I 
propose a hybrid approach.  
I propose that comprehensive personal taxation should be applied to the realized gains 
that people acquire.786 This would be done by installing a cash-flow tax that did not 
allow deductions for investments. I will call this proposal the acquired-income tax-base 
to distinguish it from the traditional accretion-income approach.787 On the acquired-
income approach, all incoming money and items of property would count as taxable 
based on their money value at the time of receipt—though with a small exemption I 
will mention below. Furthermore, when an individual realizes a gain on an investment 
or item of property, this gain would count as income.788 This is to count capital gains as 
part of the personal tax-base. The attractive feature here is that people would only pay 
tax on their gains when they sell the item and realise the gain. This means that the 
cottage owner would only have to pay tax on their gold when she sells her cottage, in 
contrast to the accretion approach whereby she would have to sell it earlier. This is an 
attractive compromise since insurers would want to tax people who have instances of 
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 McCaffery presents what he refers as pragmatic reasons for preferring a hybrid approach which 
has come about due to political compromises, McCaffery, 'Tax Policy under a Hybrid Income-
Consumption Tax',   at 1174-5. In contrast, I think that many of these compromises have come about 
for sensible reasons when looked at through the lens of this thesis. 
787
 An alternative name for the new approach would be to refer to it as a Newly-Acquired-Resources 
for Consumption (or NARC) tax-base. 
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 This one area of the proposal that may appear unattractive for practical reasons. It would be 
necessary to track the ownership of items of property that generally appreciate in value in order to 
ensure that gains are accurately captured. Ownership information is already kept by governments 
regarding ownership of land and motor vehicles, though for different reasons, and it should be 
possible to integrate these databases with the tax system. I do not think that this would be difficult 
with modern IT systems, and it would be possible to create further ‘asset registers’ for other items 
that tend to appreciate such as art works and jewellery. These asset registers should be reasonably 
self-policing since every seller would have an incentive to register the trade at a lower value and 
every purchaser would have an incentive to register the trade at a higher value; meaning that the 
true value will be recorded. The one exception to this would occur where people wished to gift 
items to others by selling them at a lower value, and it would be necessary for the authorities to 
trawl for such gifts. 
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fortune of this kind as long as it did not risk interfering with their plans. And why should 
it interfere with their plans to have a financial windfall taxed?789  
I should make clear how the tax-base should treat death and bequests. I propose that it 
would be most attractive to apply constructive realization.790 This would ensure that 
the gains are taxed and utilised to the benefit of the unlucky rather than simply the 
fortunate heirs. There would be no place for an estate tax as the gains to the 
beneficiaries would be included as taxable income for the receipt.791 In this way, wealth 
transfers will be effectively taxed—the gain to the previous owner and to the new 
owner—without interfering with anyone’s plans.792 In addition, this should be more 
economically efficient; business-builders will be able to keep control of their business 
while they are alive, while their—probably less able—heirs will not automatically 
assume control.793 
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 I emphasise that the windfall is financial here as this makes clear that hypothetical insurers would 
be interested in financial luck and less interested in other forms of luck. This explains some of the 
differences between the acquired and accretion-income approaches that I will go on to explicate. 
Many writers have assumed that what should be taxed is some form of psychic pleasure, since the 
early discussions about tax-bases, following Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest (New York: The 
Macmillian Company, 1930), reprinted in Irving Fisher, 'Income and Capital', in R. H. Parker and 
Geoffrey Colin Harcourt (eds.), Readings in the Concept and Measurement of Income (London: 
Cambridge U.P., 1969), 33-53 at 34-6. Hypothetical insurers would not choose to account for any 
such notion of inner, psychological, pleasure even if it were measurable, since it would be invasive 
and would potentially interfere with their non-hedonic-based plans. This matter would concern 
hypothetical insurers in one case, however, which is where business owners use their power over 
their business resources to directly benefit their own happiness rather than pursuing profit through 
the satisfaction of the needs and wants of others. Such a business would not be a legitimate entity 
worthy of public recognition and special tax treatment.  
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 This means that the property of the deceased is valued as if it were realized—sold—at the time of 
death. Andrews, 'A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax',   at 1147. 
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 It is therefore similar to the accessions tax described in section 7.2. 
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 Some heirs may claim that their plans have been affected by the taxation of their inheritance 
income, on which they had designs. However, this would be an invalid claim, since the legitimate 
plans we take seriously would have to be made after the imposition of taxation based upon 
hypothetical insurance. 
793
 Those who would therefore worry about the economic disadvantages of transferring economic 
power to the control of a national sovereign wealth fund in the case of income-based taxes would 
therefore have less to worry about on this acquired-income approach in comparison to the 
accretion-income approach. My claim above is that while the business-builder may be better than 
the sovereign wealth fund at understanding and managing their business, the professional sovereign 
wealth fund is likely to be better than the heirs of a success business-builder. After all, the wealth 
fund could appoint the heir if they have a good claim to run the company. 
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What differentiates the acquired-income from the accretion-income approach is that 
gains are only taxed when they are acquired in a financial form—or take the form of a 
newly acquired item of property—by their recipient. I refer to it as an “income-based” 
approach because gains on savings and property are taxed upon death or divestment. 
However, it will be important to clarify some further differences between the hybrid 
acquisition-income approach and the accretion-income approach.  
It is generally assumed that the accretion-income approach would require the taxation 
of imputed income on the rental income of owned items such as houses,794 and also on 
human capital.795 The acquired-income proposal, however, would ignore these. If 
imputed rent were included in the tax-base, then hypothetical insurers would fear that 
they would be unable to afford the tax on the rental value of items that have become 
more valuable while still part of their plans. Including human capital in taxation would 
be unattractive to insurers as it would compel those with valuable skills or talents to 
use them.796 
One possible reason to explain the attractiveness of the consumption approach to 
those interested in tax-bases is because of its better treatment of gains over time than 
the accretion-income approach. However, as Vickrey realized, many of the 
disadvantages of progressive income taxation could be mitigated by averaging. I will 
therefore discuss the idea of calculating tax on a lifetime basis in the following section. 
For now, it is useful to make clear that—whether using lifetime averaging or annual tax 
calculations—it will be necessary to account for the difference in changes in the value 
of money over time.797 This is an issue where multi-year investments are concerned, as 
well as when taxing on a multi-year basis (as I will discuss in the following section). If 
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 William F. Hellmuth, 'Homeowner Preferences', in Joseph A. Pechman (ed.), Comprehensive 
Income Taxation (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1977), 163-201. 
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 Andrews, 'A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax',   at 1145-6. Though this is not 
assumed by Goode when presenting a S-H-S type tax, Goode, 'The Economic Definition of Income',  
at 12-3. 
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 In other words, it would take a similar form to an endowment or capacity tax. 
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 This is less of a problem for the accretion approach as it would revalue each item each year. 
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inflation were ignored, savers would face an additional cost when saving or purchasing 
an asset for the future, and so insurers would want to ensure that taxation focused on 
real windfall gains rather than “paper-value” gains that do not represent any 
improvement in relative material wealth.798 
When explaining that gifts would count as income under the acquired-income base I 
mentioned that there would be an exemption. I propose that hypothetical insurers 
would choose to exempt low-value items of property from taxation for practical 
reasons. Many people give each other gifts as a token of affection and these gifts do 
not substantially affect the relative material wealth of members of society. It would be 
very difficult to keep track of so many small items, and they will often cancel each 
other out—as in the case of taking it in turns to buy rounds of beer.799 However, in 
order to ensure that this exemption was not used as a route to the transfer of 
substantial amounts of wealth in a tax-exempt fashion, it would be necessary to impose 
an annual limit on the estimated net total of such gifts between two people.800  
Another issue that I have mentioned is that of deductions for losses on investments. 
Both the accretion-income and consumption tax-bases would allow tax deductions for 
investment losses. 801 As with accretion-income, a decision would need to be made 
regarding whether to allow losses to be deducted. The downside of allowing such 
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 Some writers, such as Andrews, 'A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax',   at 
1143-5. appear to think that inflation represents a problem for lifetime and income-based taxation 
as it is impossible to get a perfectly accurate of the rate of inflation that is fair to all. However, I do 
not see that it is necessary to determine a perfect inflation rate. Rather, we should consider whether 
it is necessary to take account of inflation, and if we accept that it is then it is legitimate to apply the 
best and fairest calculation available from quasi-independent government statistical departments 
(the “Office of National Statistics” in the UK). 
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 Or whatever drink they prefer. 
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 Or, perhaps more accurately, two “taxable entities,” as it may be possible for couples to merge 
their tax accounts. I would suggest that this should be allowed, but there is no room to argue for this 
here, except to say that if two people merge their property, assets, and decision-making then it 
seems that hypothetical insurers would want to judge their fortune as a unit rather than separately. 
801
 This rule would have to be made explicit and applied directly in the case of the accretion-income 
approach, though it would appear the default choice since the loss would cause a drop in wealth for 
the investor in the period in question. On the consumption tax the deduction would be applied “in 
effect,” since the invested income would have been excluded from taxation and since it is then lost it 
would never be available for consumption and hence taxed. 
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deductions is that it will reduce future tax revenues from investment returns, which 
could be used for the unfortunate. An additional worry is that it may discourage careful 
investment.802 However, the argument for allowing deductions is that it would skew 
investment decisions back towards more speculative investments that are considered 
risky by others. This would be useful in order to encourage innovations that would 
improve economic efficiency and productivity. I therefore propose to allow deductions, 
but to a limited extent, by allowing deductions only from future investment returns, 
rather than present or past income. This means that someone with a riskier investment 
profile could be in the same tax position as someone who makes more cautious 
conservative investments, encouraging a good blend of investment strategies rather 
than encouraging one type or the other.803  
I have now presented the basic features of the acquired-income tax-base. It is designed 
to tax the gains to each individual in such a way that it will distinguish the fortunate 
from the less fortunate, making it preferable to the consumption tax approach. The 
acquired-income base also avoids the problems of the accretion-income approach. 
These are that it makes it harder for people to live in accordance with their plans, and 
that it would require the annual valuation of all items of property. Both problems are 
solved by ignoring all gains until they are realized. At the point of realization it becomes 
clear what the overall gain is on the property, and taxing that gain will not affect the 
plans of the owner, since the item is clearly no longer part of their plans.  
7.7 Tax-rates and lifetime averaging  
I have assumed since chapter five that hypothetical insurers would choose to have 
progressive tax-rates.804 Indeed, it is on this basis that they would find the acquired 
                                                        
802
 Another worry is that it may encourage people to take out loans in order to speculate. If this were 
the case, then perhaps there would need to be restrictions on the investment exposure to which 
one person can expose themselves (and therefore their society) to. 
803
 Furthermore, such deductions should only be allowed on specified types of investments, which 
would have to be approved as true investments rather than tax avoidance scams. 
804
 Sections 5.1 and 5.8.  
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income tax-base the most attractive. I will now discuss tax-rates in more detail, though 
I will not specify exact levels since these will depend upon the empirical details of a 
particular society. However, I will indicate the limits on progressivity, and in the 
following section I will present the sorts of tax-rate graphs that insurers will find 
attractive. However, before presenting the graphs, I will explain that there are some 
further qualitative issues of tax calculation to consider. The first is the taxable period 
over which to apply the tax-rates. Currently, taxes are either calculated on a particular 
event—such as stamp duty or estate taxation—or have a horizon of a year—such as 
income taxation. In the latter case, once the horizon is reached the tax-base is reset to 
zero for the new period. In this section I will explain the advantages of expanding the 
horizon to a lifetime by utilising averaging. In the following section I will explain the 
further advantages of hourly-averaging.  
I have said that taxes should be progressive,805 and explained in section 5.7 that it is 
self-defeating for effective marginal and participatory tax-rates to reach 100%. This is 
the extreme limit on tax progressivity, but insurers would consider whether 80% or 
90% tax-rates would also have such damaging effects on incentives—and thereby 
economic activity and growth—as to make them unattractive. Furthermore, insurers 
would worry that some products would be rendered extremely expensive—or 
unavailable—due the high tax-rates on their producers. Insurers would worry that they 
may be potential producers who would not be able to undertake the work due to 
reduced demand, or they may be potential consumers who are unable to obtain their 
preferred product. This would interfere with their ability to carry out their plans. In this 
section and 7.8 I will present methods of tax-rate calculation that enable higher tax-
rates without creating these disincentives.  
                                                        
805
 For the precise definition of progressive taxation see footnote 14. 
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I described lifetime averaging in section 6.2, mentioning that that its attractiveness has 
long been recognised.806 Modern technology makes such averaging much simpler now 
than it would have been previously, and I provide a mathematical exposition of 
averaging calculations in the appendix.807 For now I will explain the advantages of 
lifetime averaging, through use of the examples of windfall-recipients and different 
career-paths. Those receiving windfalls may do so evenly over the course of their lives, 
but most windfall-recipients receive a few large windfalls at various points in their 
lives—for example when a relative dies. It is much more common for workers to 
receive a steady income over their lives, though this is by no means universal. Some 
jobs—such as doctors of medicine—require years of unpaid or low-paid training, 
followed by a relatively highly-paid career. Other people have careers whereby they 
start at a relatively low position in their field or company and work their way into 
specialist or high-responsibility positions. Self-employed workers are also more likely to 
have variable incomes; they often have to build up their reputations within their field, 
and sometimes have to spend a lot of time creating their product—for example artists 
or musicians—or updating their skills through re-training—for example technology 
consultants.808 Another example is that of time-limited careers, such as professional 
sportspeople who can earn large sums in their twenties and thirties, but then retire 
with uncertain prospects.  
                                                        
806
 Multiple-year ‘moving average’ taxes were introduced in Wisconsin and Australia in the 1920s 
and 30s, and as part of US federal income tax from the 1960s to 80s; Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive 
Taxation  at 105-6, Vickrey, Public Economics: Selected Papers by William Vickrey  at 169-72. The US 
federal system is from the Internal Revenue Code §§ 1301-1305 (1964), and discussed in 
Schmalbeck, 'Income Averaging after Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity'. 
807
 The appendix describes averaging using hour-credits, a system I described in section 6.2 and will 
discuss again in section 7.8. However, it is possible to use the equation to calculate time-based 
averaging by replacing hour-credits with “years of adulthood” (or months or weeks).  
808
 Though I note that many such self-employed workers have scope to smooth out their income 
such that it is received in less variable portions. Artists and musicians can receive “advance 
payment” from publishers. Those who have companies can use their company status to defer 
payments from their company accounts to themselves in order to pay for fallow and re-training 
periods. 
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As I pointed out in section 5.1, Dworkin proposed averaging for accessions—or 
windfall—taxation.809 This is attractive because it allows us to distinguish between 
those who have higher lifetime cumulative windfalls from those with larger but 
infrequent windfalls which do not add to as much. Indeed, without averaging, insurers 
may choose to have much lower taxes on windfalls, in order to ensure that they are 
able to give and receive resources to others without facing the prospect of punitive 
taxation even on relatively low transfers. Furthermore, those who receive their 
windfalls in one large sum would fare much better under a lifetime-averaging system. 
The same advantages apply to workers. Where taxes are calculated on an annual basis, 
there is no way to distinguish those who have an unusually high income in a particular 
year from those who receive a high income more consistently in their working lives, 
which will better indicate good market fortune.810  
Annual tax calculations reflect the amount of time that the earth takes to go around 
the sun,811 but resource egalitarianism focuses on whole-lives and insurers will also 
take a lifetime perspective. Lifetime averaging also fits in better with the principle of 
abstraction which implies that people should be as free as possible; annual taxation 
would discriminate against those who wish to organise their lives very differently from 
one year to another812 in comparison to those who have a more consistent lifestyle.  
However, this does not create the problems highlighted for complete-life approaches 
to distributive justice. The problem with these views is that those with shorter lives813 
are treated either favourably or badly—and others therefore vice versa—by an 
                                                        
809
 See footnote 526, and surrounding text.  
810
 That is to say, the lifetime rates on the consistently fortunate can be higher without 
correspondingly increasing the tax-rates of all. In addition, the PTR and METR rates for those with 
temporary good fortune will be much lower when calculating on a lifetime average basis. 
811
 Annual taxation therefore makes more sense than half-yearly taxation, since it will average out 
any seasonal variations. 
812
 For example in spending one year working and earning a lot and then the following year at 
leisure. 
813
 For example because of an incurable terminal illness. 
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approach which compares people by their lifetime total.814 Those with shorter lives are 
treated favourably if they receive the same—total—allotment of resources over a 
shorter period, and they are treated badly if everyone receives an average amount of 
resources at each segment of time meaning that they receive less in total. The 
philosophical view here is total-life, but it does not imply that all individuals should 
receive exactly the same amount of “units” of something over their lives. Lifetime-
averaging is a policy which insurers would choose when taking a whole-life perspective. 
The policy allows people to take account of their expected lifespan both at the 
hypothetical insurance and real-life stage. It taxes or subsidises people on a time-
relative basis—taxing or subsidising for each time-period—and so shares attractive 
features with the averaging approach. However, it is still a total-life approach.815 
Lifetime averaging enables us to distinguish those with a consistently high windfalls or 
income—and therefore good fortune—from those with a temporarily high income—
who may not have such good fortune overall. It therefore more effectively 
distinguishes between the highly fortunate and those who are not so highly fortunate. 
This enables higher tax-rates on those with high average earnings, without fear of 
excessive impact upon those with temporarily high income or a one-off large 
                                                        
814
 McKerlie, 'Equality and Time',   at 476-7. This refers to the difference between the total and 
average view of complete-life egalitarianism. McKerlie compares three forms of time-sensitive 
egalitarianism; complete lives egalitarianism, simultaneous segments egalitarianism, and 
corresponding segments egalitarianism. Each of these potentially allows inequality of some form or 
another with regard to the other views. McKerlie argues that the simultaneous segments approach 
is superior, perhaps sharing this intuition with the social egalitarians discussed in footnote 302. 
I take a complete life approach, in the sense that the approach here does not rule-out 
inequalities of resources at a particular point in time or at corresponding segments of people’s lives, 
as long as these result from choices people make from a suitably equal position. However, this does 
not mean that the view imagines an equal amount of “units” of something which all people should 
obtain across their lives; this is the wrong way to consider equal opportunity costs. People can keep 
their resources for their whole lives or use them up, as they see fit. The examples that McKerlie gives 
against the complete lives approach do not apply, as any differences in people’s positions at a 
particular point in time or corresponding section in life arise due to different choices that the 
individuals from an equal position. If these inequalities were enforced upon people by a dictator or 
king, as appears to happen in the examples, then they would be unacceptable even if the 
inequalities evened themselves up over a lifetime. 
815
 Put another way, the numerator and denominator both rise over someone’s lifespan. 
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windfall.816 There are further advantages when moving from time-based to hour-credit-
based averaging.  
7.8 Tax-rates and hour-credits 
I have shown the greater tax-rate progressivity that lifetime averaging allows without 
affecting those who do not have consistently good market luck. I will now describe the 
further advantages of applying the hourly-averaging described in section 6.2 to all 
taxpayers. The cost of applying the same system to all taxpayers rather than those with 
low incomes will be relatively small, and so the attractiveness of applying the system to 
the fortunate and the less fortunate is cumulative.  
The advantages of utilising hour-credits to distinguish between the highly fortunate 
and those with average fortune are similar to those of utilising it to distinguish the least 
fortunate from those with temporarily low income. First, it more accurately determines 
the person’s level of fortune, and—secondly—it retains the incentives to labour. 
Regarding the first point, in addition to the advantages of lifetime-averaging 
highlighted in the previous section, the use of hourly-averaging also enables us to 
distinguish those who have obtained a high income from windfalls from those who 
have obtained a high income from work alone. As I said in section 5.8, it is attractive to 
apply a higher tax-rate on windfalls since this will create the fewest economic 
disincentives. Even more importantly, it further enables us to distinguish—and 
therefore tax at the highest rates—those who are fortunate in both respects under an 
acquired-income tax-base.  
The second advantage—economic incentives—occurs because of the substitution 
effects of hourly-averaging. High marginal tax-rates will reduce the incentives to work 
more hours, and perhaps incline high-earners to retire earlier.817 The role of hour-
                                                        
816
 Tax averaging also has the advantage that it smooths the taxpayer’s income out over time, as 
mentioned on page 232. 
817
 That is, high marginal tax-rates will encourage high-earners to reduce or withdraw their labour. 
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credits in hourly-averaging, however, is such that however high their tax-rate people 
always have a countervailing tax-incentive to work longer hours and to retire later. This 
is because hour-credits always create income for their recipient, and will also release 
past windfall income by reducing the tax-rate on it. As a result, insurers could support 
higher tax-rates on the most fortunate without the worry that this will cause them to 
withdraw their valuable labour.818  
Hourly-averaging enables the taxation of the highly able without their having the 
option of withdrawing their labour entirely. This also mitigates a further worry about 
high tax-rates. This is that those with greater ability will not use their abilities but will 
instead perform “regular” work, thus reducing the amount of highly valuable work 
performed in society. While my response to this worry is an empirical claim about 
which I have no conclusive evidence, I think that a substantial number of the more 
talented would still utilise their talents. The highly able will not have the option—at 
least any more than others—to avoid work, and so most will choose to use their 
abilities. After all, people work hard and in jobs that produce things that others value 
highly for reasons other than the high-net-pay, such as the desire for positions of 
power, to learn and exercise skills,819 to be considered by others or themselves to be 
successful, and to contribute to their locality, society, nation or humanity.820 
Furthermore, those with really high incomes usually obtain them because they are in 
“winner-take-all-markets,” and hence high taxation will fall on the rents they earn 
                                                        
818
 This point appears to be anticipated in Boadway et al., 'Optimal Redistribution with 
Heterogeneous Preferences for Leisure'. 
819
 This has been emphasized as an important aspect of human existence since Aristotle, The Ethics 
of Aristotle : The Nicomachean Ethics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976). 
820
 Some of these points are highlighted in Martin J. Jr. McMahon and Alice G. Abreu, 'Winner-Take-
All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation', Florida Tax Review, 4/1 (1998), 1-82 at 56, 65. 
This perhaps applies particularly to those who thrive in competitive environments, who may be most 
likely to occupy the highly paid positions. 
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rather than anything else.821 Earning hour-credits for ensuring that one receives one’s 
rents is not too arduous. 
Another worry is that the more able might be inclined to switch to jobs with more 
attractive non-pay attributes. As well as shifting low-paid workers into more attractive 
forms of work, hourly-averaging will have a similar effect for some highly-paid 
workers—such perhaps as those providing legal, financial and accountancy services.822 
In order to obtain the more able workers, it will be necessary to offer even larger gross 
remuneration, making the products and services produced by those in such jobs more 
expensive.823 Consumers of affected jobs will then have to go without their products or 
pay more for them. However, insurers would be willing to pay more as consumers for 
the more important of these products and services in exchange for better insurance 
coverage. In the most important cases, these services usually fall on institutions rather 
than individuals, meaning the costs are then shared amongst many customers.  
Despite these possible challenges, then, hourly-averaging should enable much higher 
tax-rates without the usual disincentives of such taxation. This enables tax-rates that 
reach the highest possible level; up to 99.99% on those who have an incredibly high 
hourly income. This is still attractive to insurers because those very few with such a 
high income will have received it through windfalls or on rents received.824 Taxing the 
                                                        
821
 See above, page 113-4, Frank and Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society : How More and More 
Americans Compete for Ever Fewer and Bigger Prizes, Encouraging Economic Waste, Income 
Inequality, and an Impoverished Cultural Life, McMahon and Abreu, 'Winner-Take-All Markets: 
Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation',   at 47. The latter highlight that the ‘winner take all market 
dramatically eliminates the equity/efficiency trade off.’  
822
 A popular response to this at present is that lawyers, financiers, and accountants are merely rent-
seekers whose attempts to earn money for themselves actively makes the society and economy 
worse-off. There is perhaps something in this, or at least the point that too great a proportion of the 
talented individuals in younger generations are devoting themselves to pursuits that add little to 
humanity. However, this may overstate the case for such taxation, since the greater financial 
efficiency that these efforts should in theory bring will be of (some) benefit to all. 
823
 This is the worry about the cost of negative tax-rates, see the example of Grant from page 126. 
824
 Those who have worked for extremely large fortunes—or potential fortunes where they have not 
cashed them in—have usually obtained those amounts by finding ways to obtain rents. Bill Gates, 
Warren Buffet, and Carlos Slim (the three richest men in the world in 2012) have been very 
successful at finding investments which will earn larger rents than others, with Gates having made 
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extremely fortunate at this level is attractive to insurers as it creates more resources 
for the less fortunate without impacting on those further down the fortune scale. 
I will not specify the particular rates that should be applied, since these depend on the 
particular facts of the society in question. However, I will specify some graphs of 
lifetime hourly tax-rate that would be attractive to hypothetical insurers for the 
reasons I have outlined.825 The constraints are that the tax-rate should always rise,826 
every income point must have one and only one tax-rate,827 and the graph should 
never be vertical nor reach 100%.828 Accordingly, all graphs rise up to a 99.99% rate 
which they should never exceed. Figures 7-1 and 7-2 are curved, while 7-3 and 7-4 have 
straighter lines. Figures 7-2 and 7-4 have a kink which may make them more attractive 
as they provide fewer disincentives for those with high ability to practice their abilities. 
My hunch is that the slightly more complicated graph in figure 7-5 would prove to be 
the most attractive.  
                                                                                                                                                            
his fortune through a monopolistic position in the computer software market. Taxing these 
individuals at a higher rate would not have had a significant effect on their productivity, though it 
should be noted that they would not have been taxed at the extremely high rates since I do not 
believe they have not yet “cashed-in” most of their investments and transferred them for their 
personal use. 
825
 I present these as graphs rather than stepped “bands” because the bands actually imply a graph 
anyway. In addition, it is highly advisable to have very smooth rate-changes, for reasons I explained 
on page 191. 
826
 That is, that the tax-rate is progressive throughout. 
827
 That is, the graph should never slope back over itself, which would create the impossible situation 
of two tax-rates applying to a particular income. This would also violate the following constraints. 
828
 These last two points ensure that the marginal rate on increasing income never reaches 100%. 
The graph, essentially, must always rise or be level as income increases. The gradient of the slope 
must be less than infinity (or less than 90 degrees from the horizontal line) and be positive or zero 
(or no less than 0 degrees). I express these constraints mathematically in the appendix. It is 
important to remember that marginal tax-rates do not work in the same way with hourly-averaging 
as with any other tax system. This is because the decision to work an additional hour will have 
reducing effect on the person’s lifetime tax-rate. With other systems the individual’s marginal tax-
rate simply applies on their next hour (or however long) worked, and so the headline rate is much 
more important. 
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Figure 7-1: Smooth curve (logarithmic graph) 
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Figure 7-3: Straight-line graph 
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Figure 7-2: Smooth graph with kink 
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Figure 7-4: Straight-line graph with kink 
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Net income must always rise with gross income, though the kink will cause a faster rise 
in the “kinked” region. These points are illustrated in figures 7-6 and 7-7.  
 
 
I emphasise that these graphs apply to the lifetime average gross-hourly-income, which 
smooths out income changes, meaning people will usually move very slowly along the 
graph over time.829 It is important to remember that marginal tax-rates do not work in 
the same way with hourly-averaging as with any other tax system. This is because the 
decision to work an additional hour will have a reducing effect on the person’s lifetime 
tax-rate. With other systems the individual’s marginal tax-rate simply applies on their 
next hour830 worked, and so the headline rate is much more important. 
I have specified what the most attractive tax and benefit policies for hypothetical 
insurers; progressive hourly-averaging of comprehensive acquired-income. I refer to 
this policy for simplicity as the CLIPH-rate tax.831 This should raise the required revenue 
without impacting on people’s abilities to live their lives, affecting the less fortunate, or 
having economically deleterious consequences. I have considered some potential 
                                                        
829
 Except those who receive a large windfall early in life, who may jump from one extreme of the 
graph to the other. 
830
 Or whatever unit of time they contract to. 
831
 Which stands for Comprehensive Lifetime Income Per-hour-rate.  
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challenges to this—that it would interfere with supplies of some products and that it 
would increase prices. I will consider some further possible challenges to this proposal 
before concluding.  
7.9 Challenges  
In this section I will consider two possible challenges to my proposal; that it enslaves 
the able and that it enslaves the leisure-lover. In sections 3.8-3.9 I rejected endowment 
taxation on the grounds that it enslaves the talented and it is important to be clear that 
the proposal here does not fall foul of this concern. While the CLIPH-rate tax enables 
much higher tax-rates on those with high ability and general good economic fortune it 
does not single them out for different treatment to anyone else; they are not forced to 
use their talents, and so they cannot envy the less talented. However, some may 
express a similar concern; that it forces the talented to the market.  
Those with good market luck would certainly be worse off under the CLIPH-rate tax 
than rival proposals; they would receive much less and would not therefore have the 
option to retire as early as under other schemes, for example. People may have to work 
longer first because of the role of hour-credits and hourly-averaging, and secondly 
because of the comprehensive acquired-income tax-base. These two elements combine 
in such a way that people cannot receive any of their good social fortune without 
obtaining hour-credits,832 and furthermore that the talented are forced to perform 
some labour which they would otherwise not be.  
Fortunately, there is no reason to be troubled by these points. While those with good 
social and market fortune would be worse-off with the CLIPH-rate tax than they would 
be under any other acceptable policy, this does not mean that they are unfairly treated. 
                                                        
832
 I should note that while those who wish to confer social advantages on others will be less able to 
do so when the recipient is young and has few hour-credits, such transfers would still have 
significant consequences for their recipient. They would receive a higher net income than they 
would have done for every single hour-credit that they earn for the rest of their lives. This is because 
their gross income will have risen, and any increase in gross income will also result in a larger net 
income, as I described in the case of Humphrey above—page 229-30. 
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The important point is that they are in the same position as the less fortunate in their 
society; to the extent that they are forced to market, so is everyone else.833 
Furthermore, the policies are obviously judged from the hypothetical position of 
equality where individuals do not know their fortune. What matters is that the policies 
are attractive to people in this position, not their attractiveness to those who know 
they are fortunate. This leads us to our second concern; that leisure-lovers would reject 
it.  
The primary answer to this challenge is that the vast majority of leisure-lovers would 
accept the policy as it offers them the chance for more leisure if they are unable to 
earn a large hourly amount, as I explained at the end of section 6.11. However, some 
leisure-lovers may not choose in this way. Some may be willing to take the risk that 
they will be fortunate, in which case they are the sub-minority which suffers from the 
averaging requirement as I discussed in section 6.11. Another group of leisure-lovers 
are those such as Grant from chapter three.834 These leisure-lovers are willing to do 
extremely unattractive jobs in order to obtain large amounts of leisure and income. 
Highly progressive hourly taxation will affect the fraction of the small minority who 
undertake such work for the sake of leisure.835 Such individuals would not prefer the 
                                                        
833
 In fact, people may not be forced to market by the CLIPH-rate tax, if certain possibilities exist. The 
first is that all citizens may receive a tax-exempt ‘stakeholder grant’ at the start of their adult life, 
which would enable them to live without working. Second, people could use this grant—or other 
money they have obtained through working—to purchase some land on which they could live a 
subsistence lifestyle. If they obtain all they need from their land and have no economic contact with 
others then they will have no need of hour-credits, at least as long as they are physically able. 
People only need to pay tax on items that they consume which they have acquired from outside 
their property. This lifestyle does not strike me as a particularly attractive choice, of course, and it is 
clear that no-one has any special talents that make life as a crofter or subsistence farmer particularly 
easy. However, I merely wish to point out that there would be options open to those who are 
desperate for whatever reason to opt out of the hour-credit system. 
834
 See page 126. 
835
 Some may do such work because they are perfectly happy to accept the conditions that others 
find unacceptable, in which case they are merely fortunate to be able to earn a kind of rent on a 
“talent” for working in such conditions. Others may of course choose such work due to their 
preferences, for example because it shows off their machismo or bravery, or because they enjoy 
challenges or facing danger. 
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system; they are unlikely to desire the improved conditions for the low-waged provided 
by the hourly-subsidy.836  
One way around this problem might be to propose that some designated jobs should 
be considered to be special cases for which compensatory hour-credits would be 
awarded, perhaps to designate that a certain amount of “recovery time” is necessary 
for those undertaking such work. These additional hour-credits could be applied to jobs 
which meet an important social and economic need, and which would go unfilled 
without special compensation.837 This could even be limited to jobs which do not 
require rare and valuable talents838 in order to ensure that those with unusual abilities 
are not able to claim this form of compensation when it is unnecessary. However, while 
this may be a good policy, and greatly mitigate the potential complaints of workers and 
consumers, it is not an entirely satisfactory response.  
The more principled response to this case is to accept—as in a previous case—that 
some people would prefer other policies due to their highly unusual taste for a large 
amount of work and leisure at any cost, or for consumption items which require highly 
unpopular work.839 However, these people would fall in a minority within a minority 
and would not form a substantial enough group to tip the scales in favour of other 
policies when applying the averaging procedure described in section 4.8. They would 
not be able to reject the averaging procedure, since it is more effective than the 
alternative of attempting to determine and react to the risk-preferences of all 
members of society.  
                                                        
836
 Though of course some might, since low-paid jobs would have a larger net hourly income under 
the CLIPH-rate tax. 
837
 This would therefore reduce the additional costs to those who wish to utilise the goods or 
services provided by those undertaking such work. This would further answer the concerns raised in 
the previous section regarding the costs to consumers of highly progressive hourly taxation. 
838
 I suggested on page 126 that deep-sea diving may be one such example, if there are even any 
such jobs. 
839
 These are items which differ from the institutional services described in the previous section, the 
costs of which can be shared out between numerous customers if they are worth paying at all. 
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7.10 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have discussed the two important aspects of taxation policy; the tax-
base and the tax-rate. Regarding the former, I argued that a comprehensive acquired-
income tax-base would be the most attractive to hypothetical insurers. Insurers would 
reject endowment, wealth, and wealth-transfer tax-bases as these tax-bases may affect 
their ability to carry out their plans. Insurers would prefer comprehensive taxation to 
broad-based taxation as it is able to distinguish the multiply fortunate from the singly 
fortunate, and also to prevent people from using one form of fortune to reduce their 
taxation on other forms. I argued that comprehensive income taxes are more 
progressive than consumption taxes, but that the traditional accretion conception of 
income shares some of the problems which led us to reject endowment and wealth 
taxation. I therefore proposed a form of comprehensive income taxation which shares 
some features with a consumption base, which I call acquired income. This tax-base 
taxes recipients of income only on the realized gains that taxpayers make on their 
property, and would allow them to effectively offset losses against future gains. This 
enables insurers to choose the tax-base that will allow the most progressive form of 
taxation without interfering with their life-plan formation and enactment.  
The second issue discussed was the tax-rate. I have argued that the form of tax 
calculation I advocated in sections 6.2 and 6.3 for the benefit of low-earners should be 
applied to all taxpayers. This is to calculate taxation based upon the lifetime average 
hourly income of each individual, with highly progressive tax-rates applied. This allows 
the application of high tax-rates on those who are consistently fortunate without 
creating the disincentives to work engendered by the same high tax-rates under any 
other policy. Insurers would choose such a system as it provides sufficient resources to 
fund redistribution to low-earners without causing problems that would affect those 
without great fortune; increased consumption prices or damage to the economy. The 
preferred policies together would also put a heavy break on the accumulated 
advantages that create the most severe forms of positional inequality.  
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Finally, I considered some possible challenges to my conclusions. I have argued that the 
policy is justifiable to all members of society either because it is the policy that they 
would choose from a position of ex ante equality, or because their choice would not be 
possible due to the averaging requirements.840 The policy is thus justified to leisure-
lovers and those with unusual insurance tastes.841  
  
                                                        
840
 That is, their unusual tastes are such that they cannot be accommodated into the hypothetical 
insurance scheme in a way that they themselves would find acceptable, but the broader agreement 
about these issues and the need to apply a universal policy overrules their preference. 
841
 An additional problem, not considered here, is that I have been overly optimistic about the costs 
of hourly-averaging and the acquired-income tax-base. I have assumed away this problem on the 
basis that technological advances make such policies less expensive to administer and onerous on 
taxpayers. If these assumptions were shown to be overly optimistic then the case for the policies 
would be weakened. One or more elements would have to be altered, with the consequence that 
taxation could not be as progressive. This in turn would doubly threaten the viability of hourly 
averaging for the benefit of low-earners. Something closer to Dworkin’s more limited proposals may 
then be all that could reasonably be supported by hypothetical insurers. 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that those who share my desire for a tax and benefit system that shows 
equal concern for all members of society, does not make any perfectionist claims, and 
holds people responsible for their own lives will find the CLIPH-rate tax—along with a 
guaranteed work programme for those otherwise unemployed—the most attractive 
system.842 This policy utilises lifetime hourly averaging in order to calculate the 
negative or positive tax-rates that each individual should pay. It applies highly 
progressive tax-rates which effectively start at negative infinity and rise to 99.99% on 
all forms of acquisition excepting small non-financial gifts and any universal stakeholder 
grant. The CLIPH-rate tax enables high taxation on good fortune and good support for 
the less fortune in a way that avoids the usual economic problems with such attempts; 
that people will substitute leisure for income.  
In order to reach this conclusion I defended resource egalitarianism and a particular—
holistic—application of it. In chapter one I explained how resource egalitarianism is an 
attractive instantiation of the starting assumptions as it attempts to construct property 
entitlements that treat all as equals and are therefore justifiable to all. It achieves this 
through the ideas of envy-freeness and equal opportunity costs. In chapter two I 
                                                        
842
 I will note that the policy would also be highly attractive for those who support many alternative 
political philosophies, particularly if we assume that it will not be possible in practice for the 
government to know the market talent of its citizens. The CLIPH-rate tax seems to follow from 
prioritarianism (footnote 9), as an attempt to mimic a talent-equal job market (3.5), or a non-ideal 
version of White’s Egalitarian Subsidy Scheme (3.10, see also White, The Civic Minimum  at 86-94. It 
might also be considered a reasonable social egalitarian policy along the lines of Rawls’ difference 
principle regarding primary goods and principle of equal opportunity (section 1.5, footnote 302), as a 
proxy for equality of welfare (sections 2.1-2.5), as a means to greater equality of capability (section 
2.7), and desert-based views (see footnotes 482-484). I think it would also be a reasonable utilitarian 
policy, assuming that there is no way to determine “utility monsters” (described in Nozick, Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia  at 41.  
The policies presented here are generally incompatible with self-ownership-based 
entitlement theories such as libertarianism (described in footnote 11) and left-libertarianism (a 
variant of libertarianism which allows self-ownership but communal world-ownership, see Hillel 
Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without 
Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003). However, some self-ownership-based views may be 
compatible with my proposals, for example, see John Philip Christman, The Myth of Property : 
Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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presented two alternative metrics that claim to offer something that resources do not. 
With regard to welfare, I showed that welfarist approaches violate the responsibility 
assumption, and that those approaches which do not will violate the continuity test; 
that people can only claim to be disadvantaged if they simultaneously reject the basis 
of their claim. The second alternative metric was capabilities. These are not readily 
amenable to egalitarianism, since people will value capabilities differently, and hence 
will tend to require a perfectionist starting point or violate the capability test. I 
considered Sen’s case for a capability metric and showed that he does not offer a viable 
approach to justice.  
In the next part of the thesis I considered responses to differential market luck. In 
chapter three I considered ex post approaches that attempt to equalise outcomes in 
some fashion. I rejected the first two radical proposals impose costs on the unfortunate 
which many of them would not be willing to pay. I then considered proposals to mimic 
a talent-equal market, agreeing with Dworkin that it is impossible to achieve. The 
second half of chapter three was concerned with various forms of work-forcing. I 
argued that these proposals can cause the talented to envy the less talented. Chapter 
four focused on Dworkin’s ex ante—hypothetical insurance—response to bad market 
luck. I explained this proposal and why it is attractive. I then countered various 
arguments against it; that it is inegalitarian, that it is less attractive than ex post envy 
freeness, that it would require personalised tax-rates, and that it would mimic equality 
of welfare.  
In chapter five I discussed the best interpretation of the hypothetical insurance 
approach, and argued for a holistic and dynamic approach whereby all relevant issues 
are considered simultaneously. This contrasts with Dworkin’s assumption that the 
insurance should be hypothecated. I also challenged Dworkin’s apparent oversight with 
regard to policies that would improve the position of low-earners. I answered possible 
worries about my approach—about its applicability to qualitative policy issues and 
complexity—and in doing so further specified how to apply the approach. I then 
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clarified what can be included within the scope of hypothetical insurance. In the final 
sections of chapter five I explained the issues that insurers would need to take account 
of in their deliberations; the incidence of tax and benefit policies, the importance of 
forming and carrying out plans, the economic effects of policies, and the classifications 
of fellow insurers that would be useful.  
Chapter six presented a negative hourly-averaging tax system as the most effective 
means to assist those with bad market luck, alongside a well-funded guaranteed work 
programme. I argued that these policies, while expensive, would be attractive to 
insurers because they do not create costs for the worst-off. I argued that insurers 
would insist upon a work-requirement, but might allow hour-credits for carers and 
those in education or training. The prominent alternative policies increase costs by 
increasing prices and having negative economic effects (minimum wage and basic 
income), or by failing effectively to help all low-earners (alternative wage subsidy 
policies).  
In chapter seven I considered taxation policies in detail. I began with the tax-base, and 
rejected several possible tax-bases in favour of comprehensive taxation that would 
best distinguish how fortunate taxpayers are. I argued that an acquired-income tax-
base would be the most attractive to insurers as it allows progressivity while enabling 
taxpayers to make and carry out plans with substantial certainty. I then turned to the 
calculation of taxation. I argued that lifetime hourly-averaging is the most attractive 
form of tax calculation. This is because it best distinguishes the level of fortune of each 
individual, allowing highly progressive tax-rates on the fortunate without affecting the 
less fortunate or producing troubling economic disincentives. I ended by rejecting some 
possible challenges to the proposals; that the policies would enslave the talented or 
leisure-lovers. Indeed, leisure is one area which this thesis has considered at greater 
length than most works, emphasising both the advantages to those who convert talent 
into leisure (section 3.2) and the need for policies to take account of the responses of 
leisure-lovers (5.8, 6.6-6.7, 7.8).  
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Appendix: Equations 
I will now express the lifetime hourly averaging scheme tax calculations described in 
sections 6.2, 7.7 and 7.8 in the form of equations and identities. This will be helpful to 
those who are mathematically inclined. I use the following symbols: 
c = hour-credits  
g = gross lifetime income 
h = gross hourly average income 
n = net lifetime income 
  = net hourly average income 
  = past net income received  
  = current net income due 
t = lifetime tax liability 
  = hourly average tax  
  = past tax paid 
  = current tax liability 
r = Tax-rate, which is expressed decimally. This would have a range of -∞ to ∞, with 
zero representing no tax and ‘one’ indicating a one hundred percent tax-rate (though 
this is never reached or exceeded, as shown in the restrictions below).  
I will begin by presenting the stages of the present or current tax liability calculation, 
namely the tax which our taxpayer owes. This is calculated with the hour-credits and 
gross income of the taxpayer in question, along with the present tax-rates.  
Step 1: Calculate gross hourly average income  
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Step 2: Apply the tax-rate (r) to gross average income to calculate the taxpayer’s hourly 
tax level (σ) 
      
Step 3: Re-multiply by hour-credits to get total lifetime tax 
      
Step 4: Deduct past lifetime tax payments ( ) to get present tax liability 
       
It is possible to calculate net income due to the individual from h calculated in step 1 
above.  
Step 2*: Apply the tax-rate to this average to calculate net hourly income 
   (   )    
Step 3*: Re-multiply by hour-credits to get net lifetime income 
      
Step 4*: Deduct past lifetime income received ( ) to get current net income due 
      
Remember that gross income equals tax plus net income 
      
This means that from it is possible to cross between one approach at the other at step 
3 or 3*.  
From step 3 it is possible to reach step 4* 
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From 3* it is possible to calculate 4 
        
That explains the calculation of current liability. I will now present the lifetime 
equations. The expression for lifetime tax is 
  [(
 
 
)  ]       
The expression of lifetime net income is  
  (
 
 
)  (   )      
The current-liability equations can be expressed as follows. 
  [(
 
 
) (   )]     
  [(
 
 
)  ]     
This is subject to the following constraints, the reasoning behind which is found in 
section 7.8:  
A higher hourly average ( ) will result in a higher tax-rate (r).  
  
  
   
An increase in gross income (g) must also always result in an increase in current net 
income due ( ), which limits the progressivity of the tax. Put differently, the tax-rate 
will never reach 100%. 
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